Development and destabilization. The selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia. by Gagliardone, Iginio
t h e  L o n d o n  S c h o o l  
o f  E c o n o m i c s  a n d  
P o l i t i c a l  Sc ience ■
D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  D e s t a b il iz a t io n
The S e le c t iv e  A d o p tio n  o f  ICTs
in Et h io p ia
Ig in io  G a g l i a r d o n e
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  M e d ia  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n s
A thesis submitted to the London School of Economics 
and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy
July 2010
UMI Number: U615B27
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615B27
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
1HB3K
«*MNUrwf*glPiMM
D e c la r a tio n
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work 
other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which 
case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is 
clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be 
reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party.
2
A b s tr a c t
This thesis questions and examines the role Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICTs) are playing in the political transitions of developing countries. 
While there is much discussion about the contribution of ICTs in promoting 
economic growth and supporting the democratisation process, there is less 
understanding of the ways in which ICTs are often re-interpreted, re-defined and re­
shaped to fit political and cultural contexts that are substantially different from those 
of their origin.
Focusing on the case of Ethiopia, I analyze one of these processes of selective 
adoption, examining which components of ICTs have been endorsed and proactively 
promoted by the government of Ethiopia, which have been constrained or inhibited, 
and for what reasons. I build on a conceptual framework that combines critical 
insights from different forms of constructivism, especially as they have emerged in 
international relations and in the history of technology tradition. I offer a new 
approach that reframes ICTs from consensual objects with an agreed set of 
characteristics and possible effects to nodes surrounded by conflict, which can be 
appropriated or resisted by different actors to pursue potentially competing goals.
This thesis draws on extensive fieldwork and employs a variety of methods that 
have allowed me to analyse both the discursive and the material elements intervening 
in the adoption and adaptation of ICTs in Ethiopia. The research progressed through 
an iterative comparison between conceptualizations emerging from interviews with 
individuals who shaped the path of ICTs in the country, as well as from other textual 
material, and observations of how the technical artefacts were actually implemented. 
This process made it possible to understand how the complex nation building project 
pursued by the government of Ethiopia motivated the development of two large scale 
ICT projects, known as Woredanet and Schoolnet, and led to the marginalization of 
alternative uses of ICTs promoted by other components of society, such as the 
private sector, Ethiopians in the diaspora and international organizations.
3
A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s
The years I have spent on my PhD project have been engaging and have shaped me 
in profound ways. I am grateful to many people for this.
Over the years, my supervisor, Robin Mansell, offered invaluable advice and 
passion, and has helped me to become the researcher I wanted to be. She taught me 
about commitment, thoroughness and responsibility. While she let me find my own 
way, she also showed me that it is by engaging with different traditions that we can 
build stronger arguments and reach beyond our limitations. I am sure that her advice 
will continue to shape my research and work for the rest of my career. The Media 
Department at the LSE has also represented an invaluable opportunity to engage with 
faculty and students driven by enthusiasm and curiosity and I am grateful for having 
had the opportunity to be a part of this community.
I am deeply thankful to the organizations and institutions that supported my efforts. 
The Rotary Foundation, awarded me one of its generous Ambassadorial Scholarships 
which was made possible through the support of the Rotary Club of Alessandria 
which supported my candidacy and believed in the potential of my research and 
work. I am also grateful to the LSE post-graduate fund and the University of Milan, 
particularly Professor Maria Luisa Betri.
I am grateful to the colleagues and friends through whom I have learned the 
importance of research and the value of diversity. Monroe Price and the other 
colleagues at the Stanhope Centre offered me unique opportunities to develop my 
research and engage in larger projects in Africa and elsewhere. I am deeply 
appreciative of all of the opportunities that working with Stanhope has offered and I 
look forward to future work together.
It was always a pleasure to share the experiences I had in Africa and beyond with 
John and Carolyn Stremlau. And I appreciated receiving their precious 
encouragement and advice. I also am deeply indebted to the many people in Ethiopia 
who offered their time and accepted to share their views with me, challenging 
preconceived ideas and contributing to build new ways to understand the country 
where I lived for more than two years.
I want to thank my parents, who have always been with me, and whose lives and 
affection remind me how fortunate a person I am. And my family at large, who 
taught me the importance of roots and memories, and how we can grow stronger 
even as we move away from home.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to Nicole, my dearest companion, with 
whom almost every moment of this adventure has been shared, and who made me the 
person I am today. She was my inspiration, challenging me when I seemed too 
confident, and being there for me when I was too doubtful. I look forward to the rest 
of the journey together.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
DEVELOPMENT AND DESTABILIZATION 1
THE SELECTIVE ADOPTION OF ICTS IN ETHIOPIA 1
IGINIO GAGLIARDONE 1
DECLARATION 2
ABSTRACT 3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
LIST OF FIGURES 8
ACRONYMS 8
CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION 11
1.1 Technology and its potential 15
1.2 Technology and its application in Ethiopia 19
1.3 An overview 24
1.4 Conclusion 27
CHAPTER 2 -  CONSTRUCTING NEW TOOLS TO UNDERSTAND THE 
ADOPTION OF ICTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28
2.1 Technology as a modernizing, democratizing and globalizing force 28
2.2 Contesting technology 37
2.3 Technologies and politics in context: lessons from the history of technology 44
2.4 Locating ICTs in an international perspective 53
2.5 O ther possible paths 59
5
2.6 A conceptual framework to study technology and politics in context
2.6 Conclusion
61
67
CHAPTER 3 -  RESEARCHING TECHNOLOGY IN CONTEXT 69
3.1 Strategies for research: case study and grounded theory 69
3.1.1 Case study research 73
3.1.2 Using grounded theory for the study of technical artefacts 76
3.2 Methods for data collection 79
3.2.1 Interviews: building trust and eliciting narratives 80
3.2.2 Observation of technical artefacts 85
3.2.3 Other data and triangulation 88
3.4 Data analysis and presentation 92
3.5 Conclusion 96
CHAPTER 4 -  COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND 
LOCAL DISCOURSES ON ICTS 98
4.1 Bringing ICTs to Ethiopia: the role of international actors 98
4.1.1 The UNECA and the politics of the apolitical 99
4.1.2 Discourses in context 102
4.2 Re-interpreting ICTs: the government response 106
4.2.1 Modernization, globalization and democratization in the Ethiopian context 109
4.2.2 The Ethiopian government’s response to the AISI’s discourses 118
4.3 The marginalization of non-state actors in the development of an approach to ICTs 121
4.3.1 International alignments: importing new solutions to old problems 122
4.3.2 Disillusionment and disengagement 125
4.3.3 The response of the diaspora: failing to engage and waving conflict 127
4.4 Conclusion 128
CHAPTER 5 -  A QUEST FOR HEGEMONY: THE USE OF ICTS IN 
SUPPORT OF THE ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL PROJECT 130
5.1 Ethnic federalism as the core discourse of the nation-state 131
5.1.1 Ethnic federalism, and its discontents 134
5.1.2 Ethnic federalism in practice: building the state to build the nation 140
5.1.3 A contradictory project: controlled decentralization 145
5.2 A populist discourse of social integration 148
5.2.1 Including the poor 151
5.2.2 Excluding the elites 153
5.3 An empiricist discourse of communication 154
5.3.1 Showing by doing 155
5.3.2 Internal communication 158
5.3.3 Refusal to engage 160
5.4 Conclusion 162
6
CHAPTER 6 -  THE NATIONAL TECHNOPOLITICAL REGIME 163
6.1 Fluctuations and turning points: moving towards a new technopolitical regime 165
6.2 Technopolitics in action: embedding the key discourses into artefacts 171
6.2.1 An ethno-technical federation tied to the centre 176
6.2.2 Shaping society thorough the use of technology 182
6.2.3 Internet or intranet? 191
6.3 Conclusion 193
CHAPTER 7 -  RESISTING ALTERNATIVE TECHNOPOLITICAL REGIMES 
195
7.1 The international technopolitical regime: fighting international politics through
technology 196
7.2 The privatised technopolitical regime: marginal nodes in a state-dominated information
economy 203
7.3 The oppositional technopolitical regime: attacking the state from beyond its borders 209
7.3.1 The free flow of contestation: connecting different media to disseminate oppositional
voices 210
7.3.2 Attacking and defending the national narrative 216
7.4 Conclusion 224
CHAPTER 8 -  ANALYSIS: THE RE-INTERPRETATION, RE-DEFINITION 
AND RE-SHAPING OF ICTS IN ETHIOPIA 226
8.1 Conflict is the starting point 226
8.2 Technology is both material and discursive 231
8.3 Discourses do not spread by themselves and require agency to diffuse and be
implemented 237
8.4 Technopolitical regimes are where the negotiations occur 241
8.5 Conclusion 245
CHAPTER 9 -  CONCLUSION 247
9.1 Broader implications 250
9.2 Theoretical and methodological contributions 253
9.3 Beyond Ethiopia 262
APPENDIX: EXAMPLE OF TOPIC GUIDE 264
BIBLIOGRAPHY 266
7
L is t  o f  F ig u r e s
Fig. 1.1 The Woredanet equipment 
Fig. 1.2 The Schoolnet equipment 
Fig. 3.1 “7 Days Update” cover 
Fig. 3.2 “Press Digest” cover 
Fig. 3.3 The coding of the first interview 
Fig. 3.4 The integration of codes into discourses 
Fig. 6.1 The Woredanet Architecture
Fig. 6.2 A room dedicated to Woredanet’s videoconferencing 
Fig. 6.3 A teacher and students in front of a VSAT terminal 
Fig. 6.4 ETC advertisement 
Fig. 7.1 The Ethiomedia website blocked 
Fig. 7.2 The Kinjit website blocked -  The website of the main 
Fig. 7.3 The Ethiopian Review website blocked
A c r o n y m s
AAU -  Addis Ababa University 
ADF -  African Development Forum 
ADSL -  Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line 
AISI -  African Information Society Initiative 
ANDM -  Amhara National Democratic Movement 
ANT -  Actor-Network Theory 
APDO -  Afar People’s Democratic Organization 
AVI -  Audio Video Interleave 
BBS -  Bulletin Board Systems 
BCX -  Business Connexion 
BGPDUF -  Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front 
BITE -  Bringing Internet to Ethiopia 
BoD -  Broadband on Demand 
BPR -  Business Process Re-engineering 
CEA -  Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique 
CPJ -  Committee to Protect Journalists 
DOT Force -  Digital Opportunity Task Force 
DW -  Deutsche Welle 
EBA -  Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority
21
22
90
91
94
95 
172 
175
183
184
214
opposition group 214
215
8
ECA -SeeU N ECA
ECSC -  Ethiopian Civil Service College
EDF -  Electricite de France
EFFORT -  Endowment Fund For The Rehabilitation of Tigray 
EFOSSNET -  Ethiopian Free and Open Source Software Network 
EICTDA -  Ethiopian ICT Development Agency
EITPA -  Ethiopian IT Professional Association EMA Educational Media Agency
ENA -  Ethiopian News Agency
EPDM -  Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement
EPLF -  Eritrean People Liberation Front
EPRDF -  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP -  Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party
ETC -  Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation
ETV -  Ethiopian Television
FAO -  Food and Agriculture Organisation
GATT -  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEQUIP -  General Education Quality Improvement Program Project
GIIC -  Global Information Infrastructure Commission
GPDF -  Gambella People’s Democratic Front
GDP -  Gross Domestic Product
GDLN -  Global Development Learning Network
GSTIT -  Graduate College of Telecommunication and Information Technology
HNL -  Harari National League
HNS -  Hughes Network Systems
ICT -  Information and Communication Technology
ICTAD -  ICT Assisted Development
IDRC -  International Development Research Centre
IFIP -  International Federation of Information Processing
ILO -  International Labour Organization
INGO -  International Non-Governmental Organizations
IP -  Internet Protocol
ISOC -  Internet Society
ISP -  Internet Service Provider
IT -  Information Technology
ITU -  International Telecommunication Union
LAN -  Local Area Network
LTS -  Large Technical System
Kbps -  Kilobyte per second
Mbps -  Megabyte per second
MCU -  Multipoint Control Unit
MEISON -  All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement
MLLT -  Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray
MXM -  Media Xchange Manager
NGO -  Non-Governmental Organization
NCBP -  National Capacity Building Programme
NICI -  National Information and Communication Infrastructure
NWICO -  New World Information and Communication Order
OECD -  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
9
OLF -  Oromo Liberation Front
OLPC -  One Laptop per Child
ONLF -  Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO -  Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
PADIS -  Pan African Development Information System
PSCAP -  Public Sector Capacity Building Program
PICTA -  Partnership for ICTs in Africa
UNECA -  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
REST -  Relief Society of Tigray
RSF -  Reporters Sans Frontieres
RFP -  Request For Proposal
SCOT -  Social Construction of Technology
SIDA -  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPDF -  Somali People’s Democratic Front
SMS -  Short Message Service
SNNP -  Southern Nations Nationalities and People
TPLF -  Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UEDF -  United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UNDP -  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO -  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNESCO-IICBA -  UNESCO’s International Institute for Capacity Building in 
Africa
USAID -  United States Agency for International Development
VO A -Voice of America
VoIP -  Voice over Internet Protocol
VS AT -  Very Small Aperture Terminal
WEF -  World Economic Forum
WPE -  Workers Party of Ethiopia
WSIS -  World Summit of Information Society
WTO -  World Trade Organization
ZTE -  Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment
10
C h a p t e r  1 -  In tr o d u c tio n
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), particularly the 
Internet, have been framed by many donor governments and international 
organizations as powerful resources for reducing poverty and challenging despotic 
regimes.1 Since national and international leaders vowed to fight the digital divide -  
the gap that separates those who have from those who do not have access to ICTs -  
the diffusion of digital technologies in poor states has been framed both as a driver of 
economic development and as a promoter of democratic values.
The evidence that new technologies are supporting economic development in 
poor countries is contested. Rather than simply activating virtuous processes of 
growth, ICTs have interacted with existing resources, offering specific advantages in 
niche markets and in countries with a pre-existing favourable environment for the 
proliferation of knowledge intensive labour (OECD, 2004; Pohjola, 2001). But even 
in the absence of clear evidence of ICTs’ contribution to economic development, 
investments in technology for poverty reduction, e-education or e-health continue 
and most states and international organizations are deeply optimistic and committed 
to further ICT implementation for development. An example of this commitment can 
be found in the address of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the UN ICT 
task force on 30 September 2002, when he maintained that “there is a vast potential 
for investment growth in the developing countries. Information and communication
1 The early faith in the power of ICTs to transform economics and politics is captured in the words of 
two former US presidents sitting on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Republican president 
Ronald Regan affirmed in his speech at London’s Guildhall on 14 June 1989. “Technology will make 
it increasingly difficult for the state to control the information people receive [...] The Goliath of 
totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip”. Seven years later, Democratic 
president Bill Clinton declared in Knoxville, on 10 October 1996 that “if we don't broadly share the 
knowledge and the technology that is developing, it could work to promote inequality, frictions, 
anxieties among people. But if we do it right, it can be a great force to help us meet our challenges and 
protect our values together”. Clinton’s perspective, originally intended to refer to the domestic digital 
divide, soon defined his global strategy (Gunkel, 2003).
2 At the turn of the millennium many international fora promoted plans to make use of digital 
technologies for the benefit of humanity. A list of the major initiatives is presented in section 1.1.
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technologies can help us turn this potential into concrete opportunities that will help 
the poor work their way out of poverty, while at the same time benefiting the world 
community as a whole”.
At the same time, an increasing number of cases of censorship, arrests and 
restrictions related to the use of ICTs is progressively contradicting the hypothesis 
that the Internet would progress in tandem with the diffusion of civic and political 
rights and the downfall of autocracies. Governments around the world have proved 
extremely efficient in diffusing the threats posed by ICTs to their authority and in 
silencing unwanted criticism. Together with the growth of networked citizens, both 
the quantity and intensity of online censorship have increased, suggesting that in the 
‘Information age’ a less open model of information flow is possible and may be 
flourishing.4
The arguments presented in this thesis offer a more nuanced understanding of 
these phenomena focusing, in particular, on how state actors in developing countries 
have influenced technology adoption and favoured the diffusion of certain uses of 
ICTs, while discouraging others. Why is it, for example, that the discourse on the 
role ICTs play in development has been embraced actively and is still popular among 
leaders in Africa, Asia and Latin America, while the democratization rhetoric often 
has been rejected or challenged? And what are the implications this selective 
approach may have for the practical implementation of technology in the developing 
world?
This thesis responds to the call for a deeper understanding on how power, at 
the local and at the international levels, as embedded in artefacts and exercised in 
social relations, influences the adoption and adaptation of new technologies 
(Mansell, 2006). It shares an interest in explaining how politics intervenes in 
motivating decisions commonly interpreted as being merely technical (Wilson III,
3 The speech was delivered at the 3rd meeting of the UN ICT Task force, at UN headquarters in New 
York. Part of it is available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technologv/2295711 .stm Last time accessed 
12.02 .2010 .
4 Numerous reports have been published by the Opennet Initiative, supported by the Universities of 
Toronto, Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard, showing how the filtering of Internet content has increased 
in the past years. The reports can be accessed at http://www.opennetinitiative.org
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2004; Wilson III & Wong, 2007).5 It is driven by the necessity of understanding how 
ICTs are integrated in locations that are different from those of their invention and 
thus further away from particular normative perspectives (Unwin, 2009b; 
Warschauer, 2003). It asks a fundamental question about why ICTs developed the 
way they did in a particular context instead of taking a normative approach and 
asking how ICTs could better serve a real or imagined need or perform a particular 
function in a specific context.
Through exploring the evolution of ICTs in Ethiopia, I examine how a semi­
authoritarian, yet developmentally oriented regime, has actively sought to mediate 
the -  either real or imagined -  destabilising aspects of ICTs while embracing them as 
a tool for development. The central question I ask is the following: why and how 
have ICTs been re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia?
Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest nations.6 It is the largest recipient of 
development aid in Africa.7 And, partly because of its strategic location in the Horn
o
of Africa, it has a preferential relationship with Western powers. However, the 
picture that emerges from a close look at how ICTs have taken shape in Ethiopia 
appears dramatically at odds with what these premises would otherwise suggest. 
Despite its limited resources, the Ethiopian government has spent hundreds of
5 “One of the most unexpected conclusions that I have drawn from my visits to dozens of countries is 
that in developing countries the information revolution is viewed as a highly political affair and not as 
a technical challenge” (Wilson III, 2004, p. 6)
6 Between 2004 and 2008 Ethiopia’s GDP per capita ranked it either at the 170th or 171st position out 
of 182 countries (UNDP, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009).
7 Between 2004 and 2008 Ethiopia’s Overseas Development Assistance, the measure used by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to assess donor’s countries 
contributions to developing countries, has almost doubled, reaching more than three billion dollars in 
2008 and ranking Ethiopia as the major recipient of donors’ funds in the continent (OECD, 2009). 
According to the same agency, in 2008 the only countries receiving more funds were Iraq with almost 
ten billion, and Afghanistan, with almost five (OECD, 2009).
8 Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was greeted by former American President Bill Clinton as 
belonging to a new generation of African leaders and was selected by former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair as the only serving African prime minister as a member of his Commission for Africa.
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million of dollars to equip every secondary school classroom along with most 
government offices with plasma TV screens to receive information through satellite 
connections. These systems were not funded through donor money, but by the 
Ethiopian treasury and were implemented despite the opposition of the 
representatives of the international community in Addis Ababa. However, despite 
these heavy investments in ICTs, Ethiopia continues to score very poorly along most 
of the prevailing indicators used by international and donor organizations to assess 
the progress of the information society: it has one of the lowest levels of Internet and 
mobile penetration on the continent, it has not liberalized its telecommunication 
market, and it pervasively filters political content online.9
Examining why and how ICTs have been re-interpreted, re-defined and re­
shaped means focusing on what ICTs have actually become rather than on what they 
could or should have been. This challenges assumptions about what represents a 
success or a failure in the application of ICTs for development that characterizes a 
large share of the literature. For example, using a satellite to connect government 
offices in remote areas to resources available in the capital might be considered a 
positive achievement. But what if most of the bandwidth is used by the Prime 
Minister and other cadres to instruct elected officials on what the party line is? 
Fundamental disagreements between donor agencies and a national government 
about how to use ICTs for education might be a sign of a likely failure to apply new 
technologies in schools, unless they become the reason for that government to take 
full ownership for installing some of the newest technologies in every secondary 
classroom. Finally, blocking websites and blogs as well as preventing people from 
using the Short Message Service (SMS) through their mobile phones might be
9 According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 2004 only 0.1% of the Ethiopian 
citizens had access to the Internet, while 0.4% had access in 2008. Apart from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, every other country in Africa scored higher along this dimension (ITU, 2009). A 
similar situation could be registered for the access to mobile telephones. In 2004, 0.1% of Ethiopian 
citizens had a subscription to the only mobile operator, while 3.7% had one in 2008 . Only Eritrea and 
the Central African Republic did worse (ITU, 2009). According to the Opennet Initiative, in 2007 
Ethiopia was the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa to pervasively filter Internet content for political 
reasons (Opennet Initiative, 2007).
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interpreted as blunt acts of censorship. But the judgment may change if some of 
those online spaces are actively promoting ethnic hatred and the SMS is used to 
organize potentially violent protests in a tense period of the history of a country.
Asking why and how ICTs have been re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped 
shifts the attention from prescribing what developing countries need, or lack, or 
whether they perform well according to preset standards, to focusing on what 
differentiates international norms and their local application. It recognizes the 
existence of preferred readings, defining how ICTs could and should be used, and 
alternative ones, possibly leading to the transformation of new technologies in 
contexts that are different from those of their invention. In the next two sections I 
explore these different dimensions, illustrating first how ICTs have been framed in 
the international policy discourse, suggesting particular readings while discouraging 
others, and, second, what has resulted from their selective appropriation in Ethiopia. 
After introducing the theory and methods in Chapters 2 and 3, the rest of the thesis 
will investigate the factors that have led to the re-interpretation, re-definition and re­
shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia and what have been the means employed to make these 
transformations possible.
1.1 Technology and its potential
Since the 1990s the increasing diffusion and popularity of the Internet 
stimulated a new wave of programmes advocating the use of the latest technology to 
address the problems of poor nations. Ethiopia, along with most developing 
countries, became the target of campaigns coordinated by new and old institutions 
that aimed at teaching how ICTs could be used for economic, social and political 
change. At the G8 summit held in Okinawa in July 2000 a Digital Opportunity Task 
Force, also known as the DOT Force, was launched to fight the increasing 
inequalities in the distribution of digital wealth. In the business sector the Global 
Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce, a partnership of global corporations 
aimed at influencing policy issues, created a Digital Bridges Task Force, and this
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was soon echoed by the Davos World Economic Forum’s establishment of a 
Bridging the Global Digital Divide Task Force. A year later, in November 2001, the 
UN established its own ICT task force to perform similar tasks under a wider 
multilateral umbrella. This period was also characterized by a proliferation of policy 
papers stressing the relevance of ICTs for development. The World Bank focused on 
the issue in three, almost consecutive, annual development reports, including 
Infrastructure for Development (1994), The State in a Changing World (1997) and 
Knowledge for Development (1998). The International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) in 1996 issued The African Green Paper (ITU, 1996), as a follow up to its 
famous Maitland report (ITU, 1985) and used the occasion to update its 
recommendations on telecommunications incorporating the developments introduced 
by the advent of the Internet. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO) followed in 2001 with Making New 
Technologies Work for Human Development and Life at Work in the Information 
Economy. These documents were also accompanied by dozens of other studies 
published by specialized institutions, such as the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC), the Benton Foundation and the Global Knowledge 
Partnership.
During this period, which culminated in the World Summit on Information 
Society (WSIS) in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005), different voices competed to 
define what ICTs could do for development, how they could optimally be employed 
and whose responsibility it was to promote their diffusion. Within the UN system, 
different organizations focused on particular aspects of the ICTs for development 
discourse. While The World Bank, for example, stressed how revolutionary new 
technologies could be when used for fighting poverty, the UNDP preferred to 
highlight how global inequalities in the distribution of ICTs could further 
marginalize the least developed countries (Wilson III, 2004). Most international 
organizations, however, operated within a common, largely deterministic, 
framework, seldom considering the criticism that emerged over the years about the 
shortcomings of framing technology simply as a driver of development (Mansell, 
2006; Nulens & Van Audenhove, 1999; Padovani & Nordenstreng, 2005; Raboy, 
2004; Schech, 2002; Sosale, 2008).
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The approach taken by international organizations depicted technological 
artefacts and new ideas as independent variables, as elements that could move into a 
perceived vacuum and start producing the desired effects once planted. In its report, 
the UNDP affirmed that “investments in technology can equip people with better 
tools and make them more productive and prosperous.” (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2001, p. 2). The World Bank complemented the statement 
by stressing that “knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily 
travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere” (World Bank, 1998, p. 
1). In the same reports some of the applications of ICTs and the effects they could 
produce were clearly indicated as more probable and more beneficial than others. 
When illustrating the applications of new technology to political life, for example, 
greater participation and democratization were cited as the likely outcomes. As the 
Human Development Report illustrated:
Like the printing press o f earlier centuries, the telephone, radio, television and 
fax o f the 20th century opened up communications, reducing isolation and 
enabling people to be better informed and to participate in decisions that affect 
their lives. Tied to these technologies is the free media, a pillar of all 
functioning democracies (UNDP, 2001, p. 29)
In the economic domain, ICTs were described as producing the greatest 
benefits when introduced in the context of liberalized and global markets. According 
to The World Bank:
Developing countries have tremendous opportunities to grow faster and possibly to 
catch up with the industrial countries. To take advantage o f these opportunities in a 
fast-moving global economy, developing countries [...] must be open to new ideas 
and capture the benefits of technological progress. Some countries have 
recognized the potential of the global economy and have defined clear strategies to 
take advantage of it. Others will have to accept the reality of globalization more 
quickly than they might wish (World Bank, 1998, section 1.4)
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Facing political and economic pressure from the US government and the 
private sector, even organizations that for a long time supported the primacy of the 
state in controlling and managing the telecommunication sector, started advocating a 
new model, where private operators had to take a greater role in the sector. As the 
International Telecommunication Union argued in its African Green Paper.
There has been a widespread move towards liberalization of economic activities, 
opening avenues for private initiatives and enhanced competition. [...] This 
implies reconsidering the role o f the state, which henceforth should center on good 
governance and basic regulatory functions. As a corollary to the globalization and 
competitive dynamics o f the economy, any country wishing to thrive in this 
environment must organize itself properly or else take the risk o f plunging the 
majority o f its population into poverty (ITU, 1996, p. 17)
In general, the range of applications proposed in reports and other policy 
documents, was based on a mix of normative indications largely derived from how 
ICTs were employed in rich countries, and assumptions about how rational actors in 
developing countries would make use of the new resources. The following excerpt, 
from the African Information Society Initiative (AISI) framework, summarizes this 
tendency:
The emerging global information infrastructure, the process o f making 
connectivity available to everyone on the planet, is making the following 
possible: Students study and research using computers, multimedia and 
networks; Doctors diagnose, aided by information accessed through global 
networks; Decision support systems for debt management help cut external debt 
by up to 50 per cent; Drought and famine warnings arrive in time to change 
planting times; Businesses compete more effectively with timely and accurate 
market information; Transport costs are reduced, also resulting in less pollution; 
Cultural heritage is captured electronically, documented and globally 
disseminated (UNECA, 1996, section 7)
The ways in which ICTs could achieve these goals were pinpointed in most 
documents by describing various success stories from all over the world, from
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students in Costa Rica, Brazil, Thailand and South Africa accessing computers to 
enjoy a more interactive learning experience, to electronic forums used in the 
Philippines to coordinate the reactions to the impeachment trial of a former President 
(UNDP, 2001); from farmers in Sri-Lanka employing telephones to better place their 
products (ITU, 1985), to small businesses in Vietnam or Panama growing through e- 
commerce (World Bank, 1998).
Overall, the policy discourse articulated through these and similar documents, 
supported uses of ICTs aimed at making developing countries more modem, 
democratic and integrated into the global economy. It was insistent and persistent. It 
was relatively more uniform than other discourses that emerged at the international 
level to tackle problems of similar scale (Nulens & Van Audenhove, 1999). 
However, as the next section illustrates, it did not always lead to applications which 
closely followed the prescriptions indicated at the international level. Even the 
countries that were the most dependent on international aid demonstrated a certain 
capacity to resist some of the prescriptions articulated by international organizations 
and to develop ICTs in accordance to their specific development path, marginalizing 
some aspects of the ICT for development discourse, while magnifying others.
1.2 Technology and its application in Ethiopia
Since the early 1990s, in the same period international organizations were 
defining a new agenda to encourage the use ICTs in developing countries, Ethiopia 
was experiencing a challenging political transition. Ethiopia’s government was 
engaged in the difficult task of rebuilding the nation after more than fifteen years of 
civil war. The new ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), had emerged victorious from the long struggle against the Derg, the 
communist military dictatorship headed by Mengitsu Haile Mariam, but it had to 
transform its military success into a broader mandate to govern. As a minority 
government, the EPRDF had a daunting task of uniting a country fractured by war 
and rebuilding central and local governments that were capable of managing the 
transition and the accompanying expectations of political reform.
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The EPRDF’s past was rooted in the fight for the rights of the people living in 
Tigray, a region in northern Ethiopia, constituting only 5.8% of the total population. 
The capture of the state required new strategies to demonstrate that all disparate 
components of an ethnically diverse country, and not just Tigreyans, would be 
represented. Political reform and development had to be pursued at the same time to 
make a stable transition possible. Different measures were adopted to reach the goal, 
from the reform of the civil service to the promotion of symbolic events such as flag 
days and other celebrations of the “unity in diversity” motto.
Given the concurrent international attention created around ICTs and their 
potential of supporting socio-economic development, it was likely that the new 
technologies would be included in the ambitious plans for the country’s 
transformation. However, as their later applications showed, this happened in 
directions that were significantly different from those illustrated in the reports, 
frameworks, and green papers of the kinds illustrated above. Taking for example the 
AISI framework quoted above as a reference point, very little of what the document 
considered possible was implemented in Ethiopia: in one of the countries most 
affected by famine no warning system was developed; no incentives were created for 
businesses to use ICTs, no projects were launched to use new technologies for health 
related purposes. The neglect in these areas, however, was matched by very large 
investments in other, unique, ICT-based projects. Hundreds of million of dollars 
were spent to create Woredanet and Schoolnet, two systems using Internet Protocol 
(IP) based satellite connections and plasma TV screens to reach all comers of the 
country with information coming from its centre. The two systems were government 
financed and implemented in collaboration with Cisco Systems and Hughes 
Networks, two companies based in the USA and providing network solutions and 
satellite connectivity, respectively.
Woredanet -  Amharic for the “network of district administrations” -  was 
designed to link the central government with the eleven regional and 550 district 
administrations and to provide different services, such as Internet connection, e-mail 
service, and Voice-over-IP. Since its installation, however, the most common use of 
the system has been videoconferencing. Through 42 inch plasma TV screens (as 
shown in Fig. 1.1), ministers, high level civil servants and trainers in the capital, have
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been communicating with the local governments in the peripheries o f  the state 
instructing and training local officials on what they should be doing and how. All the 
servers necessary to manage the videoconferencing services as well as other services 
offered by the system were installed in the office o f  the Prime Minister, from where a 
transmission could be initiated at any time, while the peripheral nodes had to be 
authorized to use the services.
Fig. 1.1 The Woredanet equipment, composed of, from top to bottom, a video­
camera, a plasma TV screen, a decoder, an amplifier/equalizer (©Author)
Schoolnet was a similar system (see Fig. 1.2). It was created to broadcast pre­
recorded classes in a variety o f  subjects, from mathematics to civics, to all secondary 
schools in the country. During school vacations, however, the system has also been 
used to broadcast messages from the political leadership in Addis Ababa to selected 
groups o f  individuals, including teachers. As o f  2008, 775 schools were connected 
and 16,686 plasma TV screens had been installed.10
10 Source: Educational Media Agency (EMA), Addis Ababa.
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The two systems were developed under the authority o f  the newly created 
Ministry for Capacity Building which delegated the Schoolnet operation to the 
Educational Media Agency (EMA), and the implementation and management o f  
Woredanet to the Ethiopian ICT Development Agency (EICTDA). The latter 
represented a new kind o f  institution in the Ethiopian landscape. Established with the 
specific intent o f  coordinating most o f  the ICTs related activities in the country, it 
was significantly better resourced than many other Ethiopian agencies, both in terms 
o f  capital and human resources. It was hosted in one o f  the newest buildings o f  the 
capital, and aimed to be a symbol o f  a more modem style o f  state administration.
Fig. 1.2 The Schoolnet equipment, the decoder in this case is in a separate room and 
can work only to receive and not to send signals (€) Author)
Schoolnet and Woredanet, as well as the institutional environment in which 
they emerged, showed a significant commitment to the use o f  ICTs despite 
Ethiopia’s limited financial resources. At the same time, they were also illustrative o f  
how new technologies could be applied in a very selective manner. As briefly
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indicated above, beyond the two systems and the remarkable efforts made to install 
the equipment necessary for a videoconference or a broadcast in even the most 
remote villages, the Ethiopian ICTs landscape appeared quite desolate.
According to the most recent data available, in 2007, the country was still 
relying almost entirely on slow and unreliable dial-up connections which for a 
country of more than 70 million people had just surpassed 30,000 subscriptions. 
There were only 629 broadband subscribers (EICTDA, 2009; Selam Development 
Consultants, 2007). In its determination to retain a government monopoly over 
telecommunications, the Ethiopian government seemed not only to have failed to 
create the conditions for local entrepreneurs to reap the benefits of global economic 
markets, but even to have worked actively to prevent this from happening. The 
monthly fees charged by the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation for a 
broadband connection ranged from USD 200 a month for a 64 Kbps, just a little bit 
faster than a dial-up, to more than USD 5,000 for 2 Mbps (EICTDA, 2009; Selam 
Development Consultants, 2007). Despite the fact that the costs for a connection 
have dropped dramatically elsewhere on the continent, partly as a result of greater 
availability of bandwidth worldwide, in Ethiopia they have remained the same for a 
long time and there appears to be little intention to reduce them in the near future 
(EICTDA, 2009). In addition, most of the political blogs, especially those backed by 
opposition members and by vocal critics of the Ethiopian diaspora, have been 
blocked, preventing important voices from participating in the local political debate.
These examples of ICT adoption in Ethiopia offer a complex puzzle to the 
researcher. At the beginning of the new millennium the country emerged as a 
laboratory where new applications of ICTs were advanced, for better or for worse, 
combining global tools and local needs, apparently resisting preferred readings to 
allow alternative ones to emerge. The international community appeared to have 
encouraged ICTs to be a national priority, but soon lost its capacity to influence their 
application in a country still marred by poverty and engaged in a complex political 
transition.
This thesis seeks to examine why and how the discrepancy between 
international and local discourses emerged and which actors and resources have
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made the subsequent reshaping of ICTs possible. It also highlights some of the 
implications the selective adoption of ICTs has had, with a particular focus on how it 
played out in the political realm. In the next section an overview of how this 
exploration evolved is presented, spanning from the construction of a conceptual 
framework capable of capturing the complexities of the transformations of ICTs in 
Ethiopia to the engagement in the field. The significance of the contributions that 
this study of the evolution of ICTs in Ethiopia offers to ICT for development and 
international relations scholars is suggested.
1.3 An overview
The conceptual framework I developed and applied to provide answers to the 
puzzle presented by the Ethiopian case is illustrated in the next chapter. It combines 
arguments drawn from the history of technology tradition and from constructivism in 
international relations which have challenged deterministic approaches to studying 
the influences between the technical and social, in the first instance, and the relations 
among the international, the national and the local, in the second. The conceptual 
framework emerging from their combination enables politics to be appreciated as a 
force structuring both the interactions among actors (i.e. international institutions, 
local governments, and civil society organizations) and between actors and technical 
artefacts. It allows elements usually studied in isolation (i.e. institutions, technical 
objects, laws, and political programmes) to be analyzed as components of a larger 
technopolitical regime, a term coined by historian Gabrielle Hecht (1998), to stress 
how technology can be employed to pursue political goals. Chapter 2 also illustrates 
how, by applying this conceptual framework, the main research question -  why and 
how ICTs have been re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia -  has been 
further refined into two more specific sub-questions, asking:
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• What factors have influenced the development of different 
technopolitical regimes based on ICTs in Ethiopia -  such as donor 
pressure, internal agenda and international standards -  and to what 
degree?
• What actors have made a selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia possible 
and what resources have been mobilized to enhance particular aspects of 
ICTs, while marginalizing others?
Asking these questions means reframing ICTs, not as consensual objects, as
they have been assumed to be in most of the literature on ICTs for development, but
as nodes surrounded by conflict and resistance. Answering them requires analysing a
variety of competing views held by different actors on what technology is and what it
should be as well as locating the concrete applications that have turned some of these
views into reality while marginalizing others.
Chapter 3 describes the methods that have been employed to perform these
tasks, mapping the actors, the discourses and the artefacts that have characterized the
Ethiopian path towards ICTs, and connecting them together. It illustrates how the
research evolved through a progressive engagement in the field, employing
techniques for data collection and data analysis that allowed a comparison between
the discourses articulated at the political level and their materialization into specific
«
technopolitical regimes. Oral history techniques, the observation of technical 
artefacts, and the analysis of textual materials have been combined. The data have 
been integrated and analysed using a grounded theory approach, progressively 
reconstructing the evolution of a national technopolitical regime based on systems 
like Schoolnet and Woredanet, and developing an understanding of what motivated it 
and made its realization possible. The same approach led to the identification and 
analysis of other technopolitical regimes that emerged in Ethiopia to complement, 
patch, or oppose the one developed by the government.
Chapters 4 and 5 assess the discourses that influenced the appropriation and 
adaptation of ICTs in Ethiopia. Chapter 4 analyzes the discourses advanced by the 
international organizations that played the most important role in “bringing” ICTs to
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Ethiopia and the reactions they produced among various local actors. In addition to 
illustrating how the same technologies could produce a variety of interpretations, the 
chapter also roots these interpretations in long-term paths of technology adoption 
which characterized what could be called an Ethiopian approach towards the 
telephone, the radio and the first computers. It concludes by indicating how local 
actors, other than the state, were marginalized in their attempts to influence the 
trajectory of ICTs in the country, leaving the government as the major player in 
making ICTs what they later became in Ethiopia. Chapter 5 builds on Chapter 4, 
examining more specifically the discourses embraced by the Ethiopian government 
representatives which appeared to have influenced the development of ICTs in the 
country. Similar to the previous chapter, it does not concentrate exclusively on the 
present, but engages in a longer term analysis of how these discourses originated, 
dating back from when the current leaders were fighting against the military 
dictatorship of the Derg which ruled Ethiopia between 1974 and 1991, and evolved, 
interacting with new challenges and new opportunities.
Chapters 6 and 7 turn to more technical aspects. Chapter 6 investigates how a 
national technopolitical regime based on Woredanet and Schoolnet emerged in 
Ethiopia. It analyses the design and functioning of the two systems, explaining how 
specific features were not simply motivated by technical issues, but were the 
enactments of political goals through the use of technology. The evolution of the two 
systems is described and connected to the discourses analyzed in the previous 
chapters. Chapter 7 is the last empirical chapter and it analyses the technopolitical 
regimes that actors other than the state tried to develop in order to oppose, 
complement or “patch” the national regime. These attempts, and some of artefacts 
and practices they originated, are shown to have represented a way to fight politics 
through technology, articulating alternative views of how ICTs could be employed, 
but also of how the Ethiopian state should be run.
In Chapter 8 the case studies and arguments put forward throughout the thesis 
are analyzed in accordance with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. 
The main research question and the two sub-questions are answered by connecting 
discourses and artefacts, actors and resources that influenced and guided the 
evolution of ICTs in Ethiopia. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by illustrating the
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contributions of this study to the ICT for development literature, as well as to the 
international relations and history of technology traditions. It also highlights possible 
paths for future research.
1.4 Conclusion
The contribution of this study is intended to be twofold. On the one hand, it 
reconstructs the history of the development of ICTs in Ethiopia since the advent of a 
new political regime led by the EPRDF. It presents the history of how one of the 
poorest countries in the world became a laboratory where global tools and local 
needs were combined under the control of a government struggling to affirm its 
legitimacy. By exploring the connections between different actors operating at the 
local and at the international level, and between these actors and a variety of 
discourses on ICTs as well as on society at large, this research promotes a richer 
understanding of the politics of the country and of the ways in which it relates to the 
international system. On the other hand, the Ethiopian case offers the opportunity to 
develop and apply an innovative conceptual and methodological framework stressing 
the conflictual nature of ICTs. As will be illustrated in the next chapter, this 
framework is inspired by concepts and insights drawn from several theoretical 
traditions as well as by the puzzle presented by the evolution of ICTs in Ethiopia. Its 
application arguably can be extended to less dramatic cases of re-definition, re­
interpretation and re-shaping of ICTs, allowing the researcher to capture phenomena 
that have been overlooked in a literature that is generally overly focused on 
analyzing countries according to how they are employing a given set of artefacts.
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C h a p te r  2 -  C o n s tru c tin g  new t o o ls  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  
THE ADOPTION OF ICTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
This chapter elaborates the theoretical foundations on which the analysis of 
how ICTs in Ethiopia have been reshaped is developed. I begin by examining the 
assumptions that have characterized the rhetoric about technology and its potential to 
transform societies in the developing world. The wave of campaigns to promote the 
use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) that characterized the 
1990s and early 2000s is placed in the context of earlier attempts to use ICTs to 
make developing countries more modem, democratic and integrated into a globalized 
world. The discourses advanced internationally, both at the policy level and among 
mainstream scholars, are then critically assessed by reviewing the literature and 
illustrating how different traditions challenged the idea of ICTs as simply impacting 
on developing countries. Building on this assessment, I then elaborate a conceptual 
framework that can enable researchers to better understand the transformations ICTs 
undergo in their transfer to locations that are different from those of their invention. 
By using concepts emerging from the history of technology tradition as well as from 
the constructivist school in international relations, a set of conceptual tools is 
generated to examine how ICTs, both in their material and discursive aspects, are 
resisted, negotiated, and inserted into pre-existing networks of technologies and 
power. Within this framework ICTs cease to be consensual objects with an agreed set 
of characteristics and are opened up to the possibility of being appropriated by 
different actors to support competing hegemonic projects.
2.1 Technology as a modernizing, democratizing and
globalizing force
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have an im mense impact 
on virtually all aspects o f  our lives. The rapid progress o f these technologies 
opens completely new opportunities to attain higher levels o f development. The
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capacity o f  these technologies to reduce many traditional obstacles, especially 
those o f time and distance, for the first time in history makes it possible to use 
the potential o f  these technologies for the benefit o f  millions o f  people in all 
com ers o f  the world (W orld Summit on the Information Society, 2003, p. 2)
Policy documents such as the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) Geneva Declaration of Principles quoted above frame ICTs, and the 
contributions they might provide to developing countries, as being radically different 
from everything that has come before. However, if the artefacts described in these 
documents are arguably new, the drive to use them “for the benefit of millions of 
people in all comers of the world” represents the most recent expression of a long­
term interest in applying ICTs to development. It re-articulates older ideas about 
technology as a modernizing, democratizing and globalizing agent, which have 
inspired projects and programmes in the developing world for a long time. A sample 
of these ideas is presented below, illustrating how they initially emerged in the policy 
debate and how they continue to influence it, characterizing newer ICTs and their 
applications in developing contexts.11
Modernization theory is probably the most powerful paradigm that, over time, 
has influenced interventions in developing countries. It dates back to the coining of 
the term “development”, when modernization was framed as one of the main forces 
that should lead to “the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, 
1949). At the same time technology became one of its most powerful symbols. As 
president Truman said in his inaugural address, “greater production is the key to
111 define ICTs as all those technologies that are used to capture, store, process, share and disseminate 
information. This definition resonates with the extensive one advanced by key authors in the field of 
ICTs, such as Castells (1996) and Mansell (1996; 1998) as well as with that proposed by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). According to the UNECA “ICTs cover Internet 
service provision, telecommunications equipment and services, information technology equipment 
and services, media and broadcasting, libraries and documentation centres, commercial information 
providers, network-based information services, and other related information and communication 
activities” (UNECA, 1999). Within this context, I consider newer ICTs those such as the Internet and 
mobile telephony which started to spread globally since the 1990s.
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prosperity and peace, and the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous 
application of modem scientific and technical knowledge” (Truman, 1949). 
According to modernization scholars, the process of development should be 
characterized by a number of steps similar to those that Western Europe and North 
America had experienced. It claimed that other countries had to pass, or should be 
helped to pass, through the same stages if they were to achieve economic and social 
well-being (Rostow, 1960; Rostow & Millikan, 1957). Rogers, in his early works 
(1962), adopted this scheme to examine the processes of technological innovation, 
showing how adopters of an innovation or idea could be categorized along a scale 
from innovators and early adopters to late adopters and laggards. The underlying 
concept of progress was mostly that of a movement from centres to peripheries, 
along which it was assumed new objects and techniques could rarely be challenged 
or modified.
In the same period Schramm and Lemer popularized similar ideas in the field 
of communication, advocating that mass media, especially radio, could be used as 
tools to bring modernity to marginal communities by educating and teaching people 
Western values and thinking. Lemer (1958), studying the effects of communication 
in the Middle East, developed the concept of a natural empathy linking populations 
in different comers of the world, that through the mass media could have a 
progressive detachment from traditional cultures and poverty to embrace Western 
values and development. Schramm (1964) stressed the mandate of local governments 
and donor agencies in promoting development through the use of the radio and that 
the press could be employed not just to inform, but, more importantly, to educate 
local populations in agriculture, health and other key development areas.
This linear approach to development has been heavily criticized (Mansell, 
1982), empirically (McMichael, 1996), and theoretically because of its Western bias 
(Mattelart, 2000; Unwin, 2009a). After decades of interventions poor countries did 
not progress as planned (McMichael, 1996) and communications did not have the 
expected impact (Bourgault, 1995). Nevertheless modernization has continued to 
influence development circles. The later advent of digital technologies represented an 
occasion to rediscover some of its claims. The unique features of new ICTs such as 
the Internet, including their interactivity, lack of hierarchy, or capacity to integrate in
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different sectors, were interpreted as being capable of providing the boost developing
10countries were said to be lacking. Rostow’s stages were resurrected to claim that 
ICTs would allow states to “leapfrog” some steps in development, leading directly 
to the knowledge era or, in a softer version, to skip inferior, less efficient and more 
expensive technologies and move directly to more advanced ones (World Bank,
1998).
The discourse on modernization was often accompanied by a complementary 
one on the democratizing potential of technology for developing countries. The 
claims about a connection between science, technology and democracy had a long 
history in Western thought, and the Second World War had given them new vigour. 
“Science and technology, in the hand of the free man had saved the world for 
democracy. Science was held to be intimately a weapon of democracy, and 
democracy a friend of science” (Macleod, 1997, p. 377). Robert Merton in his 
famous Note on Science and Democracy (1942) had described how a scientific ethos 
could stand against both Nazi and Soviet authoritarianism and his argument would 
later be turned to the struggles against other forms of political oppression in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (Mendelsohn, 1989). Modernization scholars such as 
Rostow and Millikan (1957) easily could connect the rationality inspiring modem 
science and technology to the promotion of democratic institutions in developing 
countries. Their arguments, however, were not simply motivated by a dispassionate 
interest in the rights of the poor or in using modem tools to improve their living 
conditions. They had a precise role in the Cold War balance. As Allen and Hecht 
pointed out:
Because both m odernization and democracy -  by virtue o f  their foundations in 
scientific and technical rationality -  were construed as non-ideological, aid to 
the "Third W orld" enacted through "technical assistance" was itself portrayed as 
neutral with respect to the political issues which rouse men's passions. 
"Modernizers" intended W estern technology to produce economic growth in a
12 In economics ICTs often have been referred to as General Purpose Technologies, because of their 
adaptability and capacity of contribute to different sectors of the economic life. See for example 
Genereal purpose technologies: "engines of growth? (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995).
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manner that could soar above passion, fraction, and political dispute. In this 
way, economic and technical aid also served as a powerful weapon in the Cold 
W ar fight against communism. M odernization theory justified interventions that 
m ight otherw ise be construed as neo-colonial. (Allen & Hecht, 2001, pp. 9-10)
This rhetoric survived the height of the Cold War and was reinforced by the 
advent of the Internet, which added a further dimension to the belief in the power of 
technology in promoting democratization. This was connected to the very 
architecture of the medium, its rhizomatic structure with no centre, only nodes and 
connections. Because of the protocols and standards the Internet is based on, no 
priority can be given to the transmission of content -  it does not matter if an email is 
sent by a president or by a teenager, it will be given the same rights to reach its 
destination.14 This image, that information is free to flow without hierarchy or 
constraint, promoted egalitarian ideals based on the supposed capacity of the network 
“logic” (Castells, 2001) to transform the off-line world, putting those in power at risk 
of losing their privileges and the marginalized in a better position to leverage their 
claims (UNDP, 2001).
A third powerful discourse that contributed to positioning ICTs in a 
development context is that of globalization. Differently from modernization and 
democratization, globalization as a concept emerged only in the 1980s, but many of 
the meanings later attached to it, such as the increasing interconnectedness of 
national economies (Omae, 1990), the progressive interlinking of individual lives 
(Giddens, 2000), and the greater circulation of information (Castells, 1996) already
13 The concept of rhizome was initially advanced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), as a critique of the 
hierarchical idea of knowledge articulated in tree-like models. It was later adopted by authors such as 
Levy (1998) to show how the Internet represented the realization in practice of this abstract model.
14 This fact that every bit of information moving through the Internet is treated equally, on the basis of 
a logic of “first come, first served” is known as net neutrality. It is only the end user who pays for 
receiving a more or less fast connection, while no content provider is charged for the delivery of its 
content.
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had been variously employed to shape key policies targeting developing countries.15 
The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, The World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was 
presented as being driven by the belief that greater market integration eventually 
would benefit every country in the world, including the poorer ones. The birth of the 
United Nations also was motivated by the idea that some aspects of individual lives 
should be regulated, at last in principle, by universal institutions that could appreciate 
the global effects of individual actions. And the conviction that information should 
be left free to circulate independently of national borders, informed many post-war 
activities aimed at assisting countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Of all the 
policies, the latter is probably the one that had the most direct influence on the 
subsequent framing of ICTs for development, but, as various studies have shown 
(Carlson, 2003; Padovani, 2005; Raboy, 2004; Sosale, 2008), it was only through 
complex negotiations that it eventually prevailed over competing ideas about how 
information should be handled at the international level.
As Carlson (2003), Mansell and Nordenstreng (2007), and Sosale (2008) 
illustrated in their works on the global governance of communication, the “free flow 
of information” principle, strongly supported by the USA, initially emerged in 
contrast to two other powerful arguments. One was advanced by the USSR, claiming 
that greater powers should be given to individual states to control and stimulate 
communication flows. The other, supported by the non-aligned countries, those 
refusing to position themselves on either camp of the Cold War, lamented that the 
imbalance of resources between developed and developing nations was transforming, 
in practice, the “free flow of information” into a one-way flow of information. They 
requested new norms to protect poor nations from cultural imperialism and to favour 
the circulation of information originating from what was broadly defined as the 
global south. These positions openly competed during the debate promoted by 
UNESCO for the definition of a New World Information and Communication Order
15 The term globalization started to be widely used in the 1980s. Theodore Levitt from Harvard 
University popularized the term with his article on The Globalization of Markets (1983), published in 
the Harvard Business Review. However, there is no clear-cut definition of globalization and different 
authors used the same term to refer to a variety of heterogeneous phenomena (Hopkins, 2002).
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(NWICO) in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the mediation efforts of the international 
commission chaired by Sean MacBride, the idea of a “free flow of information” 
prevailed: poor nations should be helped to develop through assistance from richer 
countries, without setting rules that hindered the free circulation of material and 
immaterial products.
The effects of these policy decisions could later be identified in the first large 
scale interventions of the Internet era aimed at bringing newer ICTs to developing 
countries, multiplying the channels for an unconstrained circulation of information as 
well as the number of access points. The information revolution was framed as 
splitting the world into information “have’s” and “have-not’s” and it was claimed 
that new interventions should be promoted to reduce the gap between the two 
groups.16
The three discourses on the modernizing, democratizing and globalizing 
potential of new technologies have been combined variously to define a shared 
doctrine in the use of ICTs for development. As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, rather than representing a simple description of reality, these discourses have 
enforced a hegemonic vision of what ICTs are and what kind of society they should 
contribute to building. This hegemonic vision has been endorsed and propagated 
mostly by private think-thanks, donor countries and international organizations. In 
addition, as much as earlier scholarship by authors such as Rostow, Schramm and 
Lemer helped provide theoretical backing for policy discourse, in the more recent 
phase of the application of ICTs to development, various scholars have reinforced the 
dominant discourse by theorizing how new technologies could produce the 
transformations described in international fora.
Authors such as Ithiel de Sola Pool (Pool, 1983, 1990) and Nicholas 
Negroponte (1995) applied the enthusiasm brought by the new wave of innovations 
experienced on the American West Coast to imagine new scenarios for the “Third 
World”. Hudson (1984; 1990) and Parker (1976; 1981) focused on how 
telecommunications could help rural areas to better integrate with national and global 
economies, augmenting their productivity and increasing their chances to access
16 For a history and critique of the concept see Gunkel (2003) and Gagliardone (2005).
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educational and health services. Soete (1985) theorized how ICTs could allow 
developing countries to leapfrog stages of development and benefit from the 
opportunities disclosed by the “microelectronics revolution”. In general, numerous 
scholars gathered at international conferences such as those organized by the 
International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP) to reflect on how ICTs 
could best be employed to produce a set of desired outcomes in various comers of 
the world, from Sub-Saharan Africa to Latin America and Asia (Bhatnagar & Bjom- 
Andersen, 1990; Bhatnagar & Odedra, 1992).
Even if these authors did not claim to belong to the same school, the 
scholarship they produced was predominantly characterized by a set of common 
traits which progressively contributed to defining a mainstream approach in the study 
of ICT applications in developing countries (Tsui, 1991). They shared a manifest 
confidence in the benefits new technologies could bring to the poorest areas of the 
world. Most of their work commonly referred to ICTs as “impacting” on developing 
countries, and they were concerned about how these impacts could be maximized 
and measured. Many authors conceded that ICTs alone would not be enough to 
activate virtuous processes of growth and development, but they were deeply 
optimistic that they could contribute to positive processes of transformation. Hudson, 
Hardy and Parker, for example, appreciated that “it is likely that telecommunications 
can be most useful when acting as a complement to other forms of essential 
infrastructure including roads, utilities and administrative structures. There must be 
some minimum threshold of economic activity and social organization before there is 
likely to be much developmental return from telecommunications investment” 
(Hudson, Hardy, & Parker, 1982, p. 306). Recognizing that ICTs need to be 
integrated into wider material and social networks, however, rarely led these and 
other authors to question the relevance of the new tools for countries struggling with 
a wide array of challenges. On the contrary, it motivated claims for radical reforms 
and for the creation of enabling environments that would allow new technologies to 
produce the greatest possible effects. According to them, it was the socio-economic 
environment that had to adapt to the advent of ICTs, rather than the other way 
around.
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Another common feature in most of the mainstream literature on ICTs for 
development was its reliance on rational choice theory to imagine how ICTs would 
be used in a developing context. Selecting some of the most pressing problems 
identified by international organizations and imagining how ICTs could be put to 
work to contribute to their solutions, various authors came up with lists of potential 
applications in agriculture, health, education, and finance, etc. For example, 
according to Bhatnagar “industry in developing countries will have to adopt 
standards to move data electronically in their operations if they have to integrate into 
an international network of buyers and sellers; [...] if democracy has to survive and 
market economies have to work, a culture of open information will have to be built” 
(Bhatnagar, 1992, pp. 3-4). Or for Hudson, Hardy and Parker “two-way radios, 
radiotelephones, or satellite links can be used to summon help in an emergency. 
Telecommunications facilities in support of health care can be used for regular 
consultation for patients, ordering of medical supplies, following up on patients 
transferred to other facilities” (Hudson et al., 1982, p. 306).
In the policy debate, the discourses about the modernizing, democratizing and 
globalizing effects of ICTs are still prevalent. In academic circles, on the contrary, 
the optimism articulated in the 1980s and 1990s has been progressively superseded 
by more critical approaches (Wilson III, 2004). The growing visibility of ICTs in 
development programmes as well as the numerous possibilities to analyze concrete 
applications in developing contexts, motivated an increasing number of studies 
challenging the basic assumptions about leapfrogging, greater political participation 
and the benefits of global integration. A selection of these important works is offered
17 Rational choice theory can arguably be considered the dominant theory in economics and has been 
increasingly used also by sociologists and political scientists to explain the most varied phenomena, 
from social stratification to voting preferences (Coleman, 1990; Scott, 1999). It is based on the 
assumption that individual actors make their choices calculating the costs and benefits of their actions. 
As a paradigm, rational choice has motivated fascinating research, attempting to unveil behavioural 
patterns that inform economic, social and political life. Criticizing it as a paradigm would be an 
untenable position, but what can be criticized is its superficial application in many studies of ICTs for 
development which embraced the philosophical premises of rational choice, but did little to test them 
at the empirical level.
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below, categorized into three streams, according to the focus on the functional, 
cultural or political aspects of the use of ICTs in developing countries. This does not 
offer a complete overview of the criticisms that have been offered to the mainstream 
approach to ICTs and development. For example, dependency theory, which often 
has been presented as the strongest opponent to old and new forms of modernization 
(Carlson, 2003; Schech, 2002), is not considered here. The rationale for this choice is 
that I seek to build on scholarship whose aim is not to dismiss the idea that ICTs can 
contribute to development, but to allow researchers to offer more nuanced 
explanations of how ICTs do not impact, but instead interact and integrate in 
contexts that are different from those of their invention.
2.2 Contesting technology
M edia technologies, like all other technologies, have the social behind them, 
the social in front o f  them and the social embedded in them. W e might talk o f  
the m edia having such and such an effect, and we are not wrong to do so, but it 
needs to be remembered that media technologies emerge as material and 
symbolic objects and as catalysts for action, and are effective as such only 
through the deeds o f  individuals and institutions. It follows that those actions 
are political. They, o f  their very nature, involve a struggle over meaning and 
control: in design in development, in distribution and in use.
The media, as cultural forces, are similarly political: subject to conflicts over 
access and participation; subject to conflicts over rights o f  ownership and 
representation; and vulnerable, always, to the uncertainties and unintended 
consequences o f  any and every act o f  communication. The media connect and 
separate in one breath. They include and simultaneously exclude. They offer 
freedom o f  expression and claim rights o f  surveillance and control. They are 
both enabling and disabling. They create new inequalities, ju s t as they seek to 
elim inate old ones (Silverstone, 1999, pp. 145-146)
Silverstone was not the first to challenge the assumptions about the beneficial 
and linear nature of the “effects” produced by what he refers to here as “media”, but 
can arguably be equated to ICTs, given the extensive definition of “media” he adopts
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1 ftin Why Study the Media from which the quote above is taken. Silverstone’s more 
complex framing of technical artefacts effectively summarize the different aspects 
that have inspired more critical approaches to the study of ICTs: the recognition of 
their malleability, the understanding of how they embed values which are specific to 
particular cultural and social environments, and the appreciation of their political 
nature, of how they can be appropriated by different actors to support competing 
agenda. This section now turns to illustrating how key authors have addressed these 
aspects and how their critiques offer a basis upon which to build a conceptual 
framework to analyze how ICTs can be re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in 
developing countries.
A common criticism directed at the attempts to use new technologies in 
developing countries originates from the claim that artefacts that have proved 
beneficial in North America or Europe would not necessarily have the same effects 
in different contexts (Adam, 1996; Grieve, 2004; Heeks, 2002; James, 2005; Madon, 
2000, 2002; Qureshi, 1998; Unwin, 2009a; Walsham, 1993; Walsham, Symons, & 
Waema, 1988). The scholars that have contributed to this approach have 
predominately focused on the functions ICTs should perform in countries in Africa, 
Latin America or Asia in order to respond to the specific needs expressed in each 
locality. They have demanded that greater attention should be given the context in 
which newer technologies had to be inserted. They also stressed that there should be 
a better understanding of the existing capabilities of a country, so as to avoid 
designing programmes with little chance to succeed, either because of a lack of 
interest or because of the absence of the necessary skills and resources to implement 
them on the ground.
18 The following is an example of how the word “media” is often equated by Silverstone to the 
definition of ICTs I adopt in this research. “We are in the midst [...] of a technological revolution far- 
reaching in its consequences, a revolution in the generation and dissemination of information. New 
technologies, new media, increasingly converging through the mechanism of digitization, are 
transforming social and cultural time and space. This new world never sleeps: 24-hour news casting, 
24-hour financial services. Instant access, globally, to the Word Wide Web. Interactive commerce and 
interactive sociability in virtual economies and virtual communities. A life to be lived on-line” 
(Silverstone, 1999, p. 19)
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Some of these criticisms have been indicative of an evolution rather than a 
departure from the mainstream (Madon, 2000, 2002; Qureshi, 1998). These authors 
have been less concerned about how to bring poor countries into the knowledge era, 
as the rhetoric of leapfrogging indicated, than with how to bring new technologies to 
poor countries to address their own problems. At the same time, their focus 
continued largely to be about how to measure effects and impacts, successes and 
failures.
Other, more substantial, criticisms focusing on the functions ICTs should 
perform if they are to help achieve goals such as poverty reduction and good 
governance, were characterized by greater attention to the failures witnessed both in 
the past and at present in the application of new technologies to developing contexts 
(Heeks, 2002; Walsham, 1993). Some of these critiques (Grieve, 2004; James, 2005) 
resonated with older debates on technological blending and on the design of 
Appropriate Technologies. The advocates of technological blending insisted that new 
artefacts should embrace, rather than displace, older ones, making use of traditional 
knowledge and habits and be appropriated as part of a more harmonious path towards 
progress (Bhalla & James, 1988; ILO, 1984). Similarly, the idea at the core of the 
Appropriate Technologies movement was that, if exported as conceived in the rich 
world, many new technologies would be of little use to fragile economies. They 
could even be disruptive in some cases, for example, forcing traditional craftsmen 
out of the market because they could not compete with newer forms of 
manufacturing (Carr, 1985; Stewart, 1987). Building on the idea of Intermediate 
Technologies proposed by Schumacher (1973), the supporters of Appropriate 
Technologies were suggesting the need to look for a local fit for new tools which 
could be capital saving, but also labour intensive, and allow large parts of the local 
population to progressively understand and master innovation rather than be forced 
into new programmes from above.
These traditions contributed by challenging the techno-determinism that saw 
ICTs as the drivers of processes of growth and transformation (UNDP, 2001; World 
Bank, 1998). They reframed ICTs as more flexible artefacts that could, and should, 
be re-shaped to adapt to different needs. Their interest in locating the most 
appropriate fit between given technologies and socio-economic contexts, however,
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often overlooked other important factors that intervene in the re-shaping of ICTs. 
They privileged the technical over the political, normally excluding the analysis of 
the distribution of power in a given society, and among societies, to understand why 
certain technologies would be preferred to others.19 Some of them similarly lacked 
adequate instruments to study technology adoption as a dynamic process, 
understanding the results of progressive negotiations among technology, in its 
material and discursive components, and changing socio-political contexts.
A different kind of criticism was directed to the cultural bias reproduced by the 
discourses on ICTs for development, and similarly reflected in the uses advocated as 
desirable by major international players. This mostly emerged from the scrutiny of 
official documents and publications aimed at defining clear priorities in the 
applications of ICTs worldwide and convincing stakeholders of their relevance. 
Observed through the lenses of discourse and content analysis, the policies and plans 
advanced by international organizations were found to be framing the market as the 
main, and often the only, driving force behind growth (Nulens & Van Audenhove,
1999); privileging business and technology rather than knowledge as the core 
characteristics of the information society (McKenna & Graham, 2000; Padovani, 
2005; Padovani & Nordenstreng, 2005; Raboy, 2004; Rooney, 2005; Thompson, 
2004); and favouring local elites (Alzouma, 2005), middle classes (Waller, 2008) and 
large multinational corporations (Leye, 2007) rather than the poor. In general, most 
of these authors charged the proponents of the new discourses with reiterating a 
modernization paradigm and presenting the West as the only development model for 
the rest of the world (Carlson, 2003; Leye, 2007; Mansell, 1982; Nulens & Van 
Audenhove, 1999; Ojo, 2004; Padovani, 2005; Padovani & Nordenstreng, 2005; 
Raboy, 2004; Thompson, 2004; Unwin, 2009a).
This scholarship contributed to unveiling the hegemonic character of many 
definitions of ICTs. It revealed how, in order to increase their capacity to influence
19 If they illustrated the importance of finding a fit for a technology to be used appropriately, they 
normally limited the research on this fit to the material level, taking less account on the relevance of 
the political level, of the local acceptance or resistance to the discourses used to advance certain uses 
of technology and discourage others.
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various audiences in both developed and developing countries, international 
organizations such as The World Bank (Thompson, 2004) or the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (Nulens & Van Audenhove, 1999) made extensive 
use of technocratic language, presenting opinions as facts, mimicking the jargon of 
science and marketing, and framing weak arguments as truth (McKenna & Graham,
2000).20 In this context, hegemony refers to what Gramsci (1951-1991) and Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) and Hall (1998), more recently, defined as the attempt by a group 
to impose a specific interpretation of the material and social reality as natural, while 
ruling alternative ones out. As Laclau and Mouffe argued about the possibility of a 
hegemonic relation, “its very condition is that a particular social force assumes the 
representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it. Such a form of 
‘hegemonic universality’ is the only one that a political community can reach” 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. x, emphasis in the original).
Within this framework, the assertions of ICTs as modernizing, globalizing and 
democratizing tools cease to be simple descriptions of realty, and become attempts to 
force a particular worldview onto new subjects. The advocacy of a limited set of uses 
of ICTs becomes part of a wider power struggle that involves asserting specific 
discourses over others by ‘the construction of a new “ common sense” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 183). This interpretation of ICTs as elements that can be captured, in 
both their material and discursive components, in hegemonic struggles resounds with 
other concepts that are employed in this thesis to develop an innovative conceptual 
framework to study why and how ICTs are selectively appropriated in developing 
countries. This is elaborated in the next section in greater detail. However, it must be 
pointed out that the critical perspectives illustrated above, targeting official 
documents and declarations, operated in a somewhat selective way. They largely 
emerged as critiques of the West from the West, taking little account of how the 
discourses on ICTs were actually received and re-articulated in developing countries. 
This aspect limited their understanding of how some components of the discourses 
defined internationally resonated with those promoted at the local level. They also
20 Connected to this kind o f criticism, but from a political economy point of view were those authors 
who criticize ICT for development programmes through the lenses of dependency theory (Wade, 
2002).
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underestimated the problematic hegemonic discourses on ICTs produced by 
governments in developing countries, which similarly should be the subject of a 
critique when the ambition is to unveil patterns of oppression and domination. In 
contrast, I analyze the hegemonic discourses that intervened in the interpretation, 
definition and shaping of ICTs both at the international and at the local levels, in 
order to appreciate how discourses which aimed to be universal were received in a 
specific context, and how the power struggles characterizing a given social formation 
played a role in making a certain meaning accepted, while ruling others out.
A third source of criticism, partially extending the one argued above, can be 
located among scholars who stressed the political nature of technology. Much of this 
literature, relying on the longstanding debate in media and communication studies 
about the possibility of messages to produce contested and oppositional readings, 
laments the narrow focus on the impact of ICTs rather than their appreciation as 
potentially contested objects, open to both symbolic and technical negotiation 
(Mansell, 2006; Mansell & Silverstone, 1996; Mattelart, 2000; Schech, 2002; 
Silverstone, 1999). Mansell and Silverstone, for example, have highlighted the fact 
that ICTs are not simply objects but that they are also discourses. “ICTs are 
characterized by their double articulation: they are both machines and media. They 
carry both functional and symbolic significance” (Mansell & Silverstone, 1996, p. 9). 
Given that the discursive and technical features of technology interact with each 
other, influencing the acts of appropriation of, and resistance to, technology, the 
application of ICTs should be studied in relation to the resources mobilized both at 
the local and at the international levels to support specific political projects, while 
countering others.
From a different perspective, and looking at technology in general, the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach has illustrated the multiplicity of 
interpretations that can surround an artefact, and the repercussions they can have on 
its design and redesign. SCOT evolved through the work of scholars that have been 
studying artefacts as diverse as bicycles (Bijker & Law, 1992), supersonic jets (Law 
& Callon, 1992), missile guidance systems (MacKenzie, 1990) and solar powered 
lamps (Akrich, 1992), but building on a shared vision of technologies, not as external
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agents belonging to the realm of mere objects, but as “artifacts [which] embody 
social, political, psychological, economic and professional commitments, skills, 
prejudices, possibilities, and constraints” (Bijker & Law, 1992, p. 7). According to 
this definition, because of its complexity, a technical object can reach a stabilization 
only as a result of conflicts over meaning and control, where a variety of actors 
compete to influence both its construction and the construction of its users.
Some of the authors contributing to this tradition, however, either located their 
scholarship largely on a theoretical plane, (Mansell, 1982, 2004; Mattelart, 2000), or 
focused their research mostly at the micro and meso level, that of designers and 
users, organizations and families (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987; Silverstone & 
Haddon, 1996). Their insights and the tools they developed are thus only partially 
useful to understand how the politics of technology operates at the level of states and 
of international systems and needs to be combined with other perspectives to 
adequately appreciate the magnitude of processes of national significance.
The three critical approaches illustrated so far, focusing on the functional, 
cultural and political aspects of technology, challenge the understanding of ICT 
application in developing countries as a simple transfer of technologies with a 
specific range of effects, and propose to analyze ICT adoption as part of more 
complex process of negotiation and progressive adaptation. IS scholars, as well as 
the advocates of blending technologies and the design of appropriate technologies, 
stressed how ICTs can be radically re-thought and re-designed in order to fit socio­
political contexts that are different from those of their invention. The authors who 
analyzed large corpuses of documents produced by international organizations have 
stressed the hegemonic nature of some of the discourses animating them, and opened 
the doors to the investigation of possible alternative readings. At the same time, the 
focus on the political nature of technology, both at the macro and at the micro level, 
illustrates how artefacts are open to conflicts, whose outcomes depend on the 
network of power within which they becomes embedded.
These concepts are a starting point to develop a conceptual framework defining 
ICTs not as “black-boxes” and consensual objects, as described in the mainstream 
discourses illustrated above, but as nodes surrounded by difference and resistance.
43
Within this context I develop a new set of instruments derived from the history of 
technology scholarly tradition and, in particular, from those historians who studied 
large technical systems, such as electric or telecommunication networks, and from 
the constructivist school in international relations, with a special focus on the 
scholarship that analyzes how discourses are propagated by international actors and 
appropriated, or resisted, by local actors.
2.3 Technologies and politics in context: lessons from the 
history of technology
A large impetus of the hype that characterized the new wave of ICTs for 
development programmes in the 1990s reflected the lack of attention to the systemic 
nature of the new technologies. Computers connected to the Internet were perceived 
as multi-purpose terminals which could be used by individuals, firms or public 
administration offices to access the most up-to-date information, increase their 
productivity and communicate among themselves. The focus on the relative number 
of computers or hosts per inhabitant, reinforced the idea that it was mostly the 
amount of technology properly deployed that could turn a poor country into a 
member of the knowledge society (UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 1998). It was 
concealed, however, that these terminals were simply components, certainly the most 
visible, of larger systems, also made of institutions, laws, political parties, 
information carriers, etc. Framing newer ICTs as constituents and constitutive of 
“large technical systems”, a term coined by Thomas Parke Hughes when he was 
studying electrification (1983), might have moderated the expectations about their 
revolutionary potential, suggesting how the phenomena experienced in the US or in 
Europe depended not simply on the diffusion of personal computers and fast 
connections, but on denser patchworks of heterogeneous technical and social 
artefacts.
“Large technical systems” is just one of several concepts proposed by Hughes 
and by other historians of technology who extended his research agenda, that can be 
applied fruitfully to the study of ICTs in developing contexts. Notions such as 
“seamless web”, “style”, “technopolitics” and “technopolitical regimes” can
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similarly help in addressing questions about the reinterpretation and reshaping of 
technical artefacts. Those are addressed in detail below. Their strength lies in their 
grounding in studies of technologies of national relevance and scale, as well as in the 
importance they accord to culture and politics, not only micro-politics, connected to 
everyday interaction, but the politics of a nation and its identity.
Among Hughes’ neologisms, large technical system (LTS) has had the greatest 
influence. It had a substantial impact on the history of technology, shifting attention 
from individual inventions or inventors to the system of relations in which every 
technology, but some more than others, is immersed. At the same time, it drew on 
earlier attempts to study technological innovations as historically grounded, and as 
part of complex processes involving heterogeneous actors and artefacts. The focus on 
the larger networks in which innovations takes place and technologies evolve, for 
example, resounded with the attention Schumpeter in his later works accorded to 
collective entrepreneurs as agents of change (Schumpeter, 1954-68). As part of his 
analysis of the mechanisms informing industrial capitalism, he recognized the 
increasing role that larger actors, such as corporations, had started to play in the 
process of technological and economic innovation. Similar to what would have later 
been the case with Hughes, this understanding was made possible by the appreciation 
of how innovation processes need to be studied in their historical context. As 
Schumpeter claimed “nobody can hope to understand the economic phenomena of 
any, including the present, epoch who has not an adequate command of historical 
facts and an adequate amount of historical sense or what may be described as 
historical experience” (Schumpeter, 1954-68, p. 12). Differently from Hughes, 
however, Schumpeter was still driven by a conception of innovation as pertaining 
almost exclusively to the realm of private initiative (Elam, 1993; Freeman, 1990), 
while Hughes later investigated more attentively the role state actors and politics 
play in the process of technological innovation and evolution.
The concept of LTS also helped hybridizing the discipline of history of 
technology with insights from sociology and by developing terms that could extend 
the research agenda to new phenomena emerging at the crossroad between the 
technical, the social and the political. According to one of Hughes’ definitions, LTS
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“interconnect components so diverse as physical artefacts, mines, manufacturing 
firms, utility companies, academic research and development laboratories, and 
investment banks. These components make up a system because they fall under a 
central control and interact functionally to fulfil a system goal, or to contribute to a 
system output” (Hughes, 1986, p. 287). Their heterogeneity can be perceived as 
problematic in detecting a clear object of analysis and alternative terms have been 
proposed by other historians to better identify specific assemblages (Joerges, 1988). 
Nevertheless, arguably, the utility of a definition like LTS resides in its capacity to 
open wider horizons beyond the isolated artefacts, rather than in its normative 
character. For Hughes there is no clear demarcation between the technical and the 
social. They are both part of a seamless web, connecting the acts carried out by social 
actors in relation to technology, the technical components that render the 
embeddedness of society into artefacts -  technology as “society frozen” -  and the 
material aspect of technology. (Hughes, 1986).
If an organizing principle can be identified in the concept of LTS, this is their 
problem solving capacity. In Hughes’ words “technological systems solve problems 
or fulfil goals using whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems 
have to do mostly with reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or 
desirable, at least by those designing or employing a technological system” (Hughes, 
1987, p. 53). This does not mean that they do it successfully. Technological systems 
often emerge as messier and more complex than originally expected, they have 
negative externalities, and are difficult to control and coordinate. Quite ironically, as 
pointed out by Joerges, “retrospective studies of LTS show that they never develop 
according to the designs and projections of dominant actors: LTS evolve behind the 
backs of the system builders” (Joerges, 1988, p. 26). However, because of their scale 
and scope, LTS tend to evolve even against the odds of their complexity, in ways 
smaller artefacts might not do. Railway systems or grids of nuclear plants would be 
much more difficult to dispose of than smaller technical objects, and would tend to 
be patched or rethought, rather than abandoned if problems arise.
Hughes analyzed the particular phases and phenomena that characterize the 
evolution of LTS when studying the case of electrification in Western societies 
(Hughes, 1983, 1987). In his later works he indicated how LTS can be similarly
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appreciated when studying other technologies in fields as diverse as urban planning, 
aerospace or computing (Hughes, 1998). He identified six different moments in the 
development of a LTS, not necessarily occurring in the sequence in which they are 
presented: invention, development, innovation, transfer, growth, competition, and 
consolidation. For the kind of phenomena I analyze here, the local reshaping of ICTs, 
the most relevant is arguably what he referred to as the “transfer” phase, describing 
the stage when a technology reaches a country that is different from the one where it 
was invented.21
Hughes investigated the applications of new technology in different national 
contexts by borrowing from art historians the concept of style, emphasizing the 
possibility of variations of the “same” technology among different cultural and 
political environments. In the case of electrification, for example, he illustrated how 
the distribution of power plants in London and Berlin differed for no particular 
technical reasons, but responded to differences in the political and regulatory regimes 
characterizing Britain and Germany at the time of electrification. By analogy it can 
be argued, for example, that the different degrees of control exercised over online 
communication by state actors, as well the greater or lesser use of free software by 
public administrations are elements defining different styles in the application of
99ICTs in various countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America.
21 It is also important to briefly reframe the advocacy of ICTs by developed countries as a result of a 
consolidation of a system attempting to grow beyond its limits. According to Hughes’ 
conceptualization, when a system becomes consolidated it acquires momentum. It tends to develop 
inertia and it becomes opaque, perceived as regulated by very specific dynamics and closed to 
modification. Applying this concept, it can be said that ICTs, as framed by the discourses articulated 
at the international level, were presented as constituting high-momentum systems. As a consequence 
developing countries were asked to prepare an enabling environment to let the new technologies 
exercise their peculiar effects rather than being equipped with instruments with which they could open 
the black boxes and adapt them to their specific needs. As Hughes argued, “large systems with high 
momentum tend to exert a soft determinism on other systems, groups and individuals in society” 
(Hughes, 1987, p. 54).
22 The focus on what Hughes identifies as the “transfer” phase also makes other concepts he 
developed less relevant here. The idea of reverse salient which he used to describe the uneven 
progression of LTS characterizing in particular their development phase, would be of little relevance
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Hughes stimulated the production of a vast body of literature and motivated 
scholars to employ his concepts to research various types of LTS, from large projects 
such as telecommunications (Davies, 1996) or nuclear programmes (Hecht, 1998), to 
more limited and focused projects, such as air traffic (LaPorte, 1988) and videotext 
systems (Mayntz & Schneider, 1988). Within this scholarship, the concepts most 
applicable for analyzing the reshaping of ICTs in Ethiopia are those of 
“technopolitics” and of “technopolitical regimes” developed by Gabrielle Hecht in 
her study on the relationship between nuclear power and national identity in France 
(1998; Hecht, 2001).
The importance of a concept such as technopolitics is apparent in its capacity 
to challenge the supposed neutrality of technical artefacts. It focuses on the argument 
that technology can become part of a national discourse, and its elements can be 
captured by the “thickness” of a specific culture. Hecht extended Hughes’ 
scholarship on the problem-solving nature of LTS that stresses their capacity to 
perform specific policies, in ways that are complementary to those usually employed 
by politicians. As Hecht explained:
I use the term  [technopolitics] to refer to the strategic practice o f  designing or 
using technology to  constitute, embody, or enact political goals. Here I define 
technology broadly to include artifacts as well as nonphysical, system atic means 
o f  making or doing things. [ ...]
Calling these hybrids "politically constructed technologies" is correct; however, 
it is not sufficient, because technologists intended them as tools in political 
negotiations. At the same time, these technologies are not, in and o f  themselves, 
technopolitics. Rather, the practice  o f  using them in political processes and/or 
toward political aims constitutes technopolitics. W hy not ju st call that practice 
"politics"? The answer lies in the material reality o f  the technologies. These 
technologies cannot be reduced  to politics. The effectiveness o f  technologies as 
objects designed to accom plish real material purposes m atters -  among many 
other reasons -  because the material effectiveness o f  technologies can affect 
their political effectiveness (Hecht, 2001, pp. 256-257).
in answering questions about the re-shaping of technology where little innovation took place to solve 
problems emerging within LTS.
48
Hecht employed the term technopolitics to describe how different groups 
operating in France in the 1950s and 1960s used technology to represent and enact 
different visions of society. The quote below summarizes the key findings of her 
research. It also illustrates the usefulness of technopolitics as a concept stressing the 
conflictual nature of technology articulated in the SCOT tradition as well as by 
authors such as Silverstone (1999). It unveils how policy makers often perceive 
technology as an extension of their plans and ambitions, rather than as a neutral tool 
that responds to functional imperatives.
G2 and EDF1 [two different types o f  nuclear reactors] were neither inevitable 
products o f  some inherent technological logic nor infinitely malleable products 
o f  political negotiation. Rather, each resulted from a seamless blend o f  political 
and technological goals and practices. The two reactors can thus be understood 
as technopolitics. CEA and EDF [the two institutions presiding to the 
development o f  nuclear reactors] technologists deliberately -  even proudly -  
sought to make their technologies instruments and embodiments o f  politics. 
Politics and policy making gave the reactor projects significance, both within 
each regim e and in the interactions each had with its surroundings. Thus, for 
example, EDF1 was important not because it would actually produce 
econom ically viable electricity (EDF's first truly com m ercially viable reactor,
EDF4, went on line in 1969) but because it represented the first step in a 
nationalized nuclear program that would enact and strengthen the utility's 
ideology and its industrial contracting practices. A t the same time, the 
technological form o f  their politics mattered. French m ilitary nuclear policy in 
the 1950s did not take the form o f a ministerial decree; it took the shape o f  G2 
(and other related technologies). This meant, for example, that in 1954 the 
assurances o f  the CEA's leaders that M arcoule reactors were both electricity- 
generating prototypes and plutonium producers enabled one prime minister to 
abstain from deciding about a bomb. Official French state policy declared a 
purely peaceful interest in atomic energy, while the CEA's actual technopolitics 
perform ed a m ilitary nuclear policy (Hecht, 2001, p. 270)
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The analysis of the technopolitics embraced by state actors in France during the 
1950s and 1960s also allowed Hecht to explore the relations between politics and 
nation building. Relying on the concept of “imagined communities” proposed by 
Anderson (1983), she illustrated how the emergence of artefacts of national 
significance was also instrumental in asserting a specific type of Frenchness, in 
making the “radiance of France” sustained by its nuclear programme a symbol of 
national prowess after the humiliation of the second world war. This example further 
substantiates the relevance of technology not just on a functional, but also on a 
symbolic plane, and its capacity to be charged by different meanings according to the 
context in which it is inserted.
Within Hecht’s framework, technopolitics is performed through the creation of 
technopolitical regimes, a term she coined to describe the combination of 
technopohtics with Hughes’ notions of LTS and style. They represent both the 
medium and the outcome of a negotiation between a specific technology or 
assemblage, a cultural and political context and the actors who animate it and 
compete for power. “Technopolitical regimes are grounded in institutions, and they 
consist of linked sets of people, engineering and industrial practices, technological 
artifacts, political programs, and institutional ideologies which act together to govern 
technological development and pursue technopolitics” (Hecht, 2001, p. 257). The 
“same” technology can be developed, or adopted, by different actors through the 
creation different technopolitical regimes. This can happen across different countries 
but, as Hecht illustrated in the case of France, it is also frequent that within the same 
country two or more regimes compete to advance different political agendas and gain 
prominence in defining the standards and uses of a particular technology. As Hughes
23 The reference Hecht uses to the word “regime” is largely connected to their significance in political 
theory. As she spells out “I have chosen the regime metaphor for three reasons. The first reason relates 
to the use of the term ‘regime’ in political parlance. [...] Second, ‘regime’ conveys the idea of a 
regimen, or prescription. [...] Third and last, ‘regime’ capture the contested nature of power” (Hecht, 
1998, p. 17). This use of the term thus distances her research, and mine, from the technological regime 
literature, which, even though dealing with large systems and research across industries, is more 
concerned with the economic incentives to innovate, rather than with the politics of technology 
(Breschi, Malerba, & Orsenigo, 2000; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996; R. Nelson & Winter, 1982).
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pointed out “one of the primary characteristics of a system builder is the ability to 
construct or to force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and 
coherence from chaos. This construction often involves the destruction of alternative 
systems” (Hughes, 1987, p. 52). Different technopolitical regimes can coexist and 
continue to compete for extended periods of time, or the battle for the control of a 
particular technology can, on the contrary, end with the destruction or 
marginalization of alternative ones.
But how does this happen? How is it that a particular technopolitical regime 
can succumb, while another one thrives in a given context? In contrast with most of 
the literature on ICTs and development, many historians of technology have looked 
at power, both as embedded in artefacts and as exercised by social actors, to provide 
an answer. Rather than looking at how technologies are more or less successfully 
applied to reach a set of given goals or operate according to predefined standards, 
authors such as Hughes and Hecht, but also other historians like Joerges (1988;
1999), and Thomas (1988), framed technical artefacts as elements that constantly 
interact with the political and social forces that surround them and bear with them the 
results of this relationship. Allen and Hecht explained the link between power and 
technology while advancing their interpretation of the title of Hughes’s famous work 
on electrification. They underlined,
[...]  the double meaning o f  networks ofpow er, electricity drives machines, light 
bulbs, and tramways, but at the same time its constant flux in networks reflects 
and makes tangible the political life o f  nation-states. Thus electrical networks 
are “charged” with corruption in Chicago, w ith localism in London, and with 
centralized social democracy in Berlin (Allen & Hecht, 2001, p. 2, emphasis 
added).
Technical artefacts do not simply adapt to the networks of power in which they 
become immersed. They also act as vehicles for exercising power. As Allen and 
Hecht continue:
Social choices shape technological development. But the resulting physical, 
financial, and institutional durability o f  systems means that, once developed,
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they -  and the values they uphold -  cannot be changed easily. As material 
manifestations o f  human choices, systems acquire momentum. In so doing they 
embody, reinforce, and enact social and political power. Thus, human power 
rides upon the history o f  things (Allen & Hecht, 2001, pp. 2-3).
Power thus has to be understood as a force flowing both through the social and 
the technical, establishing and performing authority by making specific meanings 
more widely accepted than others and certain assemblages more likely than 
alternative ones. Similar to other authors who have underlined the importance of the 
political and of power relationships in the study of technology (Mansell, 2006; 
Wilson III, 2004; Winner, 1980), Hughes and Hecht did not frame power as 
eminently social or technical, but suggested that it is only as performed in practice 
that its role and nature can be understood in a given social context.
Concepts such as LTS, technopolitics and technopolitical regimes add 
complexity to the study of ICTs for development and open new pathways for 
research. By analyzing technical transfer and appropriation as being located at the 
level of large systems, they allow us to better appreciate the influence bigger actors 
can exercise, the kind of resources they can mobilize and the types of outcomes 
emerging from these processes. Within this framework I suggest that greater agency 
can be accorded to local governments or companies, as well as greater capacity, not 
just of using technology differently, but of re-shaping it to support alternative plans. 
Borrowing post-structuralist terminology (De Certeau, 1984), it can be said that 
employing these concepts to study ICTs for development shifts the attention from the 
tactics adopted by agents in developing countries to resisting hegemonic discourses 
and demarcating spaces for alternative practices to the strategies adopted to support 
alternative discourses, in competition with those articulated at the international level.
However, if the instruments employed by Hughes and Hecht are valuable to 
understand why and how specific LTS develop at the country level, they are less 
adequate to appreciate the nexus between the national and the international. Their 
research focused on national systems, and, even when analyzed in a comparative 
perspective, it offered an insufficient account of the role played by international 
actors in advocating specific uses of technology. In contrast, to fully comprehend
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why and how ICTs are re-shaped in developing countries, it is important to relate the 
discourses articulated at the international level to those emerging locally, and to 
study how compatible they are, who propagates them, who supports or resists their 
application and how the position of a country in the international system influences 
these processes. To answer these questions, I complement the concepts developed in 
the history of technology tradition with others that emerged in the study of 
international relations. I rely, in particular, on the constructivist tradition in IR, 
because of its focus on the propagation and appropriation of discourses and of its 
capacity to take into consideration both the material and the discursive components 
of ICTs, as I discuss in the next section.
2.4 Locating ICTs in an international perspective
As much as the history of technology, as practiced by Hughes and by scholars 
who extended his agenda, represents a critique of deterministic approaches to 
technology and is aimed at bringing greater nuance to the study of the relations 
between the technical and the social, the constructivist school in international 
relations emerged in opposition to similarly reductionist views. It challenged the 
traditional notion of the international system as a space where pre-social, atomistic 
actors, pursue pre-defined interests, with that of a society where actors interact, learn, 
and modify their own identities, interests, and behaviours as a result of the 
continuous social exchanges they engage in.24 While neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
proponents based their analysis mainly on the material resources states can mobilize 
-  in terms of armed forces, production capabilities, raw materials, etc. -  and on the 
choices they make as rational actors, constructivists built their claims on an 
ideational view of the international world and on the power of ideas to shape 
interests and identities. As Alexander Wendt concluded in a seminal work on the 
social theory of international politics, “it makes more sense to begin theorizing about
24 The first use of the term constructivism in international relations is attributed to Onuf, who used it 
in World o f our making (1989), but it was Wendt’s article Anarchy is what states make of it (1992) 
that popularized the new approach.
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international politics with the distribution of ideas, and especially culture, in the 
system, and then bring in material forces, rather than the other way around” (Wendt, 
1999, p. 371). Constructivists did not refuse the role material resources play, instead 
they problematized it. Within a constructivist framework technology can still be 
considered a resource that can produce certain outputs, but the value and relevance 
that are accorded to it will depend on its material as well as its discursive 
components.
Both constructivism in IR and the tradition of the history of technology 
outlined above are based on a constructivist ontology, framing social reality as the 
product of human thought and interactions. They similarly embraced the basic 
premises characterizing most variants of social constructivism and identified by 
Phillips and Jorgensen (2002), referring also to earlier works by Burr (1995) and 
Gergen (1985), as: a critical approach to determinism and a taken-for-granted 
knowledge; an historical and cultural specificity that compels1 one to study social 
phenomena in their context; the role of social process in creating and maintaining our 
understanding of the world; and the role of socially constructed worldviews in 
defining what is possible and what is not.25 These principles have been adopted by 
constructivists in international relations to study the most varied sets of phenomena, 
from militarism in Japan (Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993), to the end of the Cold War 
(Checkel, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1994), developmentalism in Latin America (Sikkink, 
1991) and the role of UNESCO in promoting science bureaucracies (Finnemore, 
1993). However, to respond to questions about the reinterpretation and reshaping of 
ICTs, the most useful body of literature explores how, in other issue areas, such as 
environmentalism, human rights, or foreign aid, discourses propagate and are resisted 
or embraced at the local level.
These puzzles have been addressed by focusing on different actors 
participating in the diffusion process: on international organizations (Finnemore,
25 An early systematic expression of social constructivism was offered by Berger and Luckmann’s 
influential The social construction o f reality (1966), where the authors explained how it is through 
interaction that social meanings are created, shaping our perception of the social world and 
subsequently influencing our behaviours, in a circular process. As they affirm, “Society is a human 
product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 79).
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1996), NGOs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), or local 
institutions (Checkel, 1997; Sikkink, 1991). Various models have been proposed, 
stressing the importance of transnational relations, thus linking corporations and 
international NGOs to state and inter-state actors (Risse-Kappen, 1995a), or adopting 
a network metaphor to account for the relevance of non-traditional players, such as 
social movements (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Within the diffusion path, different 
moments have been privileged, exploring the spaces where discourses originate 
(Adler, 1992), the mechanisms that preside over their dissemination (Strang & 
Meyer, 1993), and the fit they find in specific cultural and political environments 
(Klotz, 2006). A few common points, however, have emerged in this research and 
these can inform the investigation of discourses on ICTs for development.
The shift from the material to the discursive has allowed scholars to move from 
explanations based on the constraining capacities of the international system (i.e. 
state-actors are forced to adapt because of imbalances of power) to others stressing 
the constitutive force of the discourses that animate it (i.e. state-actors adopt a certain 
course of action because they see windows of opportunity in a specific area). These 
discourses have been framed as elements in flux which evolve and transform along 
the path from their initial development to their eventual adoption by new actors, and 
their diffusion may be encouraged by the active role played by state and non-state 
actors. As Martha Finnemore’s research on science bureaucracies (1996) and Peter 
Haas’ analysis of epistemic communities (1992) have illustrated, discourses do not 
just spread virally, but may be carried by groups or institutions -  active teachers in 
Finnemore’s terminology (1996) -  advocating their selection. In this process, they 
usually become theorized (Strang & Meyer, 1993), they progressively lose contact 
with the place where they originated and take on meanings that make them 
applicable to a wider variety of cases. A notable example is offered by Finnemore, 
who has shown how in the 1960s and 1970s UNESCO was advocating the diffusion 
of science bureaucracies as bodies that could serve universal needs, despite the fact 
that they initially originated in the USA and in the UK to respond to a very local 
demand.
55
The language used [by UNESCO] is prescriptive but not evaluative and 
in this sense is normative. UNESCO officials simply declared science 
policymaking to be necessary and good without seriously attempting to prove 
that this is in fact so. “States should make it their business” to coordinate and 
direct science. Or, as it was later expressed, “the development o f science policy 
should be the responsibility of an organization the highest level o f government 
in the country”, and “the science policy programme of UNESCO is formulated 
on the basis o f the principle that the planning o f science policy is 
indispensable” for the coordination and promotion o f scientific research. These 
assertions are not coupled with any evidence that such bureaucratic entities 
actually enhance science capabilities. In addition, the language is universal; it 
promotes these bureaucracies as good for all states, at all levels o f scientific 
capability. (Finnemore, 1996, p. 55)
The theorization process is understood as facilitating the diffusion of 
discourses, abstracting them from the reference to a specific milieu and opening the 
doors to their adaptation. However, it is impossible to eliminate all the connotations 
they bring with them -  even when they are partially hidden in artefacts -  and “the 
degree of ‘cultural match’ between global norms and domestic practice [is] key in 
determining the pattern and degree of diffusion” (Checkel, 1999, p. 84). As Sikkik 
(1991), Checkel (1997) and Risse-Kappen (1995a) have argued, the actual forms 
discourses take at the local level depend on historical paths traced by a nation and on 
its political culture. Also, as discourses do not spread simply by themselves, they 
need carriers, “active teachers” to diffuse, the local match between them and a local 
context is not just there to be found, but it is actively constructed. Both diffusion and 
adaptation of discourses require agency and are not simply the results of their own 
characteristics.
While discussing the importance of the discursive over the material this thesis 
has privileged the term “discourse” over “idea”, which is more commonly used by 
constructivists in international relations. The main reason is to enhance the coherence 
with other concepts used to build the conceptual framework, such as hegemony as 
described by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), which has been developed as part of their 
theory of discourse. It can be argued that key constructivist scholars in IR have often
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referred to discourses, language and meaning to define the ideational components 
that permeate the international system. Finnemore’s arguments on UNESCO’s 
campaign on science bureaucracy quoted above (Finnemore, 1996, p. 55) are an 
example of how ideas have been connected to language. Similarly Laffey and 
Weldes (1997), when defining ideas as symbolic technologies, have framed them as 
a mechanism for the creation of meaning. Alexander Wendt on various occasions has 
linked ideas to discourse, claiming, for example that “in acknowledging the 
independent effects of material conditions it is also important not to lose sight of the 
discursive conditions that invest them with meaning” (Wendt, 2000, p. 393). One of 
the reasons why the ambiguity between ideas and discourses has not been resolved 
can be attributed to the association of discourses with post-structuralism which has 
emerged in IR in open opposition to the more positivist mainstream in the discipline, 
often with the result of cutting off the communication channels with it (Fierke,
2002). It is to keep these channels open and develop a middle ground that most 
constructivists, especially in the US, have preferred to drop explicit references to 
discourse and shift the discussion towards the less “polluted” definition of ideas. 
Another motif of vagueness in relating ideas and discourses is connected to the 
frequent confusion of discourse and language, which is interpreted as one specific 
articulation of ideas and often equated with everyday or spoken language. On the 
contrary, and relying on the theory of discourse advanced by Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985), I argue that discourse, broadly defined, goes beyond language, investing both 
physical objects and social practices with meaning. As Keller suggests, paraphrasing 
Laclau and Mouffe, discourses can be defined as “structured and structuring 
structures” (Keller, 2005, p. 1), aimed at making certain articulations of elements 
possible and meaningful, while ruling other possible configurations out.
A second central concept that has set constructivism apart from other traditions 
in IR, but has gained a certain consensus among scholars investigating the diffusion 
and localization of new discourses, concerns the role of the state as an agent of 
change. While recognizing the growing importance of multinational corporations, 
International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and social movements in 
these processes, constructivists tried to avoid the divide between state and non-state
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actors. Instead of a static vision of the international system, where resources either 
can be possessed by one agent or by another in a zero-sum game, they proposed a 
more fluid conception, where heterogeneous non-state institutions can coexist with 
strong states. The acknowledgement that other actors may be gaining power at the 
expense of the state has thus been coupled with the claim that states are still the 
medium through which change occurs. New discourses, policies or norms can be 
initiated by state actors, as well as by international organizations or private firms. 
The state, however, is still the entity that has to process and adopt them in order to 
make them relevant.
If this position has reached a certain consensus among constructivists, what has 
instead divided them along different fronts is how the identities of states and their 
internal structures influence the ways in which the new discourses are appropriated 
or resisted. To explain the great variation among states’ responses to the demands of 
the intentional system Wendt stressed the role of their identities which he defined as 
“relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self’ (Wendt, 
1992, p. 397). Identities classify states according to how they structure their 
relations, internally, with their societies and, externally, with the international 
system. They are the result of long term paths of domestic and international political 
interactions. They inform states’ interests and, consequently, their actions. For 
Wendt it is possible to distinguish between type (such as democratic, authoritarian, 
etc.) and role identities, which identify the role of a state in relation to others (such as 
enemy, hegemon, etc.). While he stressed the role of the international system in 
sanctioning different identities, authors such as Risse-Kappen preferred to explain 
variation referring to domestic structures, which “encompass the organizational 
apparatus of political and societal institutions, their routines, the decision-making 
rules and procedures incorporated in law and custom, as well as the values and norms 
embedded in political culture” (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 20). In both cases, however, 
the focus is on those elements that can allow researchers to classify states into 
typologies that are useful to detect similarities and regularities in cross-case studies, 
but help little in understanding which specific elements of the political culture of a 
state, which discourses animating its society, influence the reinterpretation and 
reshaping of specific ideas and artefacts. Ethiopia, for example, has been classified as
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belonging to the category of semi-authoritarian regimes (Aalen, 2006; Ottaway,
2003) that are characterized as “ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical 
acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic 
institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civic and political liberties with 
essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits” (Ottaway, 2003, p. 3). While this 
classification is useful in highlighting some key aspects of the distribution of power 
in the country, and how its centralization affects the capacity of different actors to 
advance their own political plans, it does not capture the fundamental features of the 
political culture that influenced processes of resistance and reinterpretation. A state 
identity, as authoritarian or democratic, developed or developing, cannot be the main 
explanatory variable when the scope of the research is to detect the specific traits that 
a technopolitical regime has taken on.
The concept of state identity, while still relevant, is applied here in a broader 
and less defining fashion. According to Green, for example, “national identities are 
built from basic, primordial, and constructed elements such as a traditional territory 
or homeland, common myths and historical memories, a common public culture, a 
common set of rights and duties for members, and a common economy” (Green, 
2002, p. 33). Katzenstein supported a similar understanding of identity and relied 
more heavily on cultural and political determinants to explain for example the form 
of militarism Japan developed in the aftermath of the second world war (Katzenstein 
& Okawara, 1993), and later its counterterrorism strategies (Katzenstein, 2003). This 
scholarship invites a deeper investigation of the specific discourses which may, or 
may not, be characteristic of other countries, but should be analyzed when the scope 
of the research is explaining why a country has taken a specific course of action, and 
what are its defining traits.
2.5 Other possible paths
Before choosing the history of technology tradition and constructivism in the 
IR as the primary foundation for building a conceptual framework, a number of other 
theories were explored as potential frameworks for the analysis of the interactions
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between ICTs, local and international political actors, and development challenges. 
Some of these offer interesting insights into the dynamics described so far, but were 
progressively relinquished in order to maintain conceptual homogeneity and clarity. 
In addition, while they may be helpful in illuminating specific parts of the research, 
they could not address a sufficiently wide range of issues with consistency and 
balance.
As previously mentioned, SCOT, for example, was a possible tool for 
exploring how technology and human agents influence each other, emphasizing the 
political nature hidden in artefacts and analyzing how this produces responses among 
those in power. It offered instruments to deconstruct the technological determinism 
which pervades the mainstream approach to ICT for development studies and to 
accept that conflict is part of the process of innovation. The main problem with how 
SCOT and similar traditions relate to research of the kind presented in this thesis, is 
that their ‘fine-grain’ lens emphasizes the ‘micro’ aspects of human-technology 
interaction, failing to capture key issues at the ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ level.
Actor Network Theory (ANT) which together with SCOT is part of the Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) tradition, could also have been employed as a 
perspective to examine the opportunities and limits that the interaction between 
human and non-human agents gives rise to (Latour, 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999). 
ANT overcomes the division between human and non-human, inherited from the 
social sciences, opening up the possibility of dealing with specific assemblages 
where technology is not considered a priori as ‘enabling’ and ‘fostering’, and humans 
attributed pre-existing sets of interests and plans, simply enacted by ICTs. However, 
as Fine (2005) points out, even if ANT scholars claim to have removed the 
distinction between micro and macro, similarly to SCOT, they continued to locate 
their research primarily at the micro level. This tendency is visible in a number of 
studies that have been criticized by Walsham (1997) for concentrating on detailed 
descriptions of specific networks without paying attention to the broader social 
structures and processes within which they emerge. On the contrary, relying on 
concepts such as technopolitics and focusing on the nexus between discourses 
articulated at the local and at the international level, forces the researcher to look 
beyond the simple assemblage of actors and artefacts, extending the analysis to larger
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socio-technical networks. In addition, even if attempts have been made to employ 
ANT in the study of ICTs in developing countries (Stanforth, 2007), ANT offers an 
intriguing perspective primarily in technologically dense societies, where the 
attribution of agency to artefacts may help to explain their influence on everyday life, 
while in a developing context some of its assumptions may be too audacious and 
complicated.
Constructivism was chosen over other traditions in international relations and 
comparative politics for several reasons that have already been explained, but one in 
particular is worth emphasizing: the conceptualization of discourses. As previously 
argued, in this research ICTs are considered not only as technical artefacts but also as 
discourses that influence policy and state action. Constructivists theorize discourses 
in a way that is compatible with the approach taken in this thesis, framing them as 
‘symbolic technologies’, as representations and as social phenomena that shape 
decisions and plans (Laffey & Weldes, 1997). Neo-realism and neo-liberalism, in 
contrast, leave little space to the analysis of how discourse influences specific 
courses of action, and when some authors refer to ideas, they treat them simply as 
mental concepts or beliefs that are held by individuals (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). 
This thereby excludes the possibility of analyzing, as this thesis does, the way 
narratives about technology but also about nation and culture, have implications on 
state behaviours and actions in the realm of ICTs.
2.6 A conceptual framework to study technology and 
politics in context
Examining the uses of ICTs for development by employing concepts offered 
by the history of technology and by constructivism in IR means reframing a process 
that has often been described as technologically-driven, where ICTs impact 
developing countries producing specific “effects”, or society-shaped, where 
governments restrict some uses of technology because they are considered 
incompatible with a local culture or threaten political stability. It means analyzing the 
adoption of ICTs as a complex interplay where both local and international actors
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and political and technical forces interact and negotiate to find a fixation of meanings 
and artefacts in a specific national context. To make this intricate process intelligible 
I integrate four main concepts that allow for the analysis of key actors, structures, 
and practices, while leaving other, less central, features in the background.
Conflict is the starting point
Rephrasing a claim Wendt made in the conclusion to his book on the Social 
theory o f  international politics (1999) and discussed above, it can be argued that:
It makes more sense to begin theorizing about the role o f ICTs for development 
by framing them as sites of conflicts and negotiations, and then look for a 
possible fit, rather than the other way around (assuming their neutrality to later 
appreciate resistances to their application).26
This argument contrasts with the idea embraced by many scholars and 
practitioners in the ICT for development field that the role of new technologies 
depends primarily on how they can optimally contribute to a set of pre-defmed 
indicators, such as their support to growth in the GDP per capita, the enlargement of 
the educated population or the democratization of institutions. Even if these are noble 
goals, in many cases fundamental disagreements about what a technology is, which 
discourses it incorporates or should incorporate, and what purposes it may serve, take 
its implementation away from a simple application for a predetermined set of 
objectives. As Hecht (1998; 2001) illustrated in her research on nuclear power in 
France, technology can become part of the complex political plans pursued by 
different groups within the nation and be re-shaped so as to perform policies in ways 
that complement more traditional tools such the proclamation of a law or the creation 
of an institution.
26 The original sentence says that “it makes more sense to begin theorizing about international politics 
with the distribution of ideas, and especially culture, in the system, and then bring in material forces, 
rather than the other way around” (Wendt, 1999, p. 371)
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This conflictual aspect is not isolated only to the national level. If a technology 
can become a component of the hegemonic plans advanced by a government, it can 
also be employed by international actors to advance their own hegemonic discourses. 
As illustrated in section 2.1, the use of ICTs for development has been charged with 
a variety of meanings by influential international players which, trying to frame those 
meanings as neutral or grounded in evidence, pursued the goal every hegemonic 
project is set to achieve: presenting a partial view of the world as taken-for-granted 
knowledge (Gramsci, 1951-1991; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).
Therefore, when studying the application of ICTs in a developing country it 
makes more sense to begin by mapping the discourses that permeate the politics and 
culture of that country and how they relate to those that ICTs already have, rather 
than assuming that those articulated internationally will eventually prevail. This does 
not mean rejecting the idea that new technologies have functions and produce effects. 
As much as constructivists in IR do not refuse the roles military or industrial capacity 
plays, but advocate mapping the distribution of discourses first and subsequently 
bringing in the material forces, I similarly argue that it is more useful to start with a 
consideration of politics and then investigate the possibilities of using technology to 
reach a particular goal. The approach proposed in this thesis does not intend to 
replace those that already exist, but aims to complement them.
Technology is both material and discursive
As suggested by a concept like technopolitics, and similarly advanced by 
authors such as Mansell and Silverstone (1996), and, from a different perspective by 
the SCOT tradition (Bijker et al., 1987; Bijker & Law, 1992), technologies should be 
interpreted both in terms of their material and discursive components. Here the 
discursive element of technology is considered in two different, but interrelated and 
co-present, dimensions.
On the one hand, discourses are what invest the material world with meaning 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In its simplest form meanings are attached to artefacts as 
descriptions, manuals, and texts, telling users about the appropriate ways of 
operating a specific technical object. In many cases a technology when it is marketed
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or when it is proposed, as has been initially the case for ICTs in developing 
countries, is not even visible. What are visible are only the potential and expected 
uses described by the advocates of its application. As Pinch, Ahmore and Mulkay 
have pointed out in their study of the discursive embeddedness of clinical budgeting 
systems, “technologies are often made available through texts, and the meaning 
given to a technology through such texts can vary from context to context (and/or 
audience to audience) [...] It is only by close attention to the different discursive 
contexts in which these definitions are offered and an examination of the rhetoric of 
technology that we can begin to understand the full richness of its multifaceted and 
interpretative nature” (Pinch, Ashmore, & Mulkay, 1992, p. 272). For the same 
technology, a multiplicity of possible discourses exists. However, their formulation is 
not the exclusive right of inventors or advocates. A new technology can be inserted 
into a different discursive realm that may develop different interpretations of its 
nature and use. Discourses are always in competition, looking for a closure that 
should make a certain meaning prevalent and others hardly possible. This is the 
reason why the same technology, the Internet for example, can be interpreted by 
some actors as liberating while by others as a threat. It is by investigating different 
discursive realms that these competing readings can be assessed.
On the other hand, technologies are not simply material elements, as a stone or 
a tree is, that need to be invested with specific discourses to acquire meaning. 
Because of their very nature as products of human activity, they also embed 
discourses that are enabling and constraining at the same time. Winner (1980) 
showed how certain prescriptions can be inserted into objects and work as well, if not 
better, than laws or warnings. Similarly, Hecht’s notion of technopolitics illustrated 
how technologies represent a particular way to perform politics, allowing actors to 
reach goals that would not be attainable otherwise. Thus, in this study this duality 
will be taken into account by framing technologies and discourses as two 
complementary and co-present elements through which societies may change and 
may aim at changing other societies.
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Discourses do not spread by themselves and require agency to diffuse and be 
implemented
Discourses may resonate with each other to varying degrees, and technologies 
may encounter acceptance or resistance at the local level. In any case the particular 
fit that a technology finds in each developing country is not simply there to be found, 
as the result of a static combination between given technologies and given 
discourses, but it is constructed by either local or international actors, or both. As 
Finnemore illustrated in the case of UNESCO’s advocacy role in the diffusion of 
science bureaucracy, discourses to spread need to be carried by “active teachers” 
(1993; Finnemore, 1996). And, as complementarily shown by Risse-Kappen (1995a), 
Sikkink (1991) and Keck and Sikkink (1998), to become effective at the local level 
they need to find agents that endorse them and have the power to enact them on the 
ground. In many cases it is not simply one actor -  a ministry, a company or an NGO 
-  that has enough power or capacity to perform this task alone and winning 
coalitions need to be formed.
In the case of ICTs this process that has been analyzed by constructivist 
scholars in IR for the diffusion of new discourses, is further complicated by their 
material component. The fit needs to be found both at the discursive and at the 
material level. It can be the impossibility to unlock and reshape a particular 
technology considered to be both useful and harmful by an authoritarian government 
that prevents its acceptance, and the development of a greater capacity to control it 
that opens the door to its reception. In a country like China, for example, the increase 
of the number of Internet users has coincided with an increase in the capacity of the 
central government to prevent specific uses and favour others. It can be argued that 
in the absence of such a technical capacity, a similar diffusion might not have 
happened, at least not at the same pace. The capacity of local agents to insert in a 
“technology of freedom” some element of an authoritarian discourse created the 
possibility for a fit that could have not be found otherwise (Kalathil & Boas, 2003).
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Technopolitical regimes are where the negotiations occur
The space where the negotiations and transformations described so far happen 
is what Hecht called a technopolitical regime (1998). It is an assemblage of 
discourses, artefacts, institutions, and actors connected to one another in looser or 
tighter ways to perform a particular goal or solve a particular problem. A 
technopolitical regime is an analytical construct. However, it can be perceived in its 
systemic nature not only by a researcher studying it, but also by the actors composing 
it, or against whom the regime stands. Different regimes may emerge around the 
“same” technology and compete for the definition of its standards and uses. In the 
case of Hecht’s research on France’s nuclear programme between the 1950s and the 
1970s she identified the emergence of two regimes, a nationalist and nationalized, 
performing different sets of goals, grounded in different institutions, and pursuing a 
different kind of politics. The “same” technology was captured by competing 
discourses which profoundly affected the way in which it was used and the shape 
that it took.
ICTs can similarly become part of different technopolitical regimes and can be 
appropriated by a variety of actors to advance their own political aspirations. A 
technopolitical regime may emerge not only as the outcome of a negotiated process 
between a specific technology and a cultural and political context, but also as an 
instrument for competing actors to define the uses of that technology as well as 
advance their political agenda. The number and nature of these regimes cannot be 
defined a priori, but it is only though an in-depth investigation of the distribution of 
power in a given national context, of the discourses permeating it and of the actors 
advancing them that it is possible to reconstruct their features and purposes. As both 
Hughes and Hecht indicated, a technopolitical regime is both the expression of how 
power is distributed in a particular national context and an instrument for the exercise 
of power.
Observed through the conceptual framework highlighted above the main 
question informing this thesis, and thus “Why and how have ICTs been re­
interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia?” can be further specified as follow:
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• What factors have influenced the development of different 
technopolitical regimes based on ICTs in Ethiopia -  i.e. donor pressure, 
internal agenda, international standards -  and to what degree?
• What actors have made the selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia 
possible and what resources have been mobilized to enhance particular 
aspects of ICTs while marginalizing others?
If conflict is assumed as the starting point, greater attention can be given not 
just to the fact that ICTs evolved in a direction that partially contrasted with the 
discourses articulated internationally, but to the specific factors that intervened in the 
conflict. Also, when reinterpreted as a process of mutual influence between the 
technical and the political, and not simply as more or less successful applications of 
given artefacts in new contexts, the analysis of how power is distributed and 
exercised can come to the forefront.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter a conceptual framework has been offered to analyze why and 
how ICTs can be re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in developing countries. 
Starting with an exploration of what the dominant discourses about the applications 
of ICTs to development have been, both in policy and in selected academic circles, 
the chapter proceeded to criticize some of their assumptions, especially about ICTs 
“impacting” on developing countries. In particular, I have referred to authors 
explaining how new technologies, in both their material and discursive components, 
do not simply produce effects, but can themselves undergo significant 
transformations, adapting to locations that are different from those of their invention 
because of functional, cultural and political influences.
Building on this reformulation of what ICTs are and how they can become 
immersed in networks of discourses and power, analytical tools were combined 
drawing on the history of technology tradition and from constructivism in IR to
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produce a conceptual framework that can better account for the complexity of ICTs, 
their material and discursive existence, and their conflictuality. This framework is 
used throughout this research to guide both the collection and analysis of the data, as 
will be illustrated in the next chapter in greater detail. It is also employed to structure 
the analysis of the main findings in Chapter 8 which are divided according to the four 
dimensions that comprise the framework including the conflictual nature of ICTs; 
their material and discursive character; the role of agency in negotiating the 
application of new discourses and artefacts; and the emergence of technopolitical 
regimes as a result of these negotiations.
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C h a p t e r  3 -  R e s e a r c h in g  t e c h n o l o g y  in  c o n te x t
This chapter presents the methodology employed in this thesis to examine the 
reshaping of ICTs in Ethiopia. It starts by offering a personal and reflexive account 
of how and why the Ethiopian case became the subject of a structured investigation 
that was carried out combining case study research and a grounded theory approach. 
In the subsequent sections the specific methods that were used for collecting 
evidence are discussed, indicating how interview techniques, the observation of 
technical artefacts and the collection of textual material, from blog entries to 
newspaper articles, yielded data that were later integrated and analyzed. Finally, 
examples of the data analysis procedure are provided, indicating the principles that 
informed the presentation of the main findings.
3.1 Strategies for research: case study and grounded 
theory
The understanding of the reasons and practices that informed the adaptation of 
ICTs in Ethiopia developed through a progressive engagement in the field and with 
the collected evidence. The research started with broad observations of the 
uniqueness of applications of ICTs in the country and moved towards deeper and 
more precise explanations of what influenced the emergence of specific 
technopolitical regimes.
My first exposure to the uses of ICTs in Ethiopia was in early 2005 when I 
moved to Addis Ababa as a United Nations fellow assigned to work on ICTs, 
development and education for the UNESCO International Institute for Capacity 
Building in Africa (IICBA). A major contested issue at the time was the 
implementation of Schoolnet, the system using Internet Protocol (IP) based satellite 
connections to broadcast pre-recorded classes to secondary schools. I began my 
preliminary research by visiting some schools in Addis Ababa and interviewed a
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number of teachers, deans and students. The system was very new as lessons had 
recently started to be broadcast only a few months before, in September 2004. This 
early research was not scientifically rigorous but it provided important insight into 
the system, including indications that most of the “targets”, the students and teachers, 
were at odds with it. Schoolnet had been implemented without any consultation with 
the teaching staff, whose members were very concerned that they would be made 
redundant because technology had come to do their job. Students also had problems
97understanding programmes that used English as the medium of instruction. The 
teachers and students were not alone in their frustration with Schoolnet. In monthly 
meetings organized by the donors and international organizations involved in 
education in Ethiopia, which I attended regularly as part of my job at UNESCO- 
IICBA, it was difficult to have ICT issues put on the agenda. The government had 
pushed hard for the new system to be put in place, without really seeking an 
agreement on the part of the donors.
The roll-out of Schoolnet occurred in the context of the larger events of 2005, 
during which the most contested elections in the history of Ethiopia were held. The 
pre-election period was characterized by an opening up of the spaces for the political 
debates, in the state-owned broadcast media, in the press and on-line. The 
expectations for a fair electoral process were high and the turnout on the election 
day, May 15, was unprecedented (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009; Carter Center, 2005). 
Unfortunately, the counting the ballots and the proclamation of the results, which 
gave a large majority to the incumbent government, were significantly less
9Rtransparent. This caused protests in the main cities where, in most cases, the 
government responded with overwhelming force resulting in the death of hundreds of
• • 90Ethiopians. Tens of thousands of young men were rounded up and arrested. The
27 It is worth noting that the first observations were made in the capital Addis Ababa, in schools 
located in the city centre, where the command of English, which is the compulsory medium of 
instruction in secondary education, should arguably be better than elsewhere in Ethiopia
28 Ethiopia election rows resurface http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/affica/4724755.stm. Last time accessed 
14.04.10
29 Violence across Ethiopian capital http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/affica/4398806.stm. Eyewitness: 7  
couldn't help them' http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/affica/4400270.stm. Ethiopian protesters 'massacred' 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/affica/6064638.stm Last time accessed 14.04.10
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public criticism towards the government in the immediate aftermath of the elections 
and the organization of the protest were largely influenced by new media. Websites 
and forums populated by the Ethiopian diaspora incited citizens to revolt against the 
government and the Short Message Service (SMS) was used to mobilize crowds of 
people to protest. In response, the government quickly suspended the SMS and later 
started blocking oppositional websites, in both cases attributing the blockages to 
technical problems.
The use of ICTs in this context highlighted fundamental disagreements among 
different segments of the Ethiopian society in the interpretation of how the new tools 
could and should be used. Similarly, the condemnation by the international 
community of both the censorship imposed on the Internet and the “misuse” of ICTs 
for education was a signal of an unresolved tension between prescriptions for, and 
actual uses of, ICTs. Witnessing the unfolding of these processes was an important 
stimulus to my subsequent decision to deepen my understanding of the complex 
relationship between ICTs, the state and other key actors in Ethiopia. It also 
influenced my choice of instruments to be employed for the task. The complexity of 
the relationship between the technical, the social and the political I observed in 
Ethiopia encouraged the development of a conceptual framework that could facilitate 
the study of how heterogeneous actors interact, struggle and negotiate, beyond the 
simplistic idea of technological transfer or the diffusion of innovations.
This framework was outlined in Chapter 2, where concepts emerging from the 
history of technology tradition and from constructivism in international relations 
were combined with other traditions, stressing notions of conflict, hegemony, and 
power. This has also led to reformulating the interest in the re-interpretation, re­
definition and re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia as a more detailed exploration of the 
factors influencing the emergence of specific technopolitical regimes over alternative 
ones, of the resources mobilized to make this possible and of the actors involved in 
the process. It was with these questions in mind that the following phase of the 
research was planned, involving six months of fieldwork in Ethiopia.
Between February and July 2008 data were gathered and preliminarily 
analyzed from three main sources:
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1) Seventy-seven in-depth interviews were collected with individuals who 
participated to the development of ICTs in Ethiopia in different capacities, from state 
ministers to system administrators in remote woredas, from private and government 
journalists to international civil servants. The sampling strategy I adopted is 
explained in section 3.3.1, while a full list of interviewees can be consulted in 
Appendix 1.
2) Woredanet and Schoolnet sites were visited in three regions, Oromiya, 
Tigray and Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples, for a total of six sites visited. 
In each case I collected observations on the systems’ architecture and of its 
functioning, and in most instances I had the opportunity to speak with teachers, 
students and deans when visiting a school, and with local administrators when in a 
government office. A detailed illustration of the procedures I employed is offered in 
section 3.3.2.
3) Additional textual material was collected to provide context to the 
interviews and observations and to supply additional evidence of the discourses 
characterizing the political debate in the country as well as the debate over ICTs. 
This material included: ICT policies, monitoring and evaluations reports on 
Woredanet and Schoolnet, newspapers articles and editorials from key Ethiopian 
newspapers, blog entries posted by Ethiopians in the country and in the diaspora. A 
full overview of this additional material and of the rationale behind its collection is 
provided in section 3.3.3.
In order to structure the data collection and analysis I employed a procedure 
that arguably has become the canon of good interpretive and qualitative research as 
identified by authors such as Yin (1994), Eisenhardt (1989), Glaser and Strauss 
(1967), Miles and Huberman (1994). At the same time, I developed more specific 
practices to tailor those research instruments to the case under scrutiny and to apply 
the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2. All materials have been further 
organized with the support of NVIVO 7 software for qualitative analysis.
72
3.1.1 Case study research
My research is structured along the lines of an in-depth, single case study as it 
took place in a single country and analyzed how a specific set of technologies took 
shape within it (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 1994). As Yin points out, 
case study research entails the adoption of a particular strategy rather than the 
selection of specific methods (Yin, 1994). It allows one to make use of data in a 
structured way and to examine in detail the relations that connect phenomena 
together. It involves an “empirical investigation of a particular contemporary 
phenomenon” (Robson, 1993, p. 146), even if some of its instruments are similar to 
those used by historians. A case study approach is particularly applicable for the kind 
of research question I address. It is mostly used when a “how” and/or “why” question 
is being asked and there is little or no possibility to manipulate the events being 
investigated. In contrast, other strategies such as surveys or experiments, are 
preferred when the question is about prevalence or when there is a greater control 
over the events (Campbell, Daft, & Hullin, 1982; Yin, 1994). Both historians of 
technology and constructivists in international relations have employed single or 
small-N case study research to advance knowledge in their respective fields. Hughes 
studied electrification in different Western countries (Hughes, 1983), while Hecht 
focused on the development of the nuclear programme in France (Hecht, 1998). The 
majority of IR authors I refer to in my work developed their theories and 
observations through case studies, from Sikkink’s research of how developmentalism 
was received differently in Argentina and Brazil (Sikkink, 1991), to Finnemore’s 
analysis of UNESCO’s role in the development of science bureaucracies (Finnemore, 
1996); and from Risse-Kappen’s edited book on transnational relations (1995b) to 
Checkel’s analysis of the Soviet/Russian behaviour at the end of the cold war 
(Checkel, 1997).
Despite its popularity, however, the case study approach is not exempt from 
criticism. Flyvbjerg (2006) illustrated some of the most common critical remarks 
about case-study research in the social sciences, from the accusation that no theories 
can emerge from it, to its usefulness only in the initial generation of hypotheses but 
not in their testing, to the bias towards verification. While challenging these and
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other prejudices, Flyvbjerg conceded, nonetheless, as others before him (Ragin & 
Becker, 1992; Stake, 1995), that the case study approach is not fit for all kinds of 
research, but it is most powerful when certain conditions are met. He argues, for 
example, that “the case study is ideal for generalizing using the type of test that 
Popper called “falsification” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228) and advocated experiences 
that let the researcher spend sufficient time on the ground to question preconceived 
ideas and have new ones emerge as a result of direct contact with data and events. He 
noted that:
Researchers who have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies typically 
report that their preconceived views, assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses 
were wrong and that the case material has compelled them to revise their 
hypotheses on essential points. The case study forces on the researcher the 
type o f falsifications described above. Ragin called this a “special feature o f  
small-A'" research” and went on to explain that criticizing single-case studies 
for being inferior to multiple-case studies is misguided, because even single­
case studies “are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence 
may be linked in many different ways” (p. 225). Geertz (1995) said about the 
fieldwork involved in most in-depth case studies that “The Field” itself is a 
“powerful disciplinary force: assertive, demanding, even coercive” (p. 119).
Like any such force, it can be underestimated, but it cannot be evaded. “It is 
too insistent for that,” said Geertz (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 235).30
According to Flyvbjerg, a single case study approach should thus be pursued 
when there are the premises for letting data from the field exercise assertiveness in 
challenging preconceived ideas, a feature that has characterized a large part of my 
research. As explained above, the study of the re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia 
developed through a progressive involvement with both theoretical insights and 
empirical evidence. The phenomena observed in Ethiopia initially forced me to 
reconsider some of the assumptions I developed both through my professional 
activity in the ICTs for development field and through my engagement with the
30 The works Flyvbjerg refers to in the quote reported above are (Ragin & Becker, 1992) and (Geertz, 
1995).
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literature. This led to the formulation of questions that later guided extensive 
fieldwork involving continuous comparisons among multiple sources of evidence.
Among the four categories of cases Flyvbjerg identifies -  extreme, maximum 
variation, critical, and paradigmatic -  the reshaping of ICTs in Ethiopia falls 
arguably under the critical type. Ethiopia is one of the poorest country in the world as 
its GDP per capita ranks it 171st out of 182 countries.31 It receives the largest amount 
of aid in Africa. And it enjoys a very preferential and positive relationship with 
Western governments. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was celebrated by former 
American President Bill Clinton as belonging to a new generation of African leaders 
and was selected by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to serve as the sole 
African prime minister in his Commission for Africa. Following the logic adopted by 
Flyvbjerg, Ethiopia could be considered the “least likely” case in which technology 
could be applied in ways that are conflicting with those advocated at the international 
level. Nonetheless, cases like Woredanet and Schoolnet indicated that even in a 
country whose resources largely depend on international assistance and whose 
relationship with Western countries are positive ICTs could be drastically re-shaped.
Within Ethiopia, the initial selection of which aspects of ICTs should be 
explored followed the criteria defined by Hughes and Hecht in their research. Neither 
of them offered clear-cut boundaries delimiting large technical systems (LTS) or 
technopolitical regimes. They preferred an image of the technical and the social 
connected in a seamless web, where one represents the continuation of the other. The 
definitions they provided pointed to heterogeneous sets of material and discursive 
elements, such as physical artefacts, firms and laboratories, but also laws, political 
programmes and institutional ideologies. At the same time, however, they recognized 
a unifying characteristic of LTS or technopolitical regimes in their problem-solving 
capacity and in their emergence as networks whose nodes cohere to fulfil a particular 
goal. Therefore, in order to identify a LTS or a technopolitical regime, Hughes and
31 Between 2004 and 2008 Ethiopia’s GDP per capita ranked it either at the 170th or 171st position out 
of 182 countries (UNDP, 2005, 2006,2008, 2009).
32 Between 2004 and 2008 Ethiopia’s Overseas Development Assistance, has almost doubled, 
reaching more than three billion dollars in 2008 and raking Ethiopia as the major recipient of donors’ 
funds in the continent (OECD, 2009)
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Hecht’s experiences indicate that we need to move beyond the simple artefact to look 
at the set of institutions that inform its functioning, at the actors using it to perform 
specific tasks and at the ways in which these elements connect in solving a particular 
problem. They also illustrate how it is only in practice that it becomes possible to 
understand what these institutions/actors are, how they are connected with each other 
and to specific technical objects. This exploration and the demarcation of clearer 
borders defining different technopolitical regimes has been carried out using the 
instruments of grounded theory described below. These define a set of steps to move 
between data collection and analysis and to progressively develop theory from 
empirical evidence.
3.1.2 Using grounded theory for the study of technical artefacts
Grounded theory emerged as a structured procedure to collect, organize, filter 
and analyze qualitative data and to explain social phenomena in terms of their 
causes, conditions and consequences (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Since its initial 
formulation it has been used in a variety of fields, from social psychology (Charmaz, 
1990), to organizational research (Martin & Turner, 1986), and international relations 
(Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Its application in a wider range of disciplines, however, has 
often followed only some of the procedures originally developed by its creators, 
Glaser and Strauss (1967). While, for example, many researchers have employed and 
advocated a systematic coding of the data, proceeding from open codes to concepts 
and categories, far fewer have followed the orthodoxy by engaging in research in the 
absence of any previous theoretical grounding (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example 
grounded theory has been proposed as a bridge between the theoretical assumptions 
made by discourse theory and empirical research (Keller, 2005). If grounded theory 
in fact is incommensurate with inductive a-priori theories, it has been used 
successfully in combination with more open frameworks.
33 An example of an inductive, a-priory, theory can be taken from Dahl’s work on poliarchy, where he 
proposed propositions such as that indicating that “the likelihood that a government will tolerate an 
opposition increases as the expected costs of toleration decrease” (Dahl, 1971, p. 15).
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The “theories” I have drawn upon in my research can be considered to belong 
to these types of frameworks. Within the IR tradition, a particular view of the 
international system is proposed, but no stringent theory is advanced about how it 
works, letting the researcher elicit new concepts from empirical data. As Finnemore 
and Sikkink note in their attempt to link a constructivist stance in IR with a specific 
empirical agenda, “constructivism is not a substantive theory of politics. It is a social 
theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change. 
Constructivism does not, however, make any particular claims about the content of 
social structures or the nature of agents at work in social life. [...] It offers a 
framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but 
makes no claims about their specific content” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 393). 
It is within this open framework that I employed grounded theory, interpreting it as a 
systematic approach to qualitative data analysis rather than as a prescribed formula.34 
Similarly, in the case of the history of technology tradition as developed by Hughes 
and Hecht, a greater interdependence between the social, the political and the 
technical is proposed, in order to better understand the processes of technological 
innovation and implementation. No proposition is advanced on the specific causes 
leading to a particular configuration of artefacts, or on the consequences an artefact 
or a combination of artefacts are likely to produce in a given context.
A principle defined by Glaser and Strauss that I followed is the simultaneous 
collection of evidence and their early preliminary analysis. The examination of a first 
set of data informed the selection of new individuals, cases, and objects, leading to 
further analysis and a new selection, in a circular process. This is what Glaser and 
Strauss call “theoretical sampling” and which should allow new material to be 
included in the research plan and new, emerging, lines of inquiry to be followed 
when they demonstrate their capacity to answer the questions informing the research.
34 Various works on social research methodology stress this aspect over others, presenting grounded 
theory mainly as a structured approach to qualitative data (Flick, 2006; Holstein & Gubrium, 2003; 
Kelle, 2000). Also of its most eminent representatives do recognize that, in some cases, “a previously 
identified theoretical framework can provide insight, direction and a useful list of initial concepts” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 40).
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It is through this concurrent process that, for example, the connections structuring a 
technopolitical regime were explored, moving from its core to its periphery, 
delineating its characteristics as well as the features of other possible regimes against 
which it stood.
My practice of theoretical sampling was further guided by insights emerging 
from research in the history of technology tradition which suggest linking different 
sources of data to develop a deeper understanding of the discourses informing 
technopolitics. Historians such as Allen and Hecht (2001) indicate the importance of 
exploring the conceptualizations of technology held by politicians and technocrats. 
As they claim, “how public figures articulate the relationships between technology 
and society matters [...] to the development of technology itself. Technology may 
not drive history, but the fact that influential people believe that it does has real 
consequences”(Allen & Hecht, 2001, p. 5). To analyze the shape a particular 
technology has acquired it is thus important to investigate what key individuals 
thought of that technology and of its implications, and not to assume impacts based 
on an artefact’s characteristics, as most mainstream ICT for development scholars 
have done. At the same time, however, these conceptualizations may become 
apparent only later in the research process. Especially when investigating sensitive 
issues, informants may conceal some of the motivations at the core of their decisions. 
For this reason it may be useful to combine the views articulated about a particular 
technology with close and direct observation of that technology in action. In Hecht’s 
analysis of the French nuclear programme (2001) and Weinberger’s of the Swedish 
military strategy during the Cold War (2001), for example, it is argued that it was 
through a close examination of technological systems that it became possible to 
unveil the politics a nation or a group within a nation were really following. In a 
comment on these studies Allen and Hecht affirm that “in both the French and the 
Swedish case we see a disjuncture between declared policy (policy as rhetoric) and 
enacted policy (policy as practice). In both cases, an understanding of actual 
technological practice is necessary in order to view the disjuncture clearly. One 
might say that technologies camouflaged actual political practices -  except that the 
camouflage metaphor suggests a separation between technological and political
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practice that did not exist. A more precise formulation would be that these 
technological systems performed national politics” (Allen & Hecht, 2001, p. 18).
Combining the principles of grounded theory with the practices developed in 
studies of history of technology of the type highlighted above led to a process of 
iterative comparison between conceptualizations emerging from interviews, as well 
as from other textual material, and observations of how technical artefacts actually 
took shape. This going “back and forth” between the technical and the discursive was 
also essential to capture the conflictual nature of technological appropriation 
articulated in the conceptual framework (see Chapter 2), and the ability of 
technology to embed specific political plans, despite the frequent claims of its 
neutrality.
If a linear approach to the application of ICTs in developing countries focuses 
on what technology does, on the effects it produces, or it may produce, in a specific 
context, the conceptual framework I use requires investigation about how technology 
is perceived, how different perceptions lead to specific assemblages, and how politics 
intervenes in the process. In order to detect conflict it is necessary to map both 
discursive and material elements intervening in the process of technological 
adoption, link them together and understand how a specific distribution of power, 
both as exercised through artefacts and as held by social actors, made certain 
applications possible, while it marginalized alternative uses.
The methods that have been employed to explore these complex processes, the 
collection of testimonies from people who contributed to the development of ICTs in 
the country and the observation of specific technopolitical regimes, are illustrated in 
the following sections, together with an indication of the additional data that were 
gathered and the triangulation employed to combine them together.
3.2 Methods for data collection
During the six-month field research period three main techniques were 
employed for the data collection. Interviews were carried out with key politicians, 
technocrats, opposition leaders, international civil servants, local administrators,
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bureaucrats, members of civil society organizations and journalists. Close 
observations of technical artefacts and of their functioning were made during visits to 
Woredanet and Schoolnet sites in Tigray, Oromiya, and the Southern Nations 
Nationalities and People (SNNP), three regions in the north, centre and south of 
Ethiopia respectively. To complement this evidence additional uses of ICTs in the 
country were explored, archival material was gathered, from ICT policies to 
newspapers articles and blog entries. Because of the potential sensitivity of the issues 
under scrutiny, the techniques employed had to take into account additional 
challenges connected to the access to documents and informants (Lee, 1993; Lofland, 
1971; Shaffir & Stebbins, 1991; Undheim, 2003) and to the credibility of the 
collected information (Batteson & Ball, 1995; Gewirtz & Ozga, 1994; R. Phillips, 
1998). Some of the procedures followed to face these problems have been already 
illustrated, such as the verification of verbal evidence with the analysis of technical 
artefacts. Others are detailed further below.
3.2.1 Interviews: building trust and eliciting narratives
Seventy-seven people were interviewed. Forty of them were connected to the 
government in various capacities (ministers, party members, national and local civil 
servants, engineers working for key government agencies, etc.). The other thirty- 
seven belonged to institutions that participated in the development of ICTs in the 
country, but from an external and, in some cases, adversarial position (United 
Nations officials, ICT entrepreneurs, members of opposition parties, etc.) or held 
informed and influential opinions about ICTs, their evolution and role in the 
Ethiopian society. A list of the interviewees and of their affiliations can be consulted 
in Appendix 1.
The network of contacts I had built when I was working for the UNESCO- 
IICBA in 2005 and 2006 was fundamental to facilitate access to many interviewees. 
As part of my duties at UNESCO-IICBA I used to participate to donor meetings and 
to chair the “ICTs in education task force”, a group created to facilitate the 
communication and cooperation between the donor group and the Ministry of
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Education in Ethiopia on ICT related issues. This role allowed me to meet and to 
communicate regularly with officers in the Ministry and in other institutions in 
charge of the implementation and management of relevant ICT projects, such as the 
Educational Media Agency (EMA) and the Ethiopian ICT Development Agency 
(EICTDA). In an effort to make the task force more inclusive and representative, I 
also organized meetings with members of civil society organizations such as the 
Ethiopian IT Professional Association (EITPA), and the Ethiopian Free and Open 
Source Software Network (EFOSSNET). This experience helped me develop an 
overview of the key individuals operating in the ICT sector which later served as a 
guide for the selection of the interviewees, especially in the early stages of the 
research on the ground.
The first round of interviews started in mid February 2008 and involved six 
individuals from each of the two groups highlighted above. They were selected 
because of the role they played in influencing the development of ICTs in the 
country and of their capacity to provide comprehensive answers to my research 
questions. Following the procedures characterizing the grounded theory approach 
discussed in the previous section, this first set of interviews was preliminary 
analyzed, and later correlated with data obtained through the initial observations 
emerging from visits to Schoolnet sites -  it was possible to visit Woredanet sites only 
at a later stage -  and through the collection of other material, such as ICT policies 
and media laws. The results of this analysis started to be employed as an additional 
guide for the selection of new potential interviewees.
35 As indicated in section 3.1 the decision of the Ethiopian government to implement Schoolnet 
despite the resistance of the donor agencies made them reluctant to embark on new ICT projects and 
to make ICTs a priority. The ICT in education task force was an attempt to restart the dialogue. It 
contributed to important events, such as panels on ICTs in education during two consecutive Annual 
Review Meetings -where donor and government representatives meet to assess achievements and 
discuss new priorities of their cooperation -  and the “ICT in education” conference organized on 22- 
23 May 2006 in Addis Ababa by the EICTDA and the Graduate College of Telecommunication and 
Information Technology (GSTIT). Overall, however, the task force was not successful in restarting a 
productive cooperation between donor agencies and the Ministry of Education or the EICTDA, in 
ways that could substantially influence the development of ICTs in Ethiopia and the implementation 
and use of systems like Schoolnet.
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The process of selection and preliminary analysis continued throughout the 
whole field research, leading to the construction of a corpus that was considered 
comprehensive enough to answer the main research questions and sub-questions 
(Bauer & Aarts, 2000). The rationale behind each step extending the corpus was to 
add variety to the representations held on the particular phenomena under scrutiny, 
until saturation was reached. According to Bauer and Aarts a corpus is saturated 
when “adding further strata [which they define as known categories such as age, sex, 
occupational activity, urban/rural] may make only a small difference with regard to 
additional representations” (Bauer & Aarts, 2000, p. 34). In the case of my research a 
sign that saturation was being reached was, for example, when an officer from an 
additional international organization involved in ICTs in Ethiopia was returning very 
similar answers to those already collected from members of the other international 
organizations.
The particular techniques employed to conduct each interview were the result 
of the combination of different traditions, and were aimed at developing a rich 
understanding of the mechanisms that influenced decisions and courses of action. 
This method was based on the experience of authors who have used interviews to 
reveal information about the discourses which shaped policies (R. Phillips, 1998) or 
technologies (Akrich, 1992; Hecht, 1998; Pinch et al., 1992), and aimed to produce 
historical accounts that could not be narrated easily from secondary resources or 
written materials (Portelli, 1991; Seldon & Pappworth, 1983). The capacity 
interviews have to produce “a fine-textured understanding of beliefs, attitudes, values 
and motivations” (Gaskell, 2000, p. 39), was crucial to detect the potentially 
contested nature of technology in a developing context and the alternative, 
adversarial narratives challenging the dominant ones.
The problematic nature of the events, spanning a process of substantial 
reshaping of ICTs including the censoring of blogs opposing the government, 
required the interview techniques to be particularly flexible. For example, with 
respect to the quoting of the sources, when requested, I agreed not to record and took
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detailed notes. During an interview some interviewees occasionally requested to go 
“off the record” when addressing some particularly problematic issues. This 
happened mainly in the case of civil servants working in government institutions 
who were being critical of the system they were part of, or international civil servants 
when speaking at a personal level and not as representatives of the organization they 
were part of. Some interviewees have been anonymized. For the purpose of the 
examination, they have been quoted with a code that can be matched in the list of 
interviewees in Appendix 1. While not disruptive of my research -  most 
interviewees did not resist the idea of being quoted and the segments “off the record” 
were minimal in the context of complete interviews -  this flexibility was key in 
gaining trust and access.
Even more important in allowing nuanced stories to develop were the 
structuring of the interviews, their wording and their progression. To be unobtrusive 
and engage the interviewees, without imposing my views on the informants and go 
beyond issues of my exclusive interest, I combined in-depth interviews techniques 
(Gaskell, 2000; McCracken, 1988), with the practices of narrative interviewing 
(Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000) and oral histories (Portelli, 1991). A consequence of 
this choice was the replacement of a semi-structured questionnaire with a more 
flexible topic guide (see Appendix 2) covering a number of themes, but allowing me 
to follow different paths as they emerged and to reframe questions using the same 
language and references used by the interviewer. The goal was to use the informants’ 
knowledge and visions of the world and, as Jovchelovitch & Bauer (2000) suggest, 
transforming exmanent questions into immanent ones, therefore formulating 
questions that pertained to my specific research interest using the interviewee’s own 
words and terms. Another outcome of the adoption of some oral history techniques
36 In general I noticed that even in the case of the most relaxed interviewees, the recorder was 
perceived as an impediment to the flow of the interview. In many cases, I took notes making sure to 
transcribe them right after the interview or as soon as this was possible. There are a number of 
techniques that are used for speed-writing. Probably the most famous is the Easy-script elaborated by 
Levine (2001). This technique has been used in some cases for taking notes while a personal code for 
speed writing has been elaborated based on the jargon I started recognizing after the initial interviews. 
For example, the expression “ethic federalism” that was often mentioned during interviews with 
politicians and opposition leaders became “EF”, Woreda “W”, Woredanet “Wn”, etc.
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was the focus on facts and events, and on the meanings attached to them by their 
protagonists or witnesses. This helped to reconstruct the history of the development 
of ICTs in the country, inferring what the motivations were that had inspired certain 
courses of action. As Portelli, who explained the relevance of oral histories not only 
for historians, but also for the social scientists, has argued, “oral histories tell us not 
just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were 
doing, and what they now think they did” (Portelli, 1991, p. 50).
Finally, in selecting pertinent events and timeframes for my topic guide I did 
not focus only on the most recent, but also on the recent past. For example, I 
extended my questions to cover the civil war in the 1980s and the coming of a new 
political elite in the 1990s, searching for long-term paths of adoption and uses of 
ICTs that might shed light on the more recent developments. This helped build 
rapport and demonstrated my interest not only in specific issues but also more 
widely, in the history of the country and in the interviewees. It also produced richer 
accounts, as compared to those referring to the more recent events, probably because, 
as some collections of oral histories show (Arthur, 2006; Portelli, 1991, 1997), 
moments of crisis and transition usually produce more vivid narrations.
The application of this variety of techniques, and the progressive refinement of 
the topic guide in order to incorporate new data and perspectives, made the
'in
interviewing process engaging and rewarding. Interviews lasted between forty-five 
minutes and two hours, usually progressing from more cautious to more open and 
articulated answers. Interviews conducted at a later stage in the fieldwork tended to 
be more successful than earlier ones. The knowledge I accumulated, and carefully 
displayed when needed, on the evolution of ICTs in the country and on the political 
history of Ethiopia in general, helped building rapport with the interviewees and 
eliciting more focused answers.
37 Only a few issues were considered problematic by some interviewees and created tension 
throughout the interviewing process. One of them were for example was the violence in the aftermath 
of the 2005 elections, considered an “hot topic” especially by government officials.
84
3.2.2 Observation of technical artefacts
During fieldwork and in parallel with the collection of interviews, the 
observation of a variety of technical artefacts was carried out. It started with field 
visits in selected Schoolnet and Woredanet sites in Tigray, Oromiya and SNNP 
regions, to understand how the two systems operated and how their users perceived 
them. Three schools were visited and three Woredanet sites, two at the regional level
10
and one at the woreda level, were visited. Also in this case, the network of 
colleagues I previously built in Ethiopia in 2005 and 2006 was instrumental in 
granting me access to most sites. Usually, in order to visit a secondary school or a 
woreda office, I had to display a reference letter or be introduced by an acquaintance 
I had interviewed or contacted to organize the visit.
The observation of Schoolnet and Woredanet sites represented the opportunity 
to study how specific technological artefacts had been assembled and the reasons that 
motivated specific configurations. It allowed me to better understand and 
contextualize information previously collected through interviews as well as to note 
key aspects of the systems about which I could later ask for explanations from new 
informants. An example shows how this process worked in practice.
In one of the first interviews, a young Ethiopian technocrat, answering a 
question about how Woredanet was used in practice, responded by saying that:
[Woredanet] is owned by the federal government. The technology does not 
allow the regions or the woredas to use the system independently. In theory the 
regions are independent but still the main political framework and the rules are
38 As will be explained in detail in Chapter 6 the configuration of Woredanet at the woreda and at the 
regional level is practically identical.
39 The reference letter was written by my previous UNESCO employer, briefly describing who I was 
and what the purpose of my visit was. This document was, in most cases, sufficient to access all 
Schoolnet sites. Accessing Woredanet sites either at the regional or at the woreda level was more 
complicated and in most cases I had to be introduced by either an official in Addis Ababa or by other 
colleagues who had been working with the person in charge of the management of a Woredanet site.
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decided at the centre. There is no way for the regions to go on their own. So it is 
used by the centre, but it is also as a way to share resources, to stay together.40
A statement like this, if not compared with the specific technology it referred 
to, could offer a representation of how Woredanet was a centralized and tightly 
controlled system, but would be ambiguous about the specific instruments used to 
make this possible. By studying how Woredanet functions in a site, and by collecting 
reports and technical documents about its design, I could appreciate how the system 
was enhancing specific features and marginalizing others. I could collect 
observations and information on technical aspects to be further analyzed with the 
support of additional material at a later stage.
Each visit lasted between one and two hours and in the case of Schoolnet it 
frequently offered the opportunity to speak with students and teachers, while in the 
case of Woredanet I could engage in coversations with system administrators and 
local bureaucrats. In most of these instances I did not conduct interviews of the kind 
illustrated in the previous section. I took detailed notes during or immediately after 
my meetings to capture impressions and opinions about how the two systems worked 
and what they were contributing to. Assessing how the two systems operated on the 
ground was beyond the scope of my research, but the notes I collected with these 
informants were useful in providing further context to the observations of the 
technical artefacts themselves.
The research evolved beyond Schoolnet and Woredanet, to look at other local 
applications of ICTs that were complementing, patching or opposing those developed 
by the Ethiopian government. The examination of these other sites was guided by my 
conceptual framework and grounded in the empirical evidence I had started to 
collect. As noted in Chapter 2, and advanced by authors such as Hughes and Hecht, 
the construction of technological systems usually emerges in competition with 
alternatives. Therefore, to fully understand the features characterizing a
40 Interview: Anonymous (70). Some interviewees have been anonymized. For the purpose of the 
examination, they have been quoted with a code that can be matched in the list of interviewees in 
Appendix 1.
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technopolitical regime I had to investigate whether others emerged in opposition to it 
and what their characteristics were. At the more practical level, however, after a 
couple of months the visits and interviews started indicating more or less 
systematized alternative uses of ICTs. For example, in two of the schools where 
Schoolnet had been installed I was able to observe that other uses of ICTs were being 
promoted through projects financed and implemented by the international 
community that supported goals that appeared to be opposed to those the 
government-run system was designed to reach. Similarly, some interviewees, mostly 
working for local private companies or affiliated with civil society organizations, 
described previous attempts to use ICTs in ways similar to those experimented 
within other developing countries, from the installation of telecentres to the 
privatization of Internet Service Providers, that were opposed by the local 
government. These witnesses’ observations, substantiated by archival evidence, 
helped to reconstruct the history of the technopolitical regimes that appeared to have 
been marginalized or failed to emerge as alternatives to the national one, but which, 
nonetheless, mobilized energy, resources and responded to competing discourses on 
how ICTs could, or should, be used in Ethiopia.
The exploration of actual and potential plans to use ICTs in the country and of 
the actors at the core of these real or attempted projects, also offered the opportunity 
to map and understand in practice how power is distributed in Ethiopia. Many 
projects, even if tailored to the needs of different groups within the country, as a 
functionalistic approach might have uncovered, or responding to the local specificity, 
as a cultural analysis might have yielded, lacked the necessary endorsement of 
powerful actors to be implemented. Within the government apparatus itself, 
comparing the views and opinions collected from politicians and technocrats with 
what was later implemented or not implemented on the ground offered the 
opportunity to reconstruct the distribution of power among policy makers and 
technocrats.
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3.2.3 Other data and triangulation
In combination with the two main techniques discussed above, a set of 
strategies was used to elicit additional data that could provide context and crosscheck 
the data gathered through interviews and observations. This decision was motivated 
by two of the principles informing the research design and previously discussed in 
this chapter. First, as a result of the theoretical sampling procedure proposed by a 
grounded theory approach, the preliminary analysis of some of the interviews and of 
the notes highlighted some new themes that needed to be further investigated. Some 
of these required accessing data sources other than interviews or direct observations. 
For example, some government officials, when asked about the censoring of blogs, 
responded by pointing out that some of forums could be considered to be inciting 
ethnic hatred. Such statements needed to be crosschecked through directly accessing 
some of the online spaces that had been cited. Similarly, other informants pointed at 
the adversarial tone used in the government media towards most forms of opposition. 
As it was the case for the blogs, these assertions needed to be crosschecked through 
techniques such as examining the discourse articulated in state owned newspapers. 
Second, the controversial nature of the issue under scrutiny requested to access 
archival material and other sources of evidence in order to verify facts and figures.
As a result, three additional sources of evidence were collected: blog entries, 
newspapers articles and policy and project documents. As it will be illustrated in the 
next section, data from these sources was not systematically analyzed in the same 
way as the interview transcripts and notes from the observation of technical artefacts, 
but was used mostly to integrate the main corpus when needed and to provide 
context.
In order to select a number of relevant blog entries a screening of the three 
most popular blogs among Ethiopians was carried out in the 12 months preceding 
being blocked by the Ethiopian government in May 2006. According to Alexa, an 
online resource ranking websites worldwide, the three most visited sites targeting 
Ethiopian audiences were Nazret, Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian Review.41 The
41 Alexa.com ranks websites mostly through the feedback received from users who have the Alexa 
toolbar installed as a plug-in in their browsers. Despite criticism (see for example the article Alexa’s
results offered by Alexa were further checked with informants in Ethiopia, in order 
to authenticate their relevance and importance for an Ethiopian readership.
Regarding newspapers articles, editorials were collected in two key moments 
of the recent history of the country, during the transition from the Derg regime to the 
new government headed by the EPRDF and during the highly contested 
parliamentary elections in 2005. In both cases a period of six months was covered, 
three months before and after the EPRDF took over Addis Ababa, on 28 May 1991, 
and three months before and after the election day, on 15 May 2005. In the first 
instance only articles from the state owned The Ethiopian Herald were consulted, 
since it represented the only resource in English available at the time.42 In the second 
instance, editorials were accessed in translation in two weekly publications 
summarizing the most important articles published in the state owned and private 
press. The front covers of the two outlets, 7 Days Update and Press Digest, are 
reported in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2.43
make believe Internet http://techcrunch.eom/2007/l 1/25/alexas-make-believe-intemet/ Last time 
accessed 12.01.2010), it remains the most widely used resource on the web to freely access ranking of 
websites and usage statistics.
42 Copies of The Ethiopian Herald were consulted and photocopied in the library of the UNECA in 
Addis Ababa.
43 Press Digest was consulted and photocopied in Press Digest’s office, while copies of 7 Days Update 
were purchased.
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No Meeting Point
Election results expected from NEBE were not announced last week as expected. Strong language came 
for the Prime Minister when he dedared categorically that the EPRDF would not form a coalition with the 
opposition whether It Is defeated or not And, towards the end of the week, CUD and UEDF came up with 
a document calling for the formation of a government of national unity, media reports Indicated.
Swift decision, no coalition
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said opposition 
political parties must officially resolve to conduct 
their businesses only In a legal and peaceful 
manner. In an Interview with £7V (August A), 
Prime Minister Meles said It Is impossible to 
allow problems associated with the election to 
continue creating fear among the public and 
instability In the economy. The Prime Minister 
said that In many parts of the country, 
particularly in Addis Ababa, there Is a growing 
sense of fear that violence could suddenly erupt 
and that the peace of the nation could be In 
Jeopardy. The Prime Minister also pointed out 
that such fear Is being reflected in the declining 
business activities and even in development 
activities. Meles added that it Is by no means 
acceptable to a How the deterioration of business 
and development activities In a  country with 
acute poverty.
On the rtp r tn ra l  nmrwt- The Prime Minister 
said issues related to complaints were handled 
in a unique way through the investigation 
process that involved contesting political parties 
and even International observers to make the 
process transparent for the public and to build 
confidence among the partes. The daunting 
task of complaints investigation has been 
conducted well, and is still being conducted, 
Meles said, adding, "We have gone the extra 
mile to put In place such a system of 
investigation with the conviction that It would 
be of help to build democracy in the country. 
The effort to go the extra mile to accommodate 
the situation has created delay In the official 
announcement of the election. However, 
whatever was done for the sake of making the 
investigation process transparent Is worthwhile.*
Currently, Meles said, the process Is being 
finalized as the electoral board Is winding up the 
Investigation process and preparing for the next 
phase. "Now that the electoral process is being 
wrapped up, there is no need to continue going 
the extra mile, as has been the case so far. 
Accordingly, It has become necessary to strictly 
go by the word and spirit of the law."
On opposition stand: Meles dedared: "The state 
of uncertainty and fear of violence will not be 
allowed to continue. The situation must be 
resolved swiftly. The path of violence and peace 
must dearly be distinguished, and now is the 
time to make that distinction. At this point In 
time, leaders of opposition parties and their 
members must reach at some dedslon. Their 
decisions must Involve abandoning illegal 
activities, which they have been doing so far and,
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'Seven Days Update" is a summary of 
major reports o f the week from media 
sources in Ethiopia 
Price 15 birr
A WAAG Communications News Digest Service, P.O.Box 5707, Tel. 236783, Fax: 236784
Fig. 3.1 “7 Days Update ” cover
Finally, policy documents, reports on ICTs in Ethiopia, project documents and 
evaluations of Schoolnet and Woredanet were collected. The purpose of accessing 
policy documents was to determine the official position of the Ethiopian government 
on ICTs, as articulated in the documents that were shared with other players such as 
international organizations and foreign governments and often used to assess the 
status of ICTs and government commitment to their use. Project documents and 
evaluations offered important background material and were confronted with the 
observations conducted in Woredanet and Schoolnet sites.
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In Government Media
Federal Police cet to protect 
constitutional order, ensure 
public peace, security
The Federal Police Commission says it has 
made extensive preparations at state and federal levels 
with a view to protecting the constitutional order as well 
as ensuring the peace and stability of the public
The Commission called on the public, 
particularly the youth, to refrain from involving in any 
illegal activities.
In a statement he gave to- journalists here 
yesterday, the Federal Police Commissioner Workinch 
Gebeychu said police have made neccssarv 
preparations to ensure that Use loss of lives and property 
incurred due to the violence that erupted in June this 
year following the May 2005 National Elections would 
not happen again
The commissioner said the activities of political 
organizations must be within the boundary of the 
Constitution, and added that the public should guard 
against illegal activities realizing that there is nothing to 
be gained from riots and violence.
The Commissioner said police will not hesitate 
to lake necessary legal measures and discharge their 
responsibilities if activities contrary to the Constitution 
threaten the peace and security of citizens.
Speaking of the demonstration called for 
October 2, 2005 by the United Ethiopian Democratic 
Forces (UEDFj and the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD), the Commissioner said police have 
not been officially informed about any such 
demonstration.
The Commissioner said there are preconditions 
enshrined in the Constitution that should be met by any 
organ that calls a public rally or demonstration. These 
include, according to the Commissioner, taking 
responsibility by the body that organize for any 
problems that may occur in relation to the rally or 
demonstration.
P.O.BOX : 12719 TEL: 11 21 5 4 /SO 42 00 FAX : 251-1-51 35 23 E-mail: Phoenix.UnivmalOethionet.et
Fig. 3.2 “Press Digest” cover
These three sources of data: interviews, observations of technical artefact and 
additional textual material, were progressively triangulated. Tnangulation, when 
used in social science research, particularly in projects using qualitative methods, 
improves the quality and accuracy of findings, encouraging the researcher to reflect 
on inconsistencies and to explore multiple interpretations (Flick, 1992, Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). It presents the researcher with a variety of different objects and 
explanations, some of which have to be progressively ruled out to build a coherent
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theory or narrative. In the case of this thesis where some of the issues were 
particularly sensitive and some informants may manipulate information so that a 
particular version seems to be prevailing over others, it was also fundamental for 
spotting contradictions and problematic nodes.
As explained by Denzin (1978) there are different types of triangulation. Data 
triangulation involves the collection of different sources of data to respond to the 
same research question. Investigator triangulation employs multiple researchers. 
Theory triangulation is about using different perspectives to read the same 
phenomenon. And similarly methodological triangulation requires the adoption of 
multiple tools, for example, discourse and content analysis, to analyze the same 
object. As it emerged from the previous discussion, among these different kinds of 
triangulation I relied mainly on a triangulation by data sources, and different types of 
materials were chosen to examine the same phenomena from different perspectives. 
As it is further explained in the next section on the procedure of data analysis, 
triangulating data from different sources did not mean mixing together observations, 
interviews and editorials. The materials in each corpus were kept as homogeneous as 
possible, data from each source was analyzed separately and later triangulated to test 
the compatibility of the categories that had emerged from each source and their 
capacity to respond to the research questions.
3.4 Data analysis and presentation
The data analysis was carried out following some of the principles developed 
by grounded theory. The systematic approach to the data allowed recurrent patterns 
to progressively emerge from empirical observations, later to be integrated to provide 
responses to the research questions and to serve as guide to study similar phenomena. 
As already illustrated in this chapter, during the fieldwork data collection and 
analysis proceeded together, and different sources of evidence were combined and 
analyzed in order to select new cases which could help to answer the main research 
questions.
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The first step in the analysis involved a preliminary open coding of the first 
interviews, observations of technical artefacts, and documents such as the Ethiopian 
ICT policy (EICTDA, 2006) and the ICT Action Plan (UNDP, 2004). Through a 
line-by-line or micro-analysis, codes were generated directly from the data and, if 
applicable, later used to label new interview transcripts, documents, and 
observations. This procedure followed what Glaser and Strauss termed the “constant 
comparative method” (1967, p. 104), suggesting that “the analyst [should] start by 
coding each incident in his data into as many categories of analysis as possible, as 
categories emerge or as data emerge that fit in an existing category” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, p. 105). The codes emerging in this phase were used, for example, to 
label the ways in which ICTs were interpreted according to the interviewees, “as a 
threat”, “as a tool for education”, etc. Similarly, open codes were also used to tag 
some themes that could be interpreted as explanations of observed reshaping, but 
subsequently had to be further substantiated by additional interviews and 
observations. They were, for example, “hostile diaspora” or “need for control and 
security”. The identification of themes also helped to focus subsequent interviews, 
partially amending the topic guide in order to address specific gaps and to bring 
clarity to the key issues. It was similarly used as a guide for the collection of 
additional documents and archive materials, and for a more informed observation of 
technical artefact.
Finally, when almost all the data were collected and key issues and events were 
identified, I proceeded to a second, more focused (Charmaz, 2003) or selective 
coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), aimed at integrating the open codes into more 
abstract and higher level categories that could be classified as informing the 
reshaping of ICTs. The final result was the identification of core discourses that 
appeared to have influenced the adoption and transformation of ICTs in Ethiopia and 
their connection to specific features characterizing the technopolitical regimes that 
emerged in the country. This process allowed me to reconstruct discourses which 
were specific to the Ethiopian political culture as well as to compare discourses on 
ICTs articulated internationally with those developed at the local level, assessing 
their congruence or their antagonism, and linking them to specific hegemonic 
projects advanced by different actors.
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All these phases were assisted by the use of NVIVO 7 to code, categorize and 
archive data. The use of NVIVO was important in supporting the emergent process 
of analysis advocated by grounded theory and was itself facilitating the progression 
from the initial line-by-line coding to a more focused analysis. For example, as 
shown in Fig. 3.3, which illustrates the coding of the first interview, the possibility of 
simultaneously tagging the same portion of text using a multiplicity of labels allowed 
considerable freedom in an initial phase and minimized the pressure of economizing 
on codes so as to later help to ensure a consistent analysis.
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Fig. 3.3 The coding o f the first interview
Fig 3.4 shows how the codes were integrated into higher level categories, to 
illustrate the discourses implicated in the reshaping of ICTs, according to the 
multiple dynamics that were identified in the interview data, documents, and notes.
A closer look at Fig 3.4 shows that some categories recur more often than 
others. However, the code frequencies alone do not mean that some categories are 
more important than others. They need to be weighed by other factors. There is the 
tendency in some qualitative research to imitate quantitative approaches and quantify 
some of the findings, using expressions such as “half of the interviewees” or “the 
most recurrent code”. To follow this tendency would produce serious fallacies and
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misinterpret the value added of qualitative research, and of a case study approach, 
which allows an in-depth investigation of a limited set of phenomena, understanding 
their characteristics, causes and consequences.44 For example, the category of 
censorship occurs six times in six different interviews but the censoring of blogs and 
websites occupies a central position in this research, as I will discuss later. The case 
of the code “national project” also visible in Fig. 3.3 is different. It is important not 
just for its frequency, but also because it resonates with many other codes in the 
corpus.
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Fig. 3.4 The integration o f codes into discourses
Finally, the strategy adopted for presenting the main findings integrates an 
historical and an analytical approach. In Chapter 5, for example, the text is organized 
according to the three main discourses which the analysis of the data sources suggest 
have influenced the re-interpretation, re-definition and re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia 
at the local level. Within each instance of discourse, it is illustrated how it appears to 
have originated, progressed and come to influence some aspects of the adoption of
44 For a critique o f  this use o f qualitative data see (Bauer, Gaskell, & Allum, 2000).
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ICTs. A similar style, with some variations, is adopted in the other chapters, 
combining a focus on key events and their progression with the analysis of the data 
as interpreted in the light of the conceptual framework. To illustrate each discourse, 
aspects of it, or the influences it seemed to have on specific technical configurations, 
excerpts are presented in the text, mostly taken from interviews, but also from 
newspaper articles and policy documents. Their insertion serves two purposes. First, 
it aims to represent a variety of voices and to show how different competing 
discourses battled for the fixation of meanings and artefacts. Second, it offers the 
reader the possibility to access the primary data, and an opportunity to enter the 
world I explored through my research, thereby providing a basis for the reader to 
assess the validity and reliability of the interpretations that I advance.
3.5 Conclusion
The research design developed to study why and how ICTs have been re­
interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia responded to the need to study ICTs 
as sites of potential contestation, as articulated in the conceptual framework. It 
therefore relied on tools and techniques that could map the views held by different 
individuals about what technology is and how it should be used in the country, and to 
explore how these views appeared to have led to practical applications of new 
technologies on the ground. Since the issues I investigated were delicate and 
potentially problematic, from a substantial resistance to uses of ICTs advocated 
internationally to the censoring of websites, I had to rely on a variety of data sources 
and data collection techniques to ensure that each piece of information could be 
adequately cross-checked and substantiated by additional evidence. This chapter also 
illustrated how the data were integrated and analyzed using a grounded theory 
approach, enabling theories about how ICTs developed the way they did 
progressively emerge from the collected evidence. The following chapter offers a 
first illustration of how these approaches and methods were employed in practice, 
exploring how different actors, inside and outside Ethiopia, interpreted ICTs as 
potentially modernizing, democratizing and globalizing tools, and what
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consequences different interpretations appeared to have had on the practical 
implementation of ICTs in the country.
Both the conceptual and methodological frameworks illustrated in this and in 
the previous chapter were tailored to study the case of Ethiopia, but they arguably 
can be employed to study the evolution of ICTs in other developing countries. 
Employing tools and methods stressing the conflictual nature of technology can 
allow researchers to uncover different narratives and explanations for the 
development of ICTs in countries where their application may appear to have been 
more linear.
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C h a p te r  4  -  Com peting in te rp re ta t io n s :  
INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL DISCOURSES ON ICTS
This chapter examines how the discourses on the use of ICTs for development 
that emerged at the international level have related to pre-existing experiences of 
technological adoption in Ethiopia and were appropriated or rejected by different 
players within the country. These discourses were reconstructed from a variety of 
sources: from policy documents produced both by international organizations 
involved in defining the ICTs for development agenda and by the Ethiopian 
government; as well as from interviews with international civil servants and ICTs 
experts, Ethiopian politicians, technocrats, members of the civil society and of the 
local private sector. Secondary literature on ICTs for development, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, was also employed to contextualize the analysis of policy documents and 
interviews.
The chapter is structured into three sections. The first examines how the 
discourses on the modernizing, globalizing and democratizing potential of ICTs 
reached Ethiopia and what institutions played the most important role in this process. 
Secondly, the responses of government actors to the international framing of ICTs 
are investigated and some key factors that lead to selective readings of the salient 
aspects of the new technologies are identified. Finally, it is explained how the local 
civil society, the private sector and the diaspora have interacted with both 
international and local discourses on ICTs, but ultimately have been marginalized or 
hindered in their attempts to influence the applications of ICTs in Ethiopia or to use 
new technologies in confrontational ways.
4.1 Bringing ICTs to Ethiopia: the role of international 
actors
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, since the 1990s many countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America have been targeted by campaigns advocating the use of ICTs
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for development. They were exposed to many interrelated discourses embodied by 
various institutions. In each specific country, however, it was likely to be only a few 
actors, or “active teachers”, to use Finnemore’s terminology (1993), that mediated 
this massive discursive production and played the role of socializing individual 
governments and other key actors to the new discourses. In Ethiopia, interviews and 
policy documents indicated that it was mainly through a few large initiatives and 
institutions that the new interest in ICTs reached the country and its elites. Of these, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) emerged as the 
single most important institution.
4.1.1 The UNECA and the politics of the apolitical
The UNECA, headquartered in Addis Ababa, was created in 1954 to support 
socio-economic development in Africa. By the mid 1990s it had already accumulated 
substantial experience in the promotion of ICTs for development. In 1986, with the 
support of UNESCO, UNDP and the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC), the UNECA inaugurated the Pan African Development Information System 
(PADIS), a centralized database that facilitated the sharing of information on African 
development related issues. It was within the context of PADIS that the first 
electronic connectivity was provided to twenty-four African countries through Fido­
Net, to enable local and Africa-based international agencies to access the new 
database.45
Ten years later, with resolution 795, “Building Africa’s Information Highway”, 
the UNECA’s role in promoting ICTs in Africa was taken to a new level.46 The UN 
organization started framing ICTs not just as a tool to share information relevant to 
the continent, but as an opportunity for all countries to build an African information
45 Fidonet is a computer network that was used predominantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s to 
host bulletin board systems (BBS) used to exchange messages and chat among users and to download 
software and files.
46 The resolution was passed at the end of the African Symposium on Telematics for Development, 
organized by UNECA together with UNESCO, International Telecommunication Union (ITU), IDRC 
and Bellanet. It took place in April 1995 in Addis Ababa.
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society, leapfrogging other stages of development and steering the economy towards 
the exploitation of knowledge and information. The African Information Society 
Initiative (AISI) was the document that embodied this vision and stipulated policies 
and standards for African governments to achieve it, such as the creation of National 
Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) policies, the establishment of 
specialized agencies in charge of ICTs and the development of partnerships with the 
private sector.
AISI became a dominant node that brought together existing institutions and 
inspired the creation of new ones. Financial support for the implementation of AISI 
was guaranteed through the Partnership for ICTs in Africa (PICTA), a forum of 
donors and executing agencies including The World Bank and the World Trade 
Organization.47 This alignment with the policies advanced by similar institutions 
represented a profound shift for the UNECA. As Nulens and Van Audenhove 
illustrate, “the UNECA, with its rather harsh critique on the international economic 
system of the 1980s evolved towards a more mainstream view with regard to ICTs 
and development” (Nulens & Van Audenhove, 1999, p. 468). A training centre was 
set up in Addis Ababa, targeting especially politicians and technocrats, in order to 
make them aware of the potential of ICTs.48 To ensure that key decision makers in
47 PICTA comprised representatives from: Agence de la Francophonie (ACCT), Bellanet International 
Secretariat, Carnegie Corporation, COMNET-IT Foundation, United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (UNECA), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Global Information Infrastructure 
Commission (GIIC), International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC), ITU, Rockefeller 
Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), US Department of 
State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNDP, UNESCO, WK 
Kellogg Foundation, The World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
48 The presence of the UNECA headquarters in Addis Ababa placed Ethiopia in a privileged position 
to be included in most of the activities for the implementation of the AISI objectives Ethiopia was 
involved in most, if not all, the activities organized to facilitate the use of ICTs for development 
(UNECA, 2008). It was one of the first thirteen African countries to be initially assisted in the 
development of a National Information and Communication Infrastructure plan. Between 2000 and 
2004 it was part of a group of six countries that were surveyed by the SCAN-ICT initiative to identify 
a set of indicators to assess the progress of the information society on the continent. Ethiopia has 
benefited the most from the trainings organized by the UNECA for various stakeholders to encourage 
their participation in the information society. Over the years Ethiopian representatives took part in
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Africa were aware of the existence of AISI and of the discourses it was advancing, 
the first African Development Forum (ADF), a continent-wide gathering of African 
leaders organized by the UNECA, placed the document at its core. The ADF 
addressed the “challenge to Africa of globalisation and the information age”, and it 
ended by proposing to embrace AISI as the response to the uncertainties and 
opportunities brought by ICTs. Some of the issues proposed during the forum, 
however, were contested by a number of African leaders.
Although the AISI framework was designed to serve as a reference point for 
many African governments, the discourse it promoted was problematically 
disconnected from the socio-political reality that characterized the continent in the 
1990s. Its regional scope did not distinguish it significantly from other documents 
with a global focus and, apart from generic references to poverty, the shortage of 
basic services and poor governance, it lacked any reference to the politics of the 
continent. It reflected the tendency of most international organizations to avoid 
mixing the technical with the political so as to appear neutral. This choice, however, 
failed to reflect that the technical is often political and that, at some points in history, 
it cannot be other than political.
In the decade in which the AISI framework took shape, Africa was blighted by 
an average of 7.5 civil wars per year, a very small reduction from the previous one 
which was considered the most violent in history (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; 
Nkurunziza, 2008). After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of 
the USSR, which had been supporting numerous governments in the continent, many 
African nations had to find new models of governance and experiment with new 
political arrangements. Some states became fragile democracies, while violent 
competition for power turned many into battlefields. A vocal diaspora often formed 
an oppositional force, trying to build alternatives to incumbent governments. In this 
context, failing to acknowledge that new technologies could also be interpreted 
through the lenses of politics, conflict and power, emerged as a severe shortcoming. 
This had profound consequences for how the AISI framework would be received in 
some African countries such as Ethiopia, where the government was dealing with an
workshops and conferences targeting groups from parliamentarians to on-line journalists, and from 
medical doctors to small entrepreneurs.
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ambitious internal agenda which partially conflicted with the principles advanced by 
international organizations.
4.1.2 Discourses in context
To further explain some of the aspects of the AISI document, three key 
passages are highlighted, including the foreword, vision and strategic objectives 
(UNECA, 1996). As will be analyzed below, the document has largely reproduced 
the discourses on the modernizing, globalizing and democratizing potential of ICTs 
which characterized most of the campaigns promoted at the international level.
F orew ord
The information revolution, along with its attendant explosive growth of 
knowledge, and the related phenomenon of the globalisation of the world 
economy have brought about the Information Age, which affects all 
aspects of economic, social and political activity. Insufficient 
appreciation of this phenomenon leaves African countries on the short 
end of an information and technology gap, the disparity between 
information rich and information poor. At the urging of the member 
States of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), ECA has taken 
the lead in helping prepare African countries to overcome this gap and 
utilise these new forces to promote social and economic growth in the 
region. [...]
V ision
The African Information Society Initiative aims at supporting and accelerating 
socio-economic development across the region. Driven by critical development 
imperatives, it focuses on priority strategies, programmes and projects which 
can assist in the sustainable build up o f an information society in African 
countries in accordance with the regional integration goals o f the Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community which foresaw the necessity of
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information networks and of regional databases, information sources and skills 
capacities.
By the year 2010, the AISI is intended to realize a sustainable information 
society in Africa where:
• Information and decision support systems are used to support decision making 
in all the major sectors of the economy in line with each country's national 
development priorities;
• Every man and woman, school child, village, government office and business 
can access information and knowledge resources through computers and 
telecommunications;
• Access is available to international, regional and national "information 
highways", providing "off-ramps" in the villages and in the information area 
catering specifically to grass-roots society;
• A vibrant business sector exhibits strong leadership capable of forging the 
build up of the information society;
• African information resources are available which reflect the needs of 
government, business, culture, education, tourism, energy, health, transport and 
natural resource management;
• Information and knowledge are disseminated and used by business, the public 
at large and disenfranchised groups such as women and the poor, in particular, 
to make rational choices in the economy (free markets) and for all groups to 
exercise democratic and human rights (freedom of speech and freedom of 
cultural and religious expression).
Strateg ic  objectives
To achieve the vision outlined above, African member States will need to:
• Ensure the continuous flow of information within the society by supporting 
initiatives to improve and create new information and communication services 
in different sectors of the society - education, health, employment, culture, 
environment, trade, finance, tourism, transport and commerce;
• Create a continent-wide information and telecommunication network that 
allows low-cost and reliable communication with other users in Africa and 
across the globe;
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• Achieve maximum benefits from available information by encouraging the 
development of systems that allow wide dissemination to individuals, business 
communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the public sector;
• Foster a new generation of men and women in Africa that uses information 
and communication technologies to leverage the development o f their nations;
• Link Africa with the rest o f the world by improving the flow of new 
technologies in both directions and exporting intellectual products and services 
to the rest o f the world.
In the AISI document the discourses on modernization, globalization, and 
democratization are tightly interwoven and complement each other to define the 
characteristics of ICTs. These aspects, however, can be analytically separated to 
illustrate how specific features of the text contributed to stress different aspects of the 
African information society that the UNECA and the other organizations 
contributing to AISI envisaged.
The discourse on modernization, for example, can be identified in the 
numerous references to the newness characterizing technologies that are capable of 
unleashing “new forces”. The information society is supposed to belong to a new 
“age”, inaugurated by a “revolution”, thus interrupting continuity with the past and 
with previous failures in bringing development to poor nations. The men and women 
who will be “fostered” by the information society are described as belonging to a 
“new generation” who will know how to use ICT for development. At the same time, 
however, the potentially disruptive consequences each “revolution” may bring with it 
are removed from the text or tamed by references to how ICTs will “support” or 
“accelerate” socio-economic development across the region, and how the individuals 
empowered by the use of ICTs will use their capacities to “leverage” the 
development of their nations, and not for other projects, such as organizing platforms 
to criticize and oppose the government or support a partisan agenda. ICTs are thus 
framed both as modem, as the product of a greater technical prowess, and 
modernizing, allowing nations that have been lagging behind to reach those 
perceived as already developed.
Similarly, the references to the flow of information and free markets are used 
to characterize ICTs both as an expression of a globalized world as well as a
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globalizing agent that collapses time and space. The rhetoric that permeated the 
NWICO debate, as illustrated in Chapter 2, is visibly resurrected. According to the 
document a “continuous flow of information” within the society must be ensured. 
Similarly, Africa will be linked “with the rest of the world by improving the flow of 
new technologies in both directions”. However, the “information highways”, and 
their “off-ramps” in the villages are evocative of small localities being flooded with 
huge amounts of information, rather than villagers selecting what is relevant for them 
and seizing their opportunity to produce valuable information and goods for the 
global economy. In addition, although it is said that ICTs will benefit every sector, it 
is “business” that is asked to “exhibit strong leadership capable of forging the build 
up of the information society”. Similarly “free markets” are described as a core 
component of an African information society which, also in accordance with the free 
flow rhetoric, should be increasingly linked to the global economy, allowing goods 
to circulate both ways, without protectionism.
Finally, the kind of democratization ICTs are said to be facilitating is based 
largely on the principles of liberal democracy. Apart from general references to 
“democratic and human rights (freedom of speech and freedom of cultural and 
religious expression)”, the document refers to individuals, to “every man and 
woman” as the key beneficiaries of the new opportunities and freedoms brought by 
ICTs. On the contrary, there is no reference to the collective and communal rights, 
that, as is illustrated below and is further explored in Chapter 5, have been placed by 
the Ethiopian government, as well as by other governments, at the core of the idea of 
the nation and of democracy.49
49 It is also important to note that the AISI document uses highly technocratic language and mimics 
scientific jargon offering disputed claims as objective knowledge (McKenna & Graham, 2000). The 
document, for example, employs circular arguments, collapsing causes and effects of particular 
phenomena. It inextricably connects information society and ICTs as mutually dependent and 
reinforcing suggesting, for example, that there can be no information society without ICTs, but it is 
only a fully developed information society that can make proper use of ICTs. This technocratic 
language is also coupled with its normativity. The measures the AISI proposes are based on 
development “imperatives”, on “priorities” that will have to be strictly followed to align the continent 
with the frantic rhythm that characterizes the “information age”.
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Actors within Ethiopia have reacted differently to the discourses on 
modernization, globalization and democratization, magnifying some of the elements 
highlighted above while resisting and marginalizing others. In the following sections 
these local responses are examined to investigate the interaction between the 
hegemonic plans that emerged internationally and those articulated locally and 
among the competing meanings attributed to ICTs by different agents as a result of 
this antagonism. Section 4.2 focuses primarily on the government response, while 
section 4.3 explores how other actors, including civil society organizations, the 
private sector and the Ethiopian diaspora, can be shown to have interpreted the 
potential of ICTs.
4.2 Re-interpreting ICTs: the government response
In Ethiopia the new wave of discourses on ICTs initially produced conflicting 
responses. A first division was between individuals connected to the government, 
both politicians and technocrats, on the one side, and members of the local civil 
society and from the diaspora, on the other. The latter group enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of an Ethiopian information society, appropriating most of the 
images and recipes proposed by international organizations, but, in some cases also 
using them for instrumental purposes. As will be illustrated in section 5.3, however, 
many of their attempts to influence the generation of a local approach to ICTs ended 
in frustration. As a result, the local civil society grew progressively disengaged, 
while many Ethiopians living abroad developed a mostly adversarial use of new 
technologies, aimed at challenging the government at home.
A second important split can be identified within the government camp which 
had great expectations, but even greater suspicions. Most technocrats and some 
progressive members of the government welcomed ICTs as potentially useful tools. 
Nega Alemayehu, Dean of the Graduate School of Telecommunication and 
Information Technology50, recognized that as a result of the first wave of training
50 The Graduate School of Telecommunication and Information Technology (GSTIT) is the most 
important institution in the country for the training of the Ethiopian IT workforce. It is owned and
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and conferences organized at the UNECA, “the attitude towards ICTs was very 
positive. Not only positive. People were thinking that computers could do miracles, 
that they were the panacea to solve every problem”.51 Similarly, a technocrat at the 
Ethiopian ICT Development Agency (EICTDA), the institution created by the 
government in 2003 to centralize all ICT-related activities, who was a young 
graduate in information science in the late 1990s, recalled that “at the time my 
expectations were great. I thought that everything was going to come immediately, to 
change and reform our country in a few years. [...] But also in general, there were 
such big expectations about what technology could do”. However, in contrast to the 
case illustrated by Hecht in France, where technocrats constituted a powerful and 
influential class, that could advance its own political plans, technocrats in Ethiopia 
were largely an appendix of the central government. It was mostly the understanding 
of ICTs developed by the EPRDF’s cadres that drove their application in a local 
context. And, at least in an initial phase, the most influential members of the party 
appeared to focus on the potentially harmful uses of ICTs rather than their 
development potential, highlighting their concerns about security and consolidating 
their legitimacy.
This reaction is illustrated by the words of a UNECA officer commenting on 
the Ethiopian resistance to implementing the strategies advocated by his 
organization. He focused, in particular, on the requests made to the Ethiopian 
government to liberalize the telecommunication market, a measure that had been 
opposed since the AISI was created. As he pointed out in his reply, the Ethiopian 
leaders saw their strategy as even more legitimate after having witnessed how a freer 
ICT regime could be used in other countries on the continent to challenge political 
power.
controlled by the Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) and is mandated to train most of 
its employees, from those in charge of maintenance to middle and upper level managers.
51 Interview: Nega Alemayehu (Dean of the Graduate School of Telecommunication and Information 
Technology, Addis Ababa)
52 Interview: Anonymous (8)
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We discussed a lot with the Ethiopian government but they said “Not now”.
They are very intelligent, they understand very well the situation, all of the 
cases, all the best practices we present them, but their political strategy is 
different. Now they can use Kenya as a justification.53 And say “You see? We 
told you that this technology can be used for violence in Africa. There are 
people ready to use technology to destabilize”. So they are afraid, it is a 
strategy, they want to move slowly, to be given time for implementing 
technology in a way that is not dangerous for them. When I speak to them they 
tell me “We understand very well what you are telling us but we do not want to 
use that now”. It is not a question of knowledge, it is a question o f political 
strategy.54
These conflicting responses were the result of the different meanings various 
individuals and groups have attributed to ICTs. These meanings were connected to 
competing political plans, but they were also dependent on how key concepts used to 
describe ICTs, such as modernization, democratization and globalization, have been 
framed in the history of Ethiopia.
In the next two sections, the discourses on modernization, globalization and 
democratization as they emerged throughout Ethiopia’s recent past are discussed, and 
the ways in which have been appropriated by some of the key actors involved in the 
implementation of ICTs in the country are analyzed. This discussion is located in the 
context of the introduction of previous ICTs, such as the telephone, the radio and the 
computer. The findings emerging from this analysis are then used to explain how the 
discourses advanced by the UNECA, as well as other international organizations, 
were interpreted selectively by the Ethiopian government.
53 The reference here is to the unrest in Kenya which stemmed from the elections held in 2007, and to 
the use of blogs, radios and mobile phones to incite violence across different ethnic groups within the 
country. For a detailed illustration see, for example, the BBC World Service Trust policy briefing The 
Kenyan 2007 elections and their aftermath: the role o f media and communication (Abdi & Deane, 
2008), or The role o f the media in the upcoming Somaliland elections: Lessons from Kenya (Stremlau, 
Blanchard, & Abdi Gabobe, 2009)
54 Interview: Anonymous (4)
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4.2.1 Modernization, globalization and democratization in the 
Ethiopian context
Modernization in Ethiopia has been pursued for a long time as a strategy for 
the state to maintain its independence, compete with other nations and strengthen
tficontrol over its territory (Clapham, 2006; Zewde, 1991). Since the late 19 century 
the modernization of infrastructure, the military, and other key areas of society 
became vitally necessary to resist the colonial ambitions of countries like Italy and 
Great Britain. Rulers of Ethiopia adopted various approaches to develop the 
country’s resources, but in most cases they followed what Christopher Clapham has 
termed a “politics of emulation” (Clapham, 2006). The leaders looked to other 
countries, such as Japan or the then USSR, with which they believed Ethiopia shared 
a common past or a common spirit, in order to elaborate strategies that could guide 
Ethiopia into the modem world.55 Through this process of identification and because 
of the significance the appropriation of the new tools held for the extension and 
consolidation of the borders of the state, modernization became an essential aspect of 
the country’s politics.
Since their initial development ICTs have occupied a special place in this 
process. Ethiopia was the first state in Africa to have a public telecommunication 
operator (ITU, 2002). In 1897 emperor Menelik II inaugurated the first telephone 
line, connecting the capital Addis Ababa with the city of Harar, annexed to his 
expanding empire only a few years earlier. The new technology was adopted and 
employed as a key resource for maintaining control over the new territories, enabling
55 According to Clapham (2006) and Zewde (2002), the Ethiopian rulers saw the imperial past of 
Japan to be very similar to Ethiopia. The government was fascinated by how a nation that managed to 
maintain its ties with tradition could modernize so quickly and they assumed that the same destiny 
awaited Ethiopia. Similarly, Russia was seen as comparable to Ethiopia due to the orthodox faith, and 
during Marxist inspired military dictatorship of the Derg, Marxist-Leninism became the inspiring 
ideology of the state. Other countries have have also inspired emulation. The EPRDF leadership, for 
example, looks to South Asia as a model of the developmental state which constitutes a possible 
trajectory for Ethiopian development.
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the emperor to obtain information as well as to impart orders to the rulers of the 
annexed province.56
In interviews I conducted with both older and younger interviewees, this event 
was often mentioned as an example of Ethiopia’s potential. It was an initial referent 
in a longer chain of episodes where modernization, in its different manifestations, 
was framed as an element that had been actively sought to help in exploiting the 
country’s dormant capital. This discourse continued to apply to more recent 
technological advances. As Haile Michael Aberra, the Dean of the Civil Service 
College of Addis Ababa, the institution mandated to train Ethiopian civil servants, 
noted:
I remember a book about Japan “How did Japan modernize?”57 People were 
fascinated by it. The educated people learned that modernization was key in 
development and now with ICTs they are trying to reach as many people as 
possible to make this plan real.58
The idea of modernization that emerged in Ethiopia across different political 
regimes was a force that could be channelled to support development plans defined at 
the local level and could augment the outputs of ongoing processes. Similarly to the 
telephone in imperial times, the use of ICTs such as computers -  from mainframes to 
PCs -  was framed in this context, interpreting them as tools that could embrace and 
enhance projects already defined at the centre. In the beginning, computer use 
involved only academic institutions, a few ministries and state-owned companies, as 
these were the only entities with enough resources and experience to operate what
56 The telecommunication infrastructure later expanded to reach other major towns and, apart from a 
line built in cooperation with the Italians to connect Addis Ababa and Asmara, the priority continued 
to be given to the territories that had been recently conquered, in the South and the West -  Sidamo, 
Nekemte, Gambella.
57 The book, which transliterated from Amharic is Japan endet seletenech, was published in the early 
1950s by Kebede Michael, an intellectual who worked under Haile Selassie as Director General for 
the Ministry of Education and Deputy Director for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book was 
written in Amharic and never translated into another language.
58 Interview: Haile Michael Aberra (Dean, Ethiopian Civil Service College, Addis Ababa)
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were still complicated machines.59 Later on the use of PCs for basic office 
automation began and civil servants were trained to use word processors and 
spreadsheets. In both cases computers were used mostly to improve the efficiency of 
the state apparatus, extending and enhancing its control over the country.
Also in this case, foreign countries and international organizations intervened 
and encouraged specific uses of technology. Following the example of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences, in 1975 the Derg set up the Ethiopian Science and Technology 
Commission, and twelve years later, advised by UNESCO, it created a National 
Computer Centre as part of the Commission, “to promote the development of 
computer knowledge and services in Ethiopia; to provide consultancy and 
maintenance services; to provide training courses” (Kebede, 1994). Those who 
worked for the Centre describe it as the place where the first ideas about the 
relationship between IT -  Information Technology -  and development started 
circulating. According to Abebe Checkol, who worked at the National Computer 
Centre in its final years, “the centre was where a number of Ethiopians were first 
introduced to IT and to the role IT can have for growth and development. Since the 
beginning IT was strictly connected to the idea of development, in particular 
increasing the efficiency in certain sectors”.
In contrast to modernization, globalization was received as a more problematic 
discourse, a challenge accepted by the Ethiopian government, but not interpreted as 
necessarily beneficial for the country’s development. Globalization was framed as 
something to negotiate and balance; to slow down so as to allow the country to cope 
with new influences coming from the outside. This attitude is well summarized by 
Bereket Simon, the former Minister of Information and an influential EPRDF’s 
leader.
59 Ethiopian Airlines was the first organization to introduce modem management information systems 
in 1961 with the purchase of an IBM class 421. They were closely followed by the Ethiopian Electric 
Light and Power Authority in 1962, and a few years later by the Central Statistical Office, in 1964, 
and by the Ministry of Finance, in 1968 (Kebede, 1994). The first appliances to be used in those 
offices were mainly cash registers and mechanical accounting machines and it was only a few years 
later that electronic data processing systems (such as IBM 360/20 or HP 3000) started being employed 
in government institutions.
I l l
W e studied globalization and we understood that it is a double edge sword. It 
creates opportunities and it also creates challenges. [ ...]  A t the end we 
concluded that we cannot be out o f  this globalized world. In the case o f 
technology this means that on the one hand, if you have money you can buy 
the latest technology, and you can implement it here. But on the other hand 
when you implement it you also import the challenges that you have to avoid.
And if  you are not ready you will lose. One thing is sure: you cannot stand 
still.60
The use of broadcasting to weaken the control of the government over its 
citizens was probably the earliest case in which the EPRDF could experiment with 
the challenging potential of technology referred to by Bereket. Interestingly, the first 
actor to exploit this potential was the Tigreyan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the 
movement from which the EPRDF later originated, and which fought for the rights 
of the people of Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, before extending its struggle to a 
national scale. To support the war efforts the TPLF set up its own clandestine radio 
station, known as Voice o f  Woyene or Voice o f the Rebellion, and allocated 
substantial resources to winning the hearts and minds of the Ethiopian people.61 As 
Debretsion GebreMichael, now General Manager of EICTDA, but at the time in 
charge of radio maintenance, explained, “our role was teaching about the struggle 
and trying to convince the people about our principles. [...] You had really to convert 
people, to make them think in a different way. And unless you communicate well 
and deeply you cannot get to the point of converting people”. The TPLF’s radio 
was not the only voice advocating a competing idea of the nation over the Ethiopian 
airwaves. In 1982 Voice of America (VOA) inaugurated its Amharic service with the
60 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
61 The guerrillas’ clandestine radio station started broadcasting in 1979 and successfully broadcast for 
the next 12 years on an almost daily basis. It was initially used by two insurgency groups, the TPLF 
and the EPLF. However, after a series of ideological battles between the two fronts, the TPLF started 
its own radio station in 1985.
62 Interview: Debretsion GebreMichael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
charge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
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intent of fighting Soviet influence in Ethiopia (Alexandre, 1989; M. Nelson, 1997). 
The strategy was firmly grounded in Cold War politics, but the initial aim was soon 
hijacked by a more local agenda. In 1986 the VO A management appointed as Editor 
in Chief of the Amharic service a former supporter of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) which, similar to the TPLF, was fighting the Derg’s 
dictatorship, but was also firmly opposed to the ethnic based front. Under his 
direction the VO A, in addition to its mandate of challenging state propaganda, also 
started attacking the TPLF, commencing a war over the airwaves that continued after 
Mengitsu’s defeat (Sheckler, 1999).64
By the time they came to power the EPRDF’s leaders had developed a 
noticeable experience of the multiple and conflicting uses that could be made of 
broadcasting. Through Voice of the Rebellion they had learnt how effective it is to 
counterbalance propaganda in an autocratic state, where the ownership of the media 
is only in the hands of the government. However, because of VO A, they also 
understood that the airways can be appropriated easily by opposing forces and that 
some ICTs can make borders too porous to block dissenting voices coming from a 
vocal diaspora and other actors.
A similar suspicion towards opening the country too much to external 
influences can be seen in the economic domain. A powerful expression of this
63 The EPRP was established in Ethiopia in 1972 with the aim of removing the imperial regime and 
transforming the country into a popular democratic republic. It took an active part in the revolution 
that lead to the overthrow of Haile Selassie, but, when the transition process became dominated by the 
military, members of the party were first marginalized and later persecuted. EPRP refusal of ethnic 
politics and accusations to the EPLF and TPLF of dismembering the country, led to open 
confrontations also with the two ethnic based groups, and to the eventual defeat of the party, whose 
members either left Ethiopia and continued their political activities in exhile or joined other political 
organizations (Gudina, 2003; Young, 1997)
64 As a sign of the tension between the government of Ethiopia and VO A, the government started 
jamming the signal of its Amharic service, as accused by VO A itself as well as by the Committee to 
protect Journalists. Information about the jamming of VOA as well as of Deutsche Welle (DW) can 
be found at http://wwwl.voanews.com/english/news/africa/a-13-20Q8-01-16-voa42.html Last time 
accessed 14.04.10 and http://www.cpi.org/2009/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2008-ethiopia.php Last 
time accessed 14.04.10.
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attitude was the speech Prime Minister Meles Zenawi delivered at the African 
Development Forum (ADF), the event organized by the UNECA to make the entire 
continent aware of the AISI. In contrast to other African leaders, the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister decided to use his privileged position not to endorse the idea that ICTs and 
globalization would help Africa, but to question it and propose alternative models. 
He is quoted at length below to illustrate how globalization was not simply refused 
by the leadership in Ethiopia, but was taken as an opportunity to articulate a complex 
alternative vision of the role development should play in a globalized world.
Talking about globalization, Mr. Chairman, the choice Africa has is not whether 
it should be part o f  the global economy or not. It is already part o f  it. It will 
w illy nilly be even more enmeshed in that process. This applies not only to 
A frica but no m atter how remote or isolated they m ight be, to all parts o f  the 
world. W e would be naive if  we were to underestimate the reach o f  this process 
and its capacity to penetrate and embrace all aspects o f  the lives o f  societies, 
including the cultural sphere.
But being part o f  the global economy does not necessarily mean - as indeed our 
conditions at present demonstrate in so vivid and palpable a m anner - that one 
has become a productive part o f  the process and in position to become a 
productive part o f  the process and in a position to draw benefits from it.
I f  present conditions remain unaltered and the trend we see were to continue, 
then being more enmeshed within the globalized economy would only mean 
that by force o f  circumstances, Africa would be made to stay on the margins o f 
the global economy, not as an integral part o f  the process, but as a part which, 
having been excluded from benefiting from the process in a bona fide manner, 
would have to fall back on other options likely to be opened up by those 
engaged in extra-legal business activities, ranging from crime syndicates to drug 
traffickers. [...]
There is also another element without which all our efforts at ensuring healthy 
and sustained growth are bound to fail. This relates to the role o f  the state. For a 
variety o f  reasons the role o f the state in economic development has come to be 
cast in recent years in negative terms, not however always w ithout justification.
But dam age can and have been made by going overboard on this issue.
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In short, it appears to me that it is not weak states, let alone failing states, which 
can be considered growth-friendly but rather robust states which can carry out 
their functions in all areas o f  societal needs with effectiveness. This does not 
take aw ay anything from the need for states to be legitimate and democratic.
They can be both.
In light o f  all this, it appears to me and to many others that the path to 
developm ent that has so far been encouraged by international financial 
institutions and more or less accepted willingly by governments in Africa, has 
been far from being effective.
Their economic prescriptions have proved to be narrowly focused on 
liberalization and on macro-economic stability. The orthodoxy has thus been 
devoid o f  comprehensive vision, which is so essential for ensuring durable and 
sustained economic growth and development goals which can be achieved only 
through structural transformation. This economic model chosen as a panacea for 
Africa's econom ic predicament has failed to handle issues o f  liberalization and 
m acro economic stability within the context o f  structural transformation. These 
issues are norm ally taken as an end in themselves. The end result has in fact 
proved to be that we have neither meaningful growth and transform ation nor 
sustained liberalization and macro-economic stability.
One o f  the basic features o f this model is in effect the sidelining o f  the 
transform ative role o f  the state. African countries are not assisted in finding 
ways o f  enhancing the capacity o f  the state and in addressing its weakness for 
carrying out its transform ative function with some degree o f  effectiveness. 
Instead the policy prescriptions encouraged by international financial 
institutions has had the effect o f  weakening the state and o f ensuring its 
em asculation. A radical change in policy prescriptions with respect to the state 
is thus a condition for any meaningful growth and developm ent in our continent 
(Zenawi, 1999)
The Ethiopians interviewed over the course of this research who attended the 
event recalled Meles’ speech as both inspiring and foundational in the light of the 
recent history of ICTs in the country. The Prime Minister, while demonstrating his 
understanding of globalization and recognizing the impossibility of resisting it as 
“naive”, openly challenged the claim that the integration it implied would benefit 
African countries as “being part of the global economy does not necessarily mean
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that one [is] in a position to draw benefits from it”. To make his point clear he used 
strong imagery, evoking the active role of other countries in “excluding” Africa and 
leaving it at the “margins”, and threatening that if the situation persisted the 
continent could turn to “extra-legal business activities, ranging from crime syndicates 
to drug traffickers”. This framing of the effects of globalization openly challenged 
that advanced by AISI: that it is a lack of understanding on the part of African 
countries that results in their being excluded from its benefits (“Insufficient 
appreciation of this phenomenon leaves African countries on the short end of an 
information and technology gap”).
Meles accused the “orthodoxy” promoted by financial organizations, based “on 
liberalization and on macro-economic stability”, of having failed and having merely 
“weakened” the state. He therefore requested a “radical change in policy 
prescriptions”, a change which could recognize the “transformative role” the state 
can have in Africa. This credo, also expressed by the Prime Minister on a variety of 
other occasions, would later prove to be a cornerstone of the Ethiopian approach to 
ICTs.65 The Ethiopian government refused to allow the private sector to take the 
leading role the AISI framework and other documents claimed it should play, 
preferring strong state interventionism. Similarly, it recognized the transformative 
power of ICTs, but as something that must be adapted to serve a particular political 
project and not simply permitted to alter society.
The speech delivered by Meles at the ADF pointed to broad disagreements on 
some of the principles that should inform the economics and politics of African 
countries. This divergence between discourses articulated nationally and 
internationally, however, was not always clearly spelled out. Some key concepts, 
such as democracy, could appear to be consensually embraced at both levels, while 
concealing fundamental conflicts beneath the surface. Vaughan and Tronvoll, two 
leading scholars of Ethiopian politics, warned the international community on this
65 Meles articulated extensively his appreciation of development models which placed the state as a 
driver of economic transformation in the concept paper African development: dead ends and new 
beginnings (Zenawi, 2005). As I will later explain, this publication was also important to further 
clarify other central elements in Meles’ political agenda, such as “revolutionary democracy”.
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point in an publication commissioned by the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA) to introduce key aspects of the local politics to development 
practitioners:
A point o f  prim ary importance is that donors and the EPRDF have not meant 
the same thing by ‘dem ocracy’. The ruling party has its own understanding o f 
democracy, w hich differs significantly from the type favoured, and ascendant, 
in the W est; the institutions it has created accordingly function differently. Its 
conception o f  dem ocracy is not the liberal bourgeois variety based on individual 
participation, a diversity o f  interests and views, and plural representation. [...]
W hat the Front calls ‘popular democracy’ [or revolutionary democracy] is 
based on communal collective participation, and representation based on 
consensus” (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003, pp. 116-117)
Therefore, even if donor agencies and local institutions may profess an 
apparently similar commitment to democratization, the processes they support are 
rooted in different traditions. In one case they aim at fostering individual rights such 
as private property and initiative and at having a variety of views competing in the 
public arena. In the other, the final goal is an increased sense of belonging to 
particular ethnic groups whose cultures, traditions and rights of representation are 
publicly recognized as building blocks of the nation.
Similar to other concepts, revolutionary democracy emerged at the time of the 
struggle in the bush. It embraced and resounded with the discourses on the nation, 
society and communication that are explored in the next chapter, contributing to 
characterize a specific idea of the Ethiopian nation. However, its definition continued 
to evolve after the EPRDF came to power. The Prime Minister himself contributed to 
its progressive specification through books or concept papers such as African 
development: dead ends and new beginnings (Zenawi, 2005).66 In this publication 
Meles further aligned revolutionary democracy to the ideas of developmental state 
practiced in countries such as Taiwan, and illustrated his admiration towards
66 Sections of the book can be found on the website of Columbia University, and specifically at 
wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Meles-Extracts2-AfTF2.pdf. Last accessed 12 November 2009.
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countries such as Japan where the same coalition ruled for decades offering stability 
while democratic rights were exercised within a one-party state.
This discussion of the local meanings attributed to modernization, globalization 
and democratization deepens an understanding about why and how the discourses 
advanced by AISI and other international organizations were selectively adopted by 
the Ethiopian government, leading to a partial re-shaping of newer ICTs in the 
country. As will be illustrated in the next section, in some cases, the discourses 
articulated locally and internationally emerged as congruent and compatible, in 
others those coming from outside were resisted and partially rejected.
4.2.2 The Ethiopian government’s response to the AISI’s 
discourses
Of all the discourses articulated in the AISI’s document and advanced in 
general at the international level, the potential for ICTs to modernize Ethiopia and 
support its government’s plans emerged as the most appealing to the country’s ruling 
elite. Substantial resources were invested, first to understand how these new 
technologies could be put to work for the country’s benefit and later to implement 
the plan which emerged from this deliberation. ICTs were often referred to as 
“shortcuts” to or “accelerators” of development. In the words of Debretsion, the 
General Manager of the EICTDA:
This is why we are focusing on strengthening the government. ICTs are ju st an 
instrum ent to get the government working well. This is the purpose o f the 
struggle. I f  we want to transform the country we have to transform  the 
governm ent first. In this process ICTs have the role to speed up and to facilitate.
ICTs can accelerate our development.67
67 Interview: Debretsion GebreMichael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
charge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
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The potential of ICTs was channelled to serve specific priorities, while sectors 
that could have benefited from them, but were not considered instrumental for the 
transformation of the country professed by the EPRDF, were marginalized. As the 
first computers were used simply to enhance the capacity of pre-existing intuitions or 
to increase the efficiency of particular sectors, now more advanced technologies 
were being reshaped to fit into a similar model, to expand, but not threaten, the 
capacity of the state to operate. These findings indicate how a modernization 
paradigm which has often been criticized for its Western bias, continued nonetheless 
to exercise a strong appeal.
On the contrary, the global nature of ICTs and their globalizing power 
encountered active resistance in Ethiopia. They did not lead to a purely ideological 
refusal, but motivated careful analyses by political and intellectual elites. As 
illustrated by Meles Zenawi and Bereket Simon cited earlier, at the turn of the 
millennium, there was urgency among EPRDF cadres to understand the possible 
consequences of a process Ethiopia had to accept, but which could also threaten its 
stability. This resistance to globalization was articulated in various ways. The idea of 
a free flow of information was opposed because of the challenges it could present to 
the leadership in controlling the adversarial voices coming from abroad. The power 
of ICTs to threaten governments had already been experienced during the struggle 
and it could similarly materialize, as it did, in new platforms from which to attack the 
idea of the nation advanced by the EPRDF. More generally there was widespread 
scepticism that an unrestrained circulation of information would benefit the 
population as a whole. As Nega Alemaheiu, the Dean of the Graduate College of 
Information and Communication Technology noted,
If  you have little local content and you build information superhighways the 
result is that only the external content will come. And people will be exposed to 
it. People who speak the local languages should be put in the position to access 
their own content. To be capable o f  reading and using the Internet with the 
m ediation o f  their culture. It can be really dangerous to have these people
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exposed to  too much external information. They would not know how to
•. 68 process it.
Similarly, the idea of liberalizing the ICT market and letting the private sector 
lead the creation of an information society was strongly opposed, to the extent that 
Ethiopia is at the time of writing one of the few countries in the world where 
telecommunications are still a state monopoly. In stark contrast to the benign image 
attributed to market forces by the AISI’s document, in Ethiopia they were framed as 
mostly hostile, despite the adherence to capitalist principles shown by the 
government to its international partners. Amare Amslau, CEO of ETC, for example 
responded to questions about the refusal to liberalize by arguing that “We have to 
grow first. Only when we will be strong enough, and we will have the capacity, we 
will liberalize. Things have to be done gradually. And when we will be ready we 
could go to the fight”. 69
Finally, the democratization potential of ICTs was apparently embraced with 
enthusiasm. The draft ICT policy, for example, placed democracy and good 
governance at its very core. According to the document the ICT vision for Ethiopia 
was:
To improve the social and economic well being o f  the peoples o f  Ethiopia 
through the exploitation o f  the opportunities created by ICT for achieving rapid 
and sustainable socio-economic development, and for sustaining a robust 
dem ocratic system and good governance (EICTDA, 2006, p. 9).
Similarly, the politicians and technocrats I interviewed often referred to 
democratization as one of the pillars of projects such as Woredanet and Schoolnet. 
For example, Bereket Simon, commenting on the benefits brought by Schoolnet, 
claimed that because of the new system, “now we will have a new generation that 
has been trained in the principles of democracy in secondary education and they will
68 Interview: Nega Alemaheiu, (Dean of the Graduate college of Information and Communication 
Technology, Addis Ababa)
69 Interview: Amare Amslau, (CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation)
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know how to contribute to the development of the country”.70 However, as illustrated 
in the previous section, the meanings attached to the term democracy by the 
EPRDF’s leaders were, and remain, significantly different from those implied in the 
mainstream discourses on ICTs for development. As will be illustrated in greater 
detail in Chapter 6, the training Bereket refers to is civic education where, among 
other things, some of the discourses the EPRDF placed at the centre of its idea of 
nation were taught to students. In general “sustaining a good democratic system and 
good governance” through the use of ICTs meant for the Ethiopian government 
creating a functioning state and increasing its capacity to provide services to the 
population, but also filling the political space against competing ideas of the nation. 
Employing ICTs for democratization did not signify empowering individuals so they 
could contribute with various ideas to the public debate on how the country should 
be run at best, but reinforced the nation-state so that it could best realize the 
principles of revolutionary democracy embraced by the EPRDF. This 
conceptualization of democracy and its successful implementation on the ground 
implied a centralized application of the new resources and the marginalization of 
possible competing uses.
4.3 The marginalization of non-state actors in the 
development of an approach to ICTs
Civil society, the private sector and the diasporic communities in the US and in 
Europe responded more positively to the discourse on ICTs articulated at the 
international level. This reaction was the result, in part, of the strategy adopted by the 
UNECA which attempted to involve non-state actors in many of its activities, and of 
the perception by these actors of ICTs as a window of opportunity to increase their 
influence and initiate a gradual change in Ethiopia. However, the country’s highly 
centralized power structure made most of the ideas and projects developed in these 
areas of little relevance for the actual re-shaping of technology at the local level.
70 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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Many pioneering activities, especially those resounding with the international 
discourse but taking lesser account of the local context, were blocked or 
marginalized by the government, forcing some of their promoters into adversarial 
positions and progressively alienating them from active participation in the 
development of ICT policies and plans.
4.3.1 International alignments: importing new solutions to old 
problems
Divergin from the EPRDF’s cadres, most members of Ethiopian civil society 
and the private sector did not only perceive the modernizing role of ICTs to be 
positive, but also accepted some aspects of their global nature as potentially 
beneficial for Ethiopia. The local ICT firms for example, even if small and poorly 
resourced, strongly advocated liberalization of the market. As Bogaled Demissew, 
former head of the Ethiopian Information Technology Professional Association 
(EITPA) remembered: “EITPA has been always advocating for liberalization. It was 
the main actor in promoting this agenda [...] But also the World Bank put a lot of 
pressure. We organized many events together. We showed to the government that if 
there is competition the state is also going to get more revenues. But it did not work. 
They just had a different agenda”.71 Given the direct interest IT professionals have in 
expanding the ICT sector, their reactions are hardly surprising, but other initiatives 
promoted by non-state actors were not purely connected to the advantages its 
members could have derived from their implementation. They depended more on 
curiosity about the kind of transformation ICTs could bring and on a general 
acceptance of the discourses promoted at the international level.
The first debate over the significance of the Internet for Ethiopia, for example, 
benefited from the active participation of representatives of NGOs and professional 
bodies, who were trying to strike a balance between the hype coming from the West 
and the initial scepticism and conservatism shown by the EPRDF. Initiated in 1995
71 Interview: Bogaled Demissew (Former Head of the Ethiopian Information Technology Professional 
Association)
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by Dawit Yohannes, the speaker of the House of People’s Representatives, and 
known as Bringing Internet to Ethiopia (BITE), this debate was aimed at producing 
concrete recommendations for policy makers to handle the new technology 
effectively. Dawit Bekele, a PhD graduate in computer science from the University 
of Lyon, France, and one of the most active advocates for an open and inclusive use 
of ICTs, described his own involvement in BITE:
A t the time nobody knew about the Internet. From Ethiopia we did not have 
access to the Internet, so we could not have access to relevant information for 
the BITE commission. But we made a series o f  recom m endations anyways. [...]
W e had realized that the government would have not accepted a privately 
owned Internet provider, so we proposed to have a flexible system under ETC.72
The system Dawit refers to was a public network service provider, a “not-for- 
profit service organisation with the main objective of serving the public and 
developing services” (Furzey, 1995), independent from any actor in particular, but 
accessible to all. The idea was strongly rejected by the Ethiopian government which
73 *instead decided to place service provision under its direct control. This was only 
the first of a series of frustrations civil society faced in its attempt to import tools and 
discourses emerging at the international level.
A few years later, in 1997, Abebe Checkol, the Head of Information Services 
for the British Council in Addis Ababa, initiated a process that would have lead to 
the creation of the first telecentre in Ethiopia. In the late 1990s telecentres were one 
of the most popular solutions proposed by international organizations to bring 
connectivity to remote areas, a first step towards the highway’s off ramps mentioned
72 Interview: Dawit Bekele (Professor at Addis Ababa University and Africa Focal Point for the 
Internet Society ISOC)
73 Dawit stressed the risks connected with being too proactive by noting that “the guy who made the 
recommendations, the chair of the technical committee was marginalized since then. It was bad 
judgment. The government did not really know what the Internet was and it did not want to listen. 
They did not like the Internet.”
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in the AISI document.74 As Abebe himself remembered “the ITU and IDRC were 
organizing a lot of conferences at the UNECA, in particular on telecentres. It is there 
that I picked up the idea to start one of them in Ethiopia, using a public library in 
Wolisso, in Oromia”.75 With the support of the British Council, and after having 
obtained approval from the regional and local information bureau and trainig a 
number of local IT experts for the daily running of the centre, Abebe inaugurated it 
on the 26 February 2000. Unfortunately, as he recalled, “the government closed it 
after a few days. We opened on a Saturday and on Monday it was closed. They said 
it was against the Ethiopian Telecom Law, but the main reason why they closed the 
centre is because they were scared”. It took a lot of lobbying through international 
organizations such as the Commonwealth Telecommunication Organization, the
7 f \UNECA and the UNDP to have the telecentre reopened a year later.
These experiences illustrate how the efforts made by actors other than the 
government to develop a more dynamic information environment have been strongly 
opposed at the central level. As previously argued, this reaction was motivated by the 
need to slow down the pace of transformation to be able to exert more control over it 
and by the desire to occupy the new political space that was created by ICTs in ways 
that would primarily benefit the government and its national project. As I illustrate in 
the next section, the incidents which occurred in this period, far from increasing the 
chances for civil society to be involved in the change ICTs were supposed to bring, 
was associated with further polarization between state and non-state actors, making 
ICTs yet another contentious issue in Ethiopian society.
74 My first experience in a developing country consisted of the installation of two Linux-based 
telecentres in the south of Tunisia.
75 Interview: Abebe Checkol (Former Head of Information Services for the British Council, Addis 
Ababa)
76 The next telecentre was established in 2005 in Harar, sponsored by UNESCO. In 2007 the World 
Bank initiated an ambitious programme that would lead to the creation of numerous telecentres across 
Ethiopia. This programme will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 7.
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4.3.2 Disillusionment and disengagement
After initial attempts to shape local ICT policies and plans, NGOs, academics 
and pressure groups continued to take part in initiatives aimed at contributing to the 
local development of new technologies. New projects were initiated to localize 
software in Amharic, a group for the promotion of Free and Open Source Software 
was established and many civil society organizations participated in a forum created 
to draft a comprehensive ICT policy for Ethiopia. However, none of these activities 
offered individuals and groups outside the government the opportunity to have a real 
say in shaping the future of ICTs in Ethiopia, leaving many critical individuals at the 
margins or forcing others to be co-opted and enter government ranks. These failures, 
especially when combined with the expectations that the discourses about the 
transformative power of ICTs had created, left many with a strong sense of 
disillusionment. This feeling is captured by Dawit Bekele, who, after his initial 
experience with BITE, initiated many other ICT projects in the country.
We understood that the government works alone. Everybody tried to work with 
the government, NGOs, academia, etc. But they have not been effective. The 
UNECA was instrumental in activating the civil society but was not enough. I 
am not interested anymore in ICTs in Ethiopia. I did everything I could but with 
little result.77
Similarly Abebe Checkol, after his enormous efforts to start the first Ethiopian 
telecentre, later started to doubt the real value of the model he embraced and 
promoted in his country.
The problem with telecentres is sustainability. These centres were not really 
dem anded by the community. They were more the result o f  international 
advocacy.78
77 Interview: Dawit Bekele (Professor at Addis Ababa University and Africa Focal Point for the 
Internet Society ISOC)
78 Interview: Abebe Checkol (Former Head of Information Services for the British Council, Addis 
Ababa)
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The hype created by the discourse on ICTs articulated in the 1990s did not 
frustrate only the hopes of members of civil society because of their exclusion from 
an active role in influencing the ICT sector. The unprecedented scenarios envisaged 
for developing countries also created a certain optimism among government officers 
who were later to be faced with a different reality. At the beginning of section 4.2 the 
words of two technocrats were reported to illustrate the initial faith in ICTs shared in 
some government circles. Reflecting on the stages that followed those early days 
they recognized that “after a while they realized that technology cannot do
70miracles” and that “everything happened at a much slower pace [...] During our 
meetings the politicians were saying ‘We invested so much money in it, and see what
O A
we have. There is nothing compared to what could have been done’”.
These observations help to analyze the drawbacks of technocratic discourses on 
ICTs of the kind proposed by the UNECA through AISI, as well as by other 
international organizations in the 1990s and 2000s. Presenting mere possibilities as 
facts resulted in the creation of high expectations that could not be fulfilled in 
practice. In addition, strong reliance on the support local civil society could have 
provided for a specific agenda that did not take account of the power structure in 
Ethiopia and of the actual potential for individuals and groups to succeed in their 
efforts, appeared to have fostered disillusionment. Many individuals working for 
international organizations or foreign NGOs certainly advanced an agenda of the 
kind promoted by AISI with the hope that it could benefit populations in the 
developing world. At the same time, ignorance of the context in which this agenda 
was supposed to be implemented, compounded by faith in the transformative power 
of technology, meant that many of the initial ambitions regarding the use of ICTs for 
development were frustrated and produced outcomes that were very different from 
those expected.
79 Interview: Nega Alemaheiu, (Dean of the Graduate College of Information and Communication 
Technology, Addis Ababa)
80 Interview: Anonymous (8)
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4.3.3 The response of the diaspora: failing to engage and waving 
conflict
Ethiopians residing outside the country reacted differently to the government’s 
refusal to engage other forces in the development of a more consensual path to ICTs. 
In contrast to their compatriots in Ethiopia, they did not have to engage the local 
authorities to develop their own projects and they were seemingly free from the 
control exercised by the government over what it considered to be improper or 
adversarial uses of the new technologies. As a result, some Ethiopians living abroad 
could make bolder attempts to influence the path of ICTs in the country, relying on 
the success or reputation they gained abroad. In other cases, members of the diaspora 
started to employ technologies such as the Internet precisely in the ways that were 
opposed at home, to challenge the government and its political ambitions.
The most notable example of an Ethiopian citizen abroad trying to influence 
the development of ICTs in the country was Noah Samara, the founder the first 
satellite radio network, World Space Radio. Noah had started the company with the 
ambition of providing clear and consistent information across Africa, to fight 
HIV/AIDS, provide education in remote areas and support a variety of programmes 
in health and agriculture. He successfully exploited the hype that was surrounding 
digital technologies at the end of the millennium and welcomed the opportunity to 
operate in his home country to bring what he called “information affluence” during a 
speech he delivered at the African Development Forum inaugurated by Meles 
Zenawi. As will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 6, his role was important in 
explaining to Ethiopian leaders how different uses could be made of ICTs, 
combining satellite communication, Internet Protocols and various systems for the 
reception of information. This could have represented the initial step in a longer-term 
collaboration between World Space Radio and the government of Ethiopia, offering 
the private sector a leading role as advocated by the UNECA. However, the EPRDF, 
in line with the strategy followed with the local civil society and private sector, 
preferred to continue alone in defining how ICTs should be used in the country, 
refusing to keep working with Noah and preferring more ideologically neutral 
international corporations to assist it in the development of its plans.
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If Noah Samara saw in ICTs a chance to extend his social and business agenda, 
fulfilling the ambition to bring information affluence to Africa, many Ethiopians 
abroad interpreted ICTs to be less of a business opportunity but as new channels to 
wage political battles from a safe platform, attacking the government at home. The 
reasons why a medium such as the Internet was employed in this manner can be 
found in the recent history of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States and Europe. 
As will be illustrated in the next chapter, since the 1970s the country had been 
entangled in multiple conflicts which caused significant waves of migration 
(Terrazas, 2007). A large majority of migrants was made up of professionals and 
intellectuals who escaped political persecution (Abye, 2004). Many of these refugees 
belonged to political groups hostile to the EPRDF. Throughout the 1970s and 80s 
they were members of parties such as the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (better known with its Amharic 
acronym MEISON which stands for Mela Ethiopia Sosialist Niqinaqe). These groups 
were also opposed to the Derg regime but supported a nationalist agenda which was 
equally hostile to ethnic politics. More recently, others that fled abroad were former 
Derg supporters that were defeated in 1991 along with and other ethnic based 
movements critical of the monopolizing strategy of EPRDF (Lyons, 2007). This 
composition turned many new opportunities to reconnect the diaspora with the 
homeland into a significant obstacle for the EPRDF’s nation building and 
development plan, and for the capacity to assert it without facing substantial political 
confrontations.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined how the discourses about the modernizing, globalizing 
and democratizing potential of new technologies were appropriated, resisted, or 
transformed in Ethiopia. By investigating how the same artefacts were interpreted by 
a variety of actors operating in the country, it provided an illustration of how ICTs, 
rather than being objects producing effects, are nodes influenced by wider networks 
of discourses and power.
128
More specifically, the chapter began by explaining how the UNECA emerged 
as the most important “active teacher” in the country, to assessing how its framing of 
ICTs, which resounded with the larger policy agenda developed internationally, 
produced conflicting responses in Ethiopia, supporting great expectations among the 
most progressive elements of society, but even greater concerns within the 
government ranks. It was indicated how this process of appropriation of the new 
technologies, and of definition the their most relevant uses for Ethiopia, was 
dominated by the EPRDF, frustrating the attempts of other actors to influence the 
adaptation of ICTs in the country. Finally, the process of appropriation of earlier 
ICTs, such as the telephone, the radio and computers was briefly surveyed, 
illustrating how the longer term paths of technological adoption may influence the 
interpretation of newer technologies, despite the claims of their unique attributes.
While this chapter illustrated how the same technology and the same 
discourses can be charged with different meanings, how the term democracy, for 
example, was describing different realities for international organizations and for the 
Ethiopian government, the next chapter focuses more closely on the specific 
discourses articulated by the EPRDF and explores how these discourses came to 
influence the re-interpretation, re-definition and re-shaping of ICTs in the country.
129
Ch a p t e r  5 -  A  q u e s t  fo r  h e g e m o n y : t h e  u s e  o f  IC T s in 
SUPPORT OF THE ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL PROJECT
This chapter examines the key discourses that have influenced the re­
interpretation, re-definition and re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia at the local level. 
These discourses have been reconstructed from the analysis of textual and non­
textual data, as outlined in Chapter 3. They have emerged from interviews with high- 
ranking government and opposition politicians as well as with technocrats and civil 
servants; from press clippings, especially from the state controlled press; and from a 
study of the key aspects of Woredanet and Schoolnet.
The relevance of these discourses became apparent through the investigation of 
the main research questions that are concerned with the re-shaping of ICTs. The 
same discourses, however, were also significant beyond the specific case of new 
technologies. They were characteristic of the political agenda pursued by the 
Ethiopian government, which, as the previous chapter illustrated, emerged as the 
most important actor in appropriating ICTs and marginalizing other possible uses 
that could be advanced by other components of the Ethiopian society.
Three discourses, in particular, appeared as the most influential. First is the 
discourse on the nation-state elaborated by the EPRDF. According to this discourse 
the Ethiopian nation must be understood as a patchwork of different ethnic groups, 
each with an inalienable right to self-determination. A second discourse, similarly 
grounded in the ideological background of the EPRDF and its Marxist-Leninist past, 
concerns the Ethiopian society as it exists and as it should be. This is a pillar of the 
parly’s hegemonic project, advanced to gain legitimacy and consolidate control over 
the state. Finally, a discourse about communication in Ethiopia has structured the 
relationship of the political leadership to its constituencies and adversaries. The 
EPRDF, as fighters and subsequently as rulers, have shaped communication 
according to the “psychological make-up” (an expression used in the Ethiopian 
corstitution) of the main targets of their mobilization efforts, the peasants.
The long-term development of these discourses is analyzed, from their origins 
to heir more recent influence on the re-interpretation and re-shaping of ICTs. The
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relevance of considering an extensive period of time emerged from field research and 
from the realization that many key decisions and projects were grounded in a 
relatively distant past. Even if the technologies were new and were described by 
international actors as radically innovative, only analyzing events surrounding their 
recent introduction was found to have little explanatory power. A much more 
revealing story emerged from considering how the political thinking of the current 
leadership had evolved and continued to influence more recent courses of action. 
Thus, the chapter proceeds by analyzing the three discourses over an extended period 
of time and by considering the influence they exercised on ICTs and on the 
development of different technopolitical regimes in Ethiopia.
5.1 Ethnic federalism as the core discourse of the nation­
state
I have to balance otherwise I cannot create good citizens. Technology is used to 
build the nation, for the people at the centre and at the peripheries. But this is 
true in general. For example when we build a university in Addis Ababa we 
make sure that another one is being built in the regions at the same time. 
(Amare Anslau, CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunication C orporation)81
Since coming to power in 1991, the EPRDF has struggled to unite Ethiopian 
citizens around its idea of the nation. As Amare Anslau suggests, technology has 
emerged as just one of the instruments that has been developed over time to achieve 
this goal, incorporating the discourses at the core of the government’s national plan. 
Among the most important was ethnic federalism.
Ethnicity emerged as both a means and an end. It served as an operational 
principle for the redistribution of resources to those recognized as separate ethnic 
groups. But the provision of material benefits along ethnic lines was also aimed at 
convincing people on the ground that it was in their interests to be recognized as 
ethnically diverse. Building a university in each of the regional states, as reported by
81 Interview: Amare Anslau (CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation)
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Amare, can thus be interpreted not just as a response to a generic redistributive 
principle, but as a way to show to citizens that their rights were being realized 
primarily as members of a distinctive ethnic group. Projects like Schoolnet and 
Woredanet were designed to further enforce these principles on the ground. As a 
technocrat who had been working on Woredanet illustrated, “Woredanet is to 
complete the decentralization process. The success of the government will have to be
O '}
measured against this goal. [...] This issue is both managerial and political”.
The discourse on ethnic federalism emerged during the civil war against the 
Derg, the military dictatorship that had ruled Ethiopia since 1974. For almost two 
decades the precursor to the EPRDF, the TPLF, fought for the rights of ethnic groups 
within the larger Ethiopian state. Its agenda was grounded in the historic 
marginalization of the region of Tigray, in northern Ethiopia, whose people first 
revolted against the central government in 1942-43. The insurrection, known as 
Woyene, was crushed with the support of the British army, but survived in the mind 
of Tigreyans as a key referent in the struggle of oppressed ethnicities. Following its 
formation in 1975, the TPLF joined forces with another ethnically based liberation 
movement, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Together, the two groups 
came to represent the strongest, and eventually decisive, threat to the Derg.83
The struggles of the EPLF and the TPLF were the response of the northern 
peripheries of Ethiopia to a dominating and assimilating centre. However, even if 
strongly related, the insurgencies were fought to attain different objectives. The 
EPLF had a secessionist agenda, with the independence of Eritrea as its final goal. 
The TPLF had a more ambitious and complex programme. The movement started in 
the name of the Tigreyan peasantry, but soon began to locate its activities in the
82 Interview: Anonymous (8)
83 The TPLF and the EPLF were not the only ethnic based movements fighting against the Derg 
regime. The other most important ones were the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF). However, the TPLF and the EPLF emerged as the most successful 
movements, whose activity was decisive in overthrowing Mengistu’s regime. In an initial phase the 
OLF and the ONLF were invited to take part to the transitional federal government created after the 
Derg defeat, but they left soon after and the Ethiopian government now labels them as terrorist 
organizations.
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wider context of the rights of all nations, nationalities and peoples, as it termed the 
ethnic groups composing Ethiopia. Its ultimate aim was not just Tigreyan self-rule,
fid.but control of the country. In accordance with this objective, before entering Addis 
Ababa, the TPLF leadership decided to create a new party, including fighters from 
ethnic groups other than Tigreyan. In 1990 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) was bom, as a coalition of ethnic based movements: the 
TPLF, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement (EPDM), composed mainly by 
ethnic Amhara, and the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), founded 
to represent the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the country. However, neither 
EPDM nor OPDO were the expression of a large popular movement, but were rather 
ad hoc parties created by the TPLF to demonstrate its commitment towards a larger 
constituency (Young, 1997).85
The EPRDF captured Addis Ababa on 28 May 1991, marking the end of the 
civil war but also the beginning of the quest to transform a military success into a 
broader consensus on the future of the nation. A new discourse was articulated in 
support of this agenda and to legitimate what would otherwise have been seen as the
o z
rule of a minority, representing only 5.8% of all Ethiopian citizens : Ethiopia was 
not a unitary nation but a federation of ethnicities, which at least on paper were all 
entitled to the same rights to self-determination which mobilized the people of 
Tigray. By connecting the Tigreyan minority to other oppressed groups and offering 
them, at least in principle, the opportunity to participate in the re-founding of the 
nation, the EPRDF was reframing its de facto capture of the state as a victory for all 
marginalized groups. As is shown in the next sections, achievement of this objective 
was more complicated than expected.
84 At the beginning of the struggle the TPLF leaders were also advocating the secession of Tigray 
from Ethiopia, but soon abandoned this agenda (Young, 1997).
85 EPDM was created by a group of disbanded members of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Party (EPRP), whose fight against the Derg was based on a class, rather than ethnic, basis. After
having been defeated by the TPLF, some of the members of EPRP created the new party with the
support of TPLF. OPDO’s members in contrast were mainly Oromo soldiers which had been fighting 
for the Derg and were later captured by the TPLF’s forces (Young, 1997).
86 Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, 1994.
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5.1.1 Ethnic federalism, and its discontents
Ethnic federalism entitles all major ethnic groups to promote their language, 
culture and history, to elect their local government and to representation in the 
federal government. It was this ideology which underpinned the drafting of the 
Transitional Period Charter in 1991, where the right of Ethiopian nations, 
nationalities and peoples to self-determination was affirmed for the first time, as well 
as of the Ethiopian constitution, which came into force on 21 August 1995, extending
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the right to state self government to a right to secede.
Because of its uniqueness as well as its contradictory character, ethnic 
federalism has been one of the most researched areas in the history of modem 
Ethiopia. Major recent works in comparative politics and international relations have 
addressed it as a whole (Aalen, 2002; Assefa & Tegegne, 2007; Gudina, 2003; 
Pausewang, Tronvoll, & Aalen, 2002; Tegegne, 1998; Turton, 2006) or dealt with 
specific components of it (Ottaway, 2003; Stremlau, 2008; Young, 1997). For the 
purpose of this research I will examine, in particular, how it influenced the 
applications of ICTs in the country.
As with all attempts to generalize a particularistic view across a national polity, 
the EPRDF’s vision emerged antagonistically with competing versions and entailed a 
struggle over history and the role played by adversaries of the party and its potential 
supporters within it. Of the many challenges faced by the EPRDF in attaining its 
goal, two were probably the most complex to overcome.
First, ethnic federalism stood in sharp contrast to the nation building project 
promoted by previous Ethiopian regimes, which was characterized by the imposition 
of the culture of one specific ethnic group, the Shewan-Amhara, over all others. This 
process was initiated in the second half of the 19th century by emperors Tewodros II 
and Menelik II who respectively ended a long period of competition between feudal 
princes and annexed the regions in the South to the Abyssinian empire, creating
87 According to Article 39, 1st paragraph, of the Ethiopian constitution, “Every Nation, Nationality and 
People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”.
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Ethiopia as we know it today.88 During his 50 year long reign, Emperor Haile 
Selassie further consolidated the “Amharization” of Ethiopia, also extending it to
O Q
Eritrea, which was annexed after the defeat of the Italians in World War II. This 
process did not stop with the deposition of Haile Selassie and the end of the empire 
and the feudal system which had supported it. The Derg regime in theory refused to 
distinguish between different ethnicities, but in practice continued to impose the 
culture of Amhara over the rest of the nation. Amharic was chosen as the national 
language, the use of vernacular idioms was prohibited and Amhara urban elites were 
favoured as representatives of the government across Ethiopia.
For more than a century the mission of the central authority had thus been the 
creation of a unified nation around a set of values which should bring together all 
Ethiopians. In 1991, this project was reversed, and the foundation of the nation was 
recalibrated to be based on the multiple ethnic groups which compose it and their 
distinctive cultures. The language used to advance and justify this competing 
discourse demonstrated a marked contrast with that which had been employed 
previously, as is well illustrated in the newspapers of the time. The two excerpts 
below are from editorials published by The Ethiopian Herald, the state controlled 
English daily. The first piece is taken from the newspaper before the end of the civil 
war, when in the hands of the Derg, and the second is from after the war, when 
controlled by the EPRDF. They represent occurrences of diametrically opposed, but 
repetitive discourses. It can be argued that for months before and after the transition 
two basic editorials were being written, one praising unity, the other diversity, with 
only slight variations.
The Derg attempted to rally the population around its long-term motto, unity, in 
particular, against TPLF and EPLF, defined as anti-unity and anti-peace movements.
Ethiopians throughout the length and breadth o f  the country have continued to
voice their concern over the danger posed against the nation’s unity and
88 Between Tewdros and Menelik another emperor, Yohannes IV, reigned over Ethiopia, but he spent 
most of his reign protecting the empire from foreign incursions.
89 Haile Selassie ruled over Ethiopia between 1916 and 1974, first with the title of regent and later as 
emperor. His reign was interrupted between 1936 and 1941 by the Italian occupation, during which 
he found refuge in Bath in the UK.
135
sovereign integrity. The outrage o f the people is mounting. Ethiopians 
everywhere are expressing their readiness to be deployed to the war front and 
thereby pay any and every sacrifice to safeguard the long-standing freedom and 
unity o f  the country. The Ethiopian people are very w ell aware that in unity lies 
our strength. They are equally aware that unity is the reliable guarantee for the 
attainm ent o f  socio-economic progress. Accordingly, all stand for unity. They 
bitterly oppose all forces that are bent on undermining the unity o f  the nation.
To this end, the people are prepared to pay any sacrifice the struggle calls for. 
Ensuring national unity and security is the driving force behind the people’s 
m ounting concern and firm commitment.
The Ethiopian Herald, Editorial, Friday 5 April 1991 (emphasis added)
The second editorial tries to reverse this discourse, illustrating that the 
foundation of a new Ethiopia resides, instead, in its plural nations and nationalities.
Ethiopia is a country o f  many nations and nationalities. Not only have the 
various nationalities and oppressed people o f  this country been neglected for 
too long but deliberate efforts have been exerted to cause them to live 
com pletely forgotten and neglected and to remain in a dismal state o f 
backwardness. [ ...]  By convening a national conference for the peaceful and 
dem ocratic transition aimed at resolving the com plex national tasks, the EPRDF 
has given particular emphasis for the resolution o f these problems. The 
problems o f  nations and nationalities have thus come out for serious 
discussions on a priority basis. This is the first m ajor accom plishm ent o f its 
kind in the history o f  Ethiopia. Through this forum, convened by the EPRDF at 
which representatives o f  different minority nationalities were represented, it 
was possible to hear the various political outlooks particularly in connection 
with the burning issue o f  nations and nationalities. On the basis o f  the draft 
proposals subm itted by the EPRDF regarding this m ajor national problem, 
participants have held frank and open exchange o f  views and adopted 
unanim ously a resolution on ways ensuring the dem ocratic rights o f  oppressed 
nationalities and nations.
The Ethiopian Herald, Editorial, Friday 5 July 1991 (emphasis added)
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The two pieces almost mirror each other, obsessively reiterating the terms at 
the core of two competing discourses of the nation, and attaching opposite meanings 
to similar concepts. In the first editorial for example, unity is linked to socio­
economic progress: “They are equally aware that unity is the reliable guarantee for 
the attainment of socio-economic progress”. While in the second editorial it is 
framed as oppression and becomes a cause of backwardness: “deliberate efforts have 
been exerted to cause them to live completely forgotten and neglected and to remain 
in a dismal state of backwardness”. Similarly, the two pieces indicate different sets of 
values associated with what animates Ethiopian citizens. In the first editorial, unity is 
presented as being a cause people would die for: “Ethiopians everywhere are 
expressing their readiness to be deployed to the war front and thereby pay any and 
every sacrifice to safeguard the long-standing freedom and unity of the country”. 
While in the second article the issue of nations and nationalities is said to be the one 
addressed when people were given the chance to speak out for the first time: “The 
problems of nations and nationalities have thus came out for serious discussions on a 
priority basis”.
This debate did not end with the victory of the EPRDF, but continued, first in 
newspapers such as Tobiya, which was founded by journalists who had worked for 
the state owned press under the Derg regime, and subsequently through blogs and 
websites dominated by opposition parties and the diaspora.90 An excerpt from an 
editorial in Tobiya can be illustrative of this point:
The attempt by the fascist Italians to divide the people and the country was not 
successful, but now it is getting rooted thanks to the current regime. The people of 
the country are being divided along ethnic lines... The 1991 Charter follows and 
adheres to the secessionist ideology o f a few Eritreans. It seems that the Charter 
was prepared to facilitate the secession o f Eritrea from Ethiopia... .The attempt to 
view unity as a marriage is very simplistic and incorrect. The people o f  Ethiopia 
are connected by history, nature, culture and psychological m ake-up.... W e also
90 A second threat to the ethnic federalist discourse did not come from the forces that used to control 
the state under the Derg or Haile Selassie, but from other movements which, like the TPFL, had been 
opposed to those regimes. Although the TPLF emerged as the most successful among the groups 
opposing the state it was far from being the only one.
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think that no group should be allowed to disintegrate the country. In the new 
Ethiopia, the unique and terrifying term is “unity” . The charter is not in favor of 
unity. It also seems that the constitution fears the same term. It rather pronounces 
and emphasises the phrase “self-determination up to secession” .... The regime 
supports the division and disintegration o f the country and we think this is the first 
national government to do such a thing in the world.
Tobiya, Editorial, 24 February 1994 91
Over the years the two poles of the debate remained almost the same: unity, 
which the EPRDF was accused of having destroyed by allowing the secession of 
Eritrea and imposing a new divisive nation building agenda, and ethnic federalism, 
equated to positive change by the government, which the opposition parties have 
been accused of opposing as forces of conservatism and enemies of development. As 
will be shown in Chapter 7, this polarization also came to influence newer media, 
with some of the most popular blogs attacking the EPRDF’s ethnic federalist agenda, 
and the government trying to shield readership at home from receiving these critical 
articles and posts while at the same time trying to occupy new online spaces with its 
own narrative.
A second problematic aspect of the ethnic federalist discourse, and a reason for 
the resistance it initially provoked, is connected to how it attempted to construct 
ethnicities from above, extending the experience developed by the TPLF among the 
peasantry in Tigray to other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. As authors such as Anderson 
(1983) and Hecht (1998) have explained, concepts like ethnicity and nation are 
always constructed, and their meaning is contested by competing political projects. 
However, in different locations and at different points in time the extent to which a 
particular discourse is challenged varies. At the time of the civil war against the 
Derg, for example, a variety of factors made the Tigreyan identity more stable and 
less contested than others in Ethiopia (Young, 1997). Tigreyans had powerful
09common referents: the glorious Aksumite empire , the Woyene revolution in the
91 As quoted in Stremlau (2008, p. 90)
92 The Aksumite empire represents the foundation of the modem state of Ethiopia. Between the third 
and seventh century Aksumite emperors controlled most of northern Ethiopia, Eritrea, part of
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1940s, and the struggle itself, which was uniting the population further against 
central authority. The vernacular language, Tigrinya, had been used for centuries 
and, like Amharic, had a written script. For sixteen centuries orthodox Christianity 
had been professed by almost the entire Tigreyan population. However, these factors 
were far from being present across other groups within Ethiopia, and, more 
importantly, were not necessarily understood by other ethnic groups as a reason to 
revolt against the centre and request official recognition of their ethnic diversity.
The EPRDF’s programme was based on a map of the social composition of 
Ethiopia imposed from above, and like other ‘top-down’ nation building projects,
Q 'y
encountered a great deal of hostility on the ground. As Amhed Hassen, a member 
of parliament responsible for information and communication, recalled, “at the 
beginning of the new government the idea of a federal Ethiopia was opposed from 
everywhere. We felt highly misunderstood”.94 A concrete illustration of this reaction 
is offered by Vaughan’s research in the southern region of Simien Omo, where the 
government was trying to amalgamate different ethnic groups into more manageable 
units (Vaughan, 2006). As part of this operation a new language was created from a 
variety of dialects spoken in the area intended for use in administration, for educating 
children in primary schools and providing a new glue to unite different groups living 
in the region. However, far from being perceived as a manifestation of ethnic rights, 
this act led to strong resistance and sparked violence among the population. The first 
textbooks written in the newly created idiom were publicly burned during protests 
that resulted in several deaths and imprisonments (Vaughan, 2006)
Southern Sudan and Yemen. It entertained trading relations with most of the Arab world, but also 
with India and Rome. King Ezana II was the first to convert to Christianity in 324 AD, making Aksum 
the first centre of Christianity in the continent. It is also claimed that the rests of the Arch of covenant 
are preserved in a church in Aksum. For more information about the history of the Ethiopian empire 
see Collins and Bums (2007)
93 An interesting and quite literal example of this tendency is the fact that as of 2008 there were not 
ye: official maps of the regions available. A clear delimitation of regional boundaries could lead to 
violent conflict since these boundaries, especially in the South, are strongly disputed.
94 Interview: Ahmed Hassen (Member of Parliament and Deputy Chairman of the Information & 
Cilture Affairs Commission)
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It is difficult to reconstruct the degree to which such reactions surprised the 
new leaders or were anticipated, but since ethnicity alone could not mobilize all 
people of Ethiopia as much as it did in Tigray and in Eritrea, a variety of different 
strategies had to be adopted to implement the ethnic federalist agenda in the country.
5.1.2 Ethnic federalism in practice: building the state to build the 
nation
To translate the ethnic federalist discourse into more concrete forms and, at the 
same time, to increase its control over the territory the government started 
developing institutions which embodied the principles of ethnic federation. As key 
components of the new order, these institutions had to fulfil two main requirements: 
first, they had to be based on ethnicity, incorporating quotas to equally represent 
different groups in society; second, they had to be efficient, or at least more efficient 
than those Ethiopian citizens had known in the past. The two principles were 
presented as being strictly interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Ethnicity 
provided the ideational framework for the creation of the new administrative 
infrastructure on the ground. Efficiency and an equal redistribution of resources 
among the identified groups were supposed to substantiate this and reinforce among 
the population the belief that an ethnic federation was the most appropriate form of 
government.
These processes can be interpreted as further examples of Anderson’s 
formulation of nations as imagined communities (Anderson, 1983). It was through 
the invention of new symbolic referents that a different idea of the nation was 
proposed and negotiated, in the attempt to reach some for of consensus among the 
Ethiopian population. But, as Anderson also points out, and as Hechf s research 
further substantiates, ideational referents needs to be grounded in a material reality in 
order to function among communities at large. Some of these material referents may 
already exist and be invested with new meaning which is functional to a nation 
building process. This can be the case of a location becoming a destination for 
pilgrimage. Others need to be constructed, such as a series of reactors, as explained
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by Hecht in her research on the French ambitious nuclear programme. In the case of 
Ethiopia, it was systems like Woredanet and Schoolnet, together with numerous 
other physical substantiations of EPRDF’s national project, that came to play this 
role. They were designed to simultaneously embody the principles of the ethnic 
federalist state, to signal it on the ground and to improve its image. Debretsion Gebre 
Michael, the General Manager of EICTDA, illustrated this point.
Ethnic federalism is a key component. In Woredanet you can see the federal 
system reproduced at the technical level. You have the federal, the regional and 
the woreda. The system is organized in a way that you can make sure the 
message is delivered to the lowest levels of the government.95
To establish the ethnic federalist discourse at the political and social levels, the 
country was divided into nine regional states96, each intended to represent “a group 
of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar 
customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a 
common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly
07contiguous territory”. The states were split into woreda, units of approximately 
100,000 people, governed by administrations modelled on baito, the councils created 
bj the TPLF in Tigray during the war. The woredas were in turn divided in kebele,
Q O
village councils representing grassroots units of government. In 1992, elections 
were held to provide the new institutions with a popular mandate and to signal to the 
population that a new order was being created. The EPRDF had founded a number of 
etmically based parties which could compete in each of the regions, but the only two 
gamine opposition parties, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the All Amhara 
People’s Organization (AAPO) withdrew due to harassment and intimidation.99
95 Interview: Debretsion Gebre Michael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
clarge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
96rhe cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were also granted administrative status.
97rhe Constitution o f the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, art.39, paragraph 5.
98rhe kebele maintained the form of the village councils created by the Derg.
"T h e  four member parties of the EPRDF were the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation 
(CPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Southern Ethiopian People’s
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Subsequent elections, for the constitutional assembly in 1994 and for the regional 
and federal governments in 1995, were similarly uncontested. This was not novel for 
the Ethiopian population, who had never been called to vote in free and fair 
elections. The electoral contests were rather a means of providing the new leaders 
with a symbolic mandate which, even if it did not emerge from genuine competition, 
could be used in support of their national discourse and to justify continued reforms 
in the country, especially among the rural population.100
The political remapping of the country along ethnic lines was accompanied by 
a similarly ambitious reform of the civil service.101 Many administrators I
Democratic Front (SEPDF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The affiliates were the 
Afar People’s Democratic Organization (APDO) in Afar region, the Somali People’s Democratic 
Front (SPDF) in Somali, the Gambella People’s Democratic Front (GPDF) in Gambella, the 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF) in Benishangul-Gumuz, and the 
Harari National League (HNL) in Harari. They are officially independent but have been created by the 
EPRDF and have strong links with it.
100 As indicated by von Bogdandy, HauBler, Hanschmann, & Utz (2005), processes of state and nation 
building are closely related and successful reforms of the state can be undertaken only if the ruling 
elite has a certain degree of legitimacy. This relation can be found in their definition of state and 
nation building, focusing in particular on post-conflict situations of the kind experienced in Ethiopia 
after 1991. “State-building means the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public 
structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. Essential to state-building is the 
creation of sovereign capacities of which the fundamental one is the successful and generally 
undisputed claim to a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’” (pp. 583-584). “Nation- 
building is the most common form of a process of collective identity formation with a view to 
legitimizing public power within a given territory. This is an essentially indigenous process which 
often not only projects a meaningful future but also draws on existing traditions, institutions, and 
customs, redefining them as national characteristics in order to support the nation’s claim to 
sovereignty and uniqueness. A successful nation-building process produces a cultural projection of the 
nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs which can function as the 
legitimizing foundation of a state structure.” (p. 586).
101 The World Bank, for example, described the operation in a background paper: “Following the fall 
of the Derg regime in the early 1990s, the EPRDF-coalition Government embarked on a long term 
strategy of “state transformation” characterized by bold attempts to implement multiple reforms in 
parallel; the massive scale-up of institutional development efforts across tiers of government; and the 
deliberate expansion of the scope of public sector capacity building initiatives” (World Bank, 2004b, 
p. 5).
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interviewed at different levels of the government apparatus by 2008 had become 
obsessed with keywords such as efficiency, good governance, empowerment and 
service delivery, the meaning of which seemed, however, to be increasingly distorted 
at lower levels of the administration. At the time of my research, a number of 
ministries were being restructured using the principles of Business Process Re­
engineering (BPR), and BPR manuals could often be found on the desks of their 
General Managers. However, BPR was only the latest of a long series of techniques
# 1  0 9employed to reform the civil service.
The most important of these reforms, known as the National Capacity Building 
Programme (NCBP), started in 2001. It was a multi-sector and intergovernmental 
programme, involving a variety of activities, of which the most relevant was the 
creation of the Super-Ministry of Capacity Building and the reinforcement of the 
woreda as the fundamental building block of the Ethiopian state machinery. Prior to 
2001 the decentralization process had not produced the expected results and the 
NCBP was intended to improve performance by devolving authority to lower levels 
of the administration, the woredas, while at the same time linking them tightly to a 
newly created institution. The programme was initially piloted in four regions 
(Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and Southern Nations Nationalities and People Regions) 
and later expanded under the name of the Public Sector Capacity Building Program 
(PSCAP).
Woredanet and Schoolnet were set to play an important role in this later wave 
of state transformation, supporting some key aspects of the reforms. The link 
between investment in technology and the decentralization process was evident to the 
engineers and technocrats that were asked to formulate solutions to the challenges 
presented by the NCBP and PSCAP reforms. The testimony below is from one of the 
technocrats that had been involved in the design and implementation of Woredanet 
from the very beginning:
102 For details of BPR and for a comprehensive illustration of the decentralization process and civil 
service reform see the Special SIDA Study written by Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003), or the book 
edited by Tegegne (1998).
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The Minister of Capacity Building was asking and demanding and we had to 
come up with solutions to what he was asking. There was frustration after 
frustration. All the decisions were political decisions, to decentralize, to follow 
the project of decentralization, to create a sense of collectiveness among 
different communities and the centre.103
This explanation suggests how the decentralization project influenced the 
design of Woredanet, and how the newly created Ministry of Capacity Building 
exercised a prominent role in the initial phases in which Woredanet took shape. They 
also illustrate, similarly to what Hecht discusses in her work on nuclear power in 
France, how the political nature of technology is often appreciated and portrayed as 
an explanation for technical decisions by technical personnel. The interview from 
which the quote above is taken was one of my first and as much as Hecht reports she 
was surprised by the explicit reference to politics in technocrats’ answers to her 
questions, I was not expecting to receive such straightforward accounts of issues that 
I considered very problematic in terms of how technology was used to enact specific 
political needs. As the interviewee continued,
Another request was to diffuse information up to date to the periphery and to know 
what was going on in there. A minister cannot wait for too long. Now the Prime 
Minister can speak to the rural areas, all at the same time. All the costs for his 
transportation, his security, are not there anymore. [...] The Prime Minister can 
use the system every time he wants, while for the other nodes, they should fill a 
form.104
The tendency to underline the political nature of systems like Woredanet and 
Schoolnet was confirmed in many interviews with technocrats and other non­
political personnel. The following comments by a computer scientist working at 
Addis Ababa university is indicative of this.
103 Interview: Anonymous (32)
104 Interview: ibid.
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China is now the model. To be effective and deliver is a way for them to stay in 
control. The government thinks that if they do a good job with the economy and 
provide good services the people should keep quiet and let politics take its 
course.105
The above examples are initial illustrations of how Woredanet and Schoolnet 
emerged as technopolitical regimes, as the embodiment of a political plan that could 
be enforced with the support of technology. Their scope, however, was not simply to 
support a decentralized state. The combination of the foundational discourse of the 
nation advanced by the EPRDF and the kind of state building project this “dictated” 
in practice, created a more intricate distribution of forces that the new systems had to 
“fix”. This, in part, explains the unique nature of the two systems, their scale and 
complexity.
5.1.3 A contradictory project: controlled decentralization
This is the paradox the current government created: it is a minority government 
and it needs to justify with an ideology like ethnic federalism its staying in 
power. They need to decentralize to support their ideology but also to exert a 
central control to make sure they can stay in power.106 
(Bahru Zewde, Historian)
Bahru Zewde is one of Ethiopia’s renowned historians, and his words indicate 
the contradictions in which the EPRDF became embroiled as a result of its complex 
nation and state building projects. Ethnic federalism was probably the only possible 
compromise which could legitimate the EPRDF’s control over the country, but in 
order to bring this about it had to strengthen centrifugal forces which had the 
potential to threaten the capacity of the new leaders to maintain the control they were 
seeking.
105 Interview: Anonymous (35)
106 Interview: Bahru Zewde (Historian)
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Different measures have been devised to resolve this paradox, some of which 
have been illustrated in previous studies. Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen (2002) 
have explored how the EPRDF created a de facto single party system by founding 
dependent ethnically based parties and assuring that these were able to win majorities 
in both local and parliamentary elections. Control of what appeared to be a highly 
decentralized administrative system could thus be guaranteed by a centralized party. 
Assefa and Tegegne (2007) have shown how the close control exercised by central 
government over financial resources has, in practice, denied local administrations the 
capacity to define their own priority spending. Sara Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll 
(2003) have identified additional measures such as the use of the federal security 
forces to control unstable peripheral zones and the provision of a wide range of 
training and courses to universalize the philosophy of the EPRDF.
Woredanet and Schoolnet represent the latest incarnation of the desire for 
controlled decentralization. Since power was further devolved to woreda level, a new 
mechanism was required to ensure that, whilst granted greater responsibilities and 
increased capacity to operate, the units did not fall outside of the control of the state. 
The system, although bidirectional in principle, has been used mostly to consolidate 
the EPRDF’s influence in the periphery, to ensure that the powers to which local 
administrators were entitled were exercised within a framework decided at the 
central level. This was elaborated by an EICTDA technocrat.
Woredanet is used mainly to connect people with the centre for administration 
purposes, to govern the entire community and provide services. By using 
technology, information is not lost when it is transferred. This is at the base of 
everything. Let me give you an example. If you are in a school where the 
professor teaches by saying something to a student and asking him to pass the 
message to the next student, and so forth, the last student will have information 
that is completely different from the one communicated at the beginning. 
Woredanet prevents this from happening 107
107 Interview: Anonymous (16)
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Making sure that all receive the same message and can act accordingly 
contrasts with the principles which should inspire a decentralized state, whereby 
those working in the localities are able to make decisions autonomously on the basis 
of their knowledge of the local context. However, this had been one of the major 
requirements in designing Woredanet which aimed at intensifying the presence of the 
centre in the periphery, empowering local administrations without the risk that they 
could fall outside of the orbit of the leadership at the centre.
Beyond government circles, this characteristic of the system was heavily 
criticized for having magnified the need to control the local administrative structures 
rather than enhancing their capacity. Yemane Kidane, a former guerrilla fighter and 
government official who left the government in 2001 as a result of a critical stance 
towards some of its policies, argued that this excessive attempt to control could
1 A O
jeopardize the whole state building project.
Through Woredanet there can be a commitment to building their [the local 
cadres] capacity and probably they are doing it. But the problem is that the 
people at the centre do not allow people at the woreda level to make their own 
mistakes. There is this obsession with control and command. So the people in 
the woredas even if more trained and skilled [...] they are not allowed to leam 
from trial and error. They will always wait for instructions and will be afraid 
of taking responsibility.109
An even more critical stance was expressed by Merera Gudina, Assistant 
Professor of political science at Addis Ababa University and Deputy Chairman of the 
United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), a moderate opposition party.
108 After the war with Eritrea (1998-2000) some of the most influential members of TPLF started 
criticizing Meles’ rule, especially over the ways in which the Prime Minister handled the war with the 
neighbouring country and former ally. This led to a profound split within the front which, according to 
Tadesse and Young (2003), was based on ideology, but was also an expression of a contest over 
power. Meles Zenawi, supported by key members of Amhara National Democratic Movement 
(ANDM), emerged victorious from the dispute, while most of his opponents were purged, arrested or 
marginalized.
109 Interview: Yemane Kidane (Former Member of EPRDF and Officer in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Director, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue in Addis Ababa)
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The rhetoric is about decentralization, the empowerment of the people. But 
when you look at it in practice very little is happening in this direction. The 
government strategy is to control, not to empower. So Woredanet is to transfer 
their message from the centre to the periphery. It is used to control and 
indoctrinate. Maybe they say it is for public service delivery but I saw very little 
results so far. Good governance is just a way to cover all this with nice words.110
Projects such as Woredanet emerged as the latest incarnation of complex, and 
partially contradictory, nation building and state building projects. These projects 
embodied the ideologies that sustained the guerrilla struggle in the bush, but at the 
same time they were aimed at enforcing some key components of those ideologies on 
the ground. As such they could not but emerge in competition with alternative 
political plans advanced by other key actors in Ethiopia, operating domestically and 
from abroad. To succeed, the EPRDF had to marginalize not only the oppositional 
discourses, but also the actors articulating them. The next section illustrates how this 
was achieved in practice and how it has resulted in the polarization of the Ethiopian 
society where citizens are framed as either beneficiaries or as enemies of the 
EPRDF’s national plan.
5.2 A populist discourse of social integration
Between the start of the civil war and 1991, when the EPRDF came to power, 
global political conditions changed dramatically. The Berlin Wall had fallen and the 
USSR was slowly dissolving. The Marxist-Leninist thinking, which had inspired the 
struggle had become a problematic legacy for the new government as it sought to 
position itself in the post Cold War order. At the same time, to install itself firmly at 
the centre of the local political scene against many competing forces, the EPRDF 
needed strong backing from the international community. In this context the party 
leadership decided to distance itself from its communist past and to publicly embrace
110 Interview: Merera Gudina (Professor at Addis Ababa University and Chair of the United Ethiopian 
Democratic Forces)
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the principles of liberal democracy. This move was, however, more strategic than 
ideological.
The TPLF had always shown a remarkable dedication to the rights and needs 
of peasants, who they considered to be their most important constituents. This 
commitment was grounded in Marxist-Leninist thinking and was common to many 
other movements which had been fighting oppression in Ethiopia and elsewhere in 
Africa. In contrast to other groups, however, the TPLF fighters were not simply 
abiding by a programmatic point. They took this principle as an inspiration for their 
everyday conduct and tried to maintain a lifestyle as close as possible to that of the 
farmers. Alfred Taban, a Southern Sudanese journalist who was invited by the TPLF 
to report on their struggle, illustrated this point in a memory from his time in Tigray.
Because of the bombings we were travelling at night.... We found a small town 
at 2 am where they said we should sleep. It was very cold, they threw us some 
blankets. [I said] are you going to sleep here in this cold? [They said] yes it is 
very late so we cannot wake up these people at this time of the night. I was 
shocked because my only knowledge of guerrillas was not like that. There were 
people that would throw away any people at any minute [at] will. Take the 
SPLA111; they wanted the best things for themselves at the expense of the 
citizens.112
Other reflections of the TPLF’s ideological background were the absence of 
aiy private property among the fighters and the regular meetings held by the leaders 
to study and discuss Marxist-Leninist thinking.113 It is difficult to accept that this 
approach, practised for such a long period of time, could be so swiftly and easily
111 The SPLA is the Sudanese People Liberation Front, led by Joseph Garang, which has fought for 
tie recognition of the right to self determination of Southern Sudan.
1E Interview: Alfred Taban (Editor in Chief of The Khartoum Monitor and BBC Correspondent in 
Sidan). This interview was conducted with Nicole Stremlau, who has also used it in her monograph 
01 The press and consolidation o f power in Ethiopia and Uganda (Stremlau, 2008).
1B One of the most influential organs within the TPLF was the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray 
(MLLT). The members of MLLT, among which was also future prime minister Meles Zenawi, 
pirtrayed themselves as defenders of orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideas, and often used disputes over 
doctrinal interpretation as ways to fight for power within the front (Young, 1997).
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overturned and replaced with new principles. Behind the rhetoric of liberal 
democracy, important vestiges of the TPLF’s past remained. As of 2008, all land in 
Ethiopia was owned by the state, which is supposed to guarantee access to farmers 
on an equal basis. The telecommunication sector was a monopoly, the only system 
that, according to Ethiopian leaders, can make sure peasants are not forgotten in the 
name of profit. The state or the party continued to control large proportion of shares 
in some of the biggest industries in the country.114 Whilst EPRDF cadres saw, and 
many still do, rural Ethiopia as the principal target of their endeavours, they 
concurrently framed the elites who were not aligned with the EPRDF as enemies of 
the government to be fought and prevented from gaining any form of power. This 
attitude could be partially interpreted as retaliation against the oppression suffered by 
many ethnic groups under the rule of the Amhara class, which had largely settled in 
the major towns. It resulted in government policies which often marginalized the 
urban population, even when this was against the national economic interest.
As ethnic federalism was the founding discourse for the Ethiopian nation-state, 
the primacy of the rural population was the discourse embraced by the EPRDF to 
frame its idea of Ethiopian society. Both discourses resounded with another 
discourse that was central to the EPRDF: revolutionary democracy. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, revolutionary democracy refused the focus on the individual that 
characterizes liberal democracy, preferring to stress group rights and consensus. It 
similarly favoured a populist discourse claiming a direct connection of the leadership 
with the masses, bypassing the need to negotiate with other elites who advanced 
competing ideas of the nation-state and of the role different groups can have within 
it. This conceptualization of the Ethiopian society had also concrete repercussions on 
how priorities were set and resources allocated. While very little was invested to 
increase and improve the communication channels with dissenting voices, substantial
114 The tendency of having loyal political figures heading the most important industries in the country 
is particularly evident in Tigray, where the biggest industries, from tanneries to pharmaceutical 
factories, are clustered in a consortium known as Endowment Fund For The Rehabilitation of Tigray 
(EFFORT), responding directly to TPLF cadres. Among board chairmen of EFFORT companies is 
worth remembering Sebhat Nega, former Chairman of the TPLF and Head of the Economic Affairs 
Department of the EPRDF.
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efforts were made to consolidate and reinforce the relationship with the base of 
political power.
5.2.1 Including the poor
We always said that whatever policy we decide to develop, it will always be the 
farmers and the peasants to implement it. So the decisions may be taken at the 
centre but the targets for these decisions are the farmers. So even now through 
technology the final targets are the farmers. It is the concept of mass 
mobilization. The whole idea of revolutionary democracy is to have the 
hegemony of ideas and views, to be the only one occupying the political space.
But this has to be implemented on the ground. So technology is used to 
disseminate ideas but also to achieve results, otherwise people will know that 
what you say is just words."5 (Yimane Kidane, Former Leader in the 
TPLF)
During the civil war Yemane Kidane’s assignment was to mobilize support for 
the TPLF inside and outside Ethiopia. From its base in Sudan he contacted 
journalists and officials in ministries of foreign affairs, but also covertly conveyed 
leaflets to influential politicians through their Ethiopian maids. As a TPLF leader, he 
continued to shape state policy, especially communication and foreign policy, until 
2001, when an internal split in the party forced him to leave government. Although 
he was not directly involved in ICT related projects, his experience in defining the 
TPLF and EPRDF communication strategy during and after the war, as well as his 
criticism of his former allies and his witty personality, made Yemane’s perspective 
particularly illuminating regarding important aspects of discourses used by the 
EPRDF and their influence on the re-shaping of ICTs.
As cited above, Yemane notes that there were several key points used by the 
EPRDF to define and structure Ethiopian society and the party’s role within it. This 
section focuses on the links between mass mobilization, the peasantry and
115 Interview: Yemane Kidane (Former Member of EPRDF and Officer in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Director, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue in Addis Ababa)
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revolutionary democracy, leaving the analysis of others, such as the importance of 
achieving results instead of using “just words”, for the following section (5.3).
Mass mobilization has been at the core of numerous revolutions throughout 
history. It refers to the need to activate large numbers to guarantee the success of a 
specific political project, and its nature varies according to the relationship between 
the mobilizing and the mobilized.116 In the case of the Ethiopian civil war, the 
peasants were placed at the core of revolutionary efforts, not just as ideal-type 
referents, but as individuals to whom the party leadership had to show its 
commitment. Yemane Kidane explained how “when we were in the bush we were 
sleeping with the people to show with facts what our struggle was about”.117
The TPLF/EPRDF’s idea of mass mobilization was heavily reliant on a direct 
connection with the peasantry. The quest for “hegemony of ideas and views” 
mentioned by Yemane should thus be interpreted as having the farmers as its main 
focus. Less attention was accorded to other social groups, whose ideas and critiques 
have been actively excluded from political debate since the EPRDF came to power. 
This aspect is well illustrated by the words of Haddush Kassu, former General 
Manager of the Ethiopian News Agency and one of the senior officials in the 
Ministry of Information. His words were a reply to a question about censorship of 
oppositional blogs.
During the elections it is true that websites played a big role and people were 
printing articles from the Internet and using them and disseminating them. But I 
do not know about the relevance of these ideas, because they are just individual 
opinions. Some issues are controversial only for the politicians but not for the 
people. So we think that if people think differently they have to have the chance 
to express it and strengthen their way of looking at things. But if it is just about
116 For a comprehensive review of the role of the concept of mass mobilization in revolutions see, for 
example, Jack Goldstone (2001).
117 A female former fighter I interviewed in Tigray further illustrated this point with her testimony by 
explaining that “during the struggle we were going house to house to talk with the women and also to 
help them. So at the end we were like friends. And they became interested in what we were saying” 
(Interview: Roman Almaz, Regional Head of Women Affairs, Tigray and Former TPLF Fighter).
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the elite agenda, the individual agenda and not the agenda of the people why we 
should allow them to express.118
The populist attitude exemplified by Haddush is a key component of the 
EPRDF’s political project. By framing rural Ethiopia as the most important, and 
almost the only important, constituent of Ethiopian society, and by claiming to have 
developed a special relationship with it, the EPRDF has created a way to assert its 
legitimacy outside of the representation model which characterizes liberal 
democracies. But, as Yemane pointed out in his final remark, this has to be proven in 
practice, and technology, ICTs in particular, have come to play a key role in keeping 
contact with the masses, and demonstrating commitment to them through the 
implementation of government plans. How this was achieved in practice will be 
illustrated in Chapter 6 as the design of Woredanet and Schoolnet was profoundly 
influenced by the necessity to replicate some of the mechanisms that had been at the 
centre of mass mobilization at the time of the struggle with a larger constituency than 
the peasants of Tigray.
5.2.2 Excluding the elites
The process of framing the peasants as the building blocks of Ethiopian society 
was accompanied by a complementary framing of other groups as irrelevant or as 
enemies of the oppressed. Below is an excerpt from an editorial published a month 
after the capture of Addis Ababa, which describes the members of the Workers Party 
of Ethiopia (WPE), the party created by the Derg, as exploiters of the innocent.
The so-called WPE is a dictatorial fascist party which had been spilling the 
blood of the innocents from its very foundation till its doom. On the basis of the 
unjustifiable expression ‘priority for the comrades; the best for the comrades’,
WPE members used to lead an affluent life. On the other hand, the unfortunate
1,8 Interview: Haddush Kassu (Head of External Relations at the Ministry of Information and Former 
General Manager of the Ethiopian News Agency)
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poor were not properly paid for their labour and were even robbed of the fruits 
of their labour. The Ethiopian Herald, Friday 28 June 1991
It was not only the long term enemy which was framed as a danger to society. 
Other liberation movements which fought the Derg with agendas which differed 
from that of EPRDF, received similar treatment.
At the present moment chauvinists living in foreign countries are doing 
everything to ignite the flames of war only days after the former regime, which 
was in the forefront of the war drama, was defeated. Only a few days ago, these 
anti-peace elements held a meeting in Washington and made various anti-peace 
decisions. We must not fail to recognize that anti-peace forces like the EPRP 
and MEISON undertake acts of war. These groups, being the very forces who 
used to murder the children of the oppressed people, have no compassion 
whatsoever for the oppressed.
The Ethiopian Herald, Thursday 6 June 1991
Use of such language has continued and could be easily found in the 
government sponsored media at the time of research. This is a signal of the 
problematic nature of a nation building project which attempts to marginalize 
political dissent. As will be illustrated in Chapter 7, it has also triggered responses 
from those portrayed as enemies using similarly polarized rhetoric, which has been 
highly detrimental to political debate in Ethiopia.
5.3 An empiricist discourse of communication
In the previous sections, two components of the EPRDF’s ideology have been 
examined, illustrating how the party devised its nation building agenda through the 
extension of discourses regarding the nation and society, ethnicity and the peasantry. 
Some aspects of the influence these two discourses have had on the reshaping of 
ICTs at the local level have also been illustrated and will be analyzed in detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7. However, the nature of the Ethiopian approach to ICTs cannot be
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fully understood without referring to a third discourse: communication as an 
empirical process. On the one hand its characteristics derive from the two previous 
discourses: the definition of the farmers as the main targets of state activities and of 
the nation as a federation of ethnicities to be held together by increasing the presence 
of the state on the ground. Conversely, the discourse about communication has also 
structured the other two, defining the ways in which they are put into practice.
All three discourses are rooted in the experience the EPRDF leadership 
developed during the civil war. After the struggle ended the EPRDF demonstrated 
great reluctance to abandon or transform them, given the key role they played in 
coalescing various individuals around a common cause. When the TPLF started its 
struggle it was composed of a few hundred people, but only a few years later it had 
already gained control of most of rural Tigray.119 Many other movements, such as the 
All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Party (EPRP) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had been active before the 
TPLF’s foundation and were initially better resourced and more experienced, but it 
was the TPLF/EPRDF that eventually put an end to the Derg regime. Drawing 
confidence from this background, the new rulers proceeded to apply the lessons 
learned in Tigray to the whole of Ethiopia. Their communication strategy during the 
transition in the 1990s and the consolidation of power later on continued to heavily 
rely on practices and principles developed in their recent past.
5.3.1 Showing by doing
The TPLF always recognized the importance of communication in supporting 
its struggle. From the very beginning a variety of means were used to mobilize the 
local population and to make people aware of the causes for which the movement 
stood. Many fighters were given the task of visiting villages and explaining what the 
TPLF was and what its goals were. Churches and markets were used as focal points 
to address crowds. Leaflets in both Amharic and Tigrinya were printed in caves and
" 9 According to Markakis (1987), at the time of the first TPLF congress in 1976 its entire membership 
was 170 people.
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secretly brought into schools and government offices. In 1979 a radio station was 
established to extend dissemination of the message into enemy held territory. 
Debretsion GebreMichael, General Manager of EICTDA and formerly responsible 
for the maintenance of the radio in the bush, explained how communication was 
perceived during the war:
Communication was central to the struggle, it was the essence of the struggle 
for us. [...] You had really to convert people, to make them think in a different 
way. And unless you communicate well and deeply you cannot get to the point 
of converting people. It is what you communicate but it is also the design of the 
communication itself. This component was critical to our success.120
He further elaborated on the meaning of “design of communication”.
Communication has to be not just abstract communication, just about 
principles. It has to be linked to the real life of people. We had to convince 
them through practice, showing what was practically changing in their lives 
and giving information that they could practically use in their life. [...] If you 
are talking to the peasants you have to show. The strategies that we were using 
in the struggle are still important and are still used now. Only the form has 
changed.121
The importance of showing and not using “just words” was similarly captured 
in Yemane Kidane’s quotation in section 4.2.1 and in many other interviews with 
former fighters and members of the Ethiopian government. Fetlework 
GebreEsgabier, a female fighter who was active in mobilization during the struggle,
1 77named this strategy empiricism.
120 Interview: Debretsion DebreMichael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
charge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
121 Ibid.
122 Empiricism should not be confused with pragmatism, another of the principles guiding the 
operations of the fighters during the struggle. Pragmatism was embraced only by a minority of the 
TPLF vanguard and caused a split within the font. The idea at its core was that some key aspects of
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We were supporting empiricism. The idea to practice first rather than just 
disseminating ideology. We were not using theories to explain to people. We 
had to act first to show them. But at the same time we were thinking that 
practice should be led by theory. Theory was important to analyze issues. And 
practice should be theory driven. But you have to implement to make people 
understand, to explain to them.123
Empiricism does not operate on the principle that actions should follow words, 
as is generally the case where political organizations are competing for power. 
Rather, it demonstrates that for the TPLF facts were words. Facts were the message. 
It was mostly through direct exposure to what was being done on the ground that 
people could be “converted”, as pointed out by Debretsion, and thus choose different 
courses of action. This belief continued to guide EPRDF cadres, and has strongly 
influenced key aspects of the re-shaping of ICTs, as will be shown in Chapter 6. 
Debretsion illustrated this relevance of empiricism in recent times.
So this is also key now, because all the strata of society have to be reached.
ICTs represent an extension of that very idea. If the Prime Minister wants now 
to communicate with the people he can do it. So, this need to reach out to the 
people is still there. But now since you have a country to rule it is more 
difficult, you cannot gather all the people. You need the infrastructure, but 
communicating effectively is still an art.124
Similarly, Bereket Simon, former Minister of Information and Advisor to the 
Prime Minister, explained that Woredanet was designed with the farmers as one of 
the main targets.
the struggle should be concealed to those who were not part of the core leadership. (Tadesse & 
Young, 2003)
123 Interview: Fetlework GebreEsgabier (Former Guerrilla Fighter and Officer in the Aksum province)
124 Interview: Debretsion DebreMichael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
charge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
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Woredanet is for different purposes. It is to strengthen the capacity of the public 
administration,
but it is also to reach rural Ethiopia, to make sure that the farmers get the right 
information. Woredanet is part of the wider communication strategy we have 
developed. Instead of communicating with everybody, we prefer to 
communicate with the most advanced part of the society and let it be our
125messenger.
Some features of Woredanet were thus optimized to emulate some of the 
communication mechanisms employed in the bush, but on a larger scale. 
Videoconferencing from the centre towards the peripheries was prioritized over 
Internet browsing, for example. As is further explained in the next section, having 
the vanguard talking to the local political cadres was considered more important than 
letting them use new tools to find tailored solutions on their own.
5.3.2 Internal communication
The focus on showing results instead of just promising them was effective with 
the peasants during the struggle but presented a fundamental challenge: to ensure that 
at different levels the fighters, and subsequently the administrators, knew what these 
results had to be. As indicated by Fetlework in the previous section, theory did not 
have to be communicated directly to the ground, but was nonetheless informing the 
majority of decision-making (“We were not using theories to explain to people. We 
had to act first to show them. But at the same time we were thinking that practice 
should be led by theory. Theory was important to analyze issues”). Yemane Kidane 
extended her argument:
When communicating in the bush we had a lot of problems in making sure that 
the same information could make it to the village councils without being 
corrupted. Because of course everybody was interpreting [it in] his own way.
And these people who were leading the struggle at the grassroots level could not
125 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Advisor to the Prime Minister)
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show that they did not know what they were fighting for and what they were 
doing. So even if they had not understood a message well, they had to 
communicate to the people what was their interpretation. And maybe this was 
different from the original message. [...] The people on the ground were the 
ones who had to know how to implement. But the ideology was at the centre. It 
was the prism through which all information was elaborated and decisions were 
taken.126
The need to ensure that a vision and the activities derived from it are known at 
different levels is common to many organizations. What is important in the present 
context is how this has been perceived as a priority by the government for a long 
time and has influenced the interpretation of ICTs as the tool that could meet this 
need. In section 4.1.3, I illustrated the importance of Woredanet in ensuring that all 
cadres received the same message. Amare Anslau, CEO of ETC, reaffirmed this 
point.
When information is provided through mediators it may loose the value that the 
first person gave to it. But now a message that emanates from the Prime 
Minister can produce the same level of understanding both among officials as 
well as at the lowest level.127
Amare used the example of the Prime Minister to illustrate his point which is 
similar to the example cited by Debretsion in the previous section when he noted “If 
the Prime Minister wants now to communicate with the people he can do it”. These 
two cases are far from being isolated examples. Most politicians and civil servants, 
when asked to provide an example of how Woredanet was used, mentioned the need 
for the Prime Minister to communicate. This aspect has had a profound influence 
on the design of Woredanet, and will be analyzed later in Chapter 6.
126 Interview: Yemane Kidane (Former Member of EPRDF and Officer in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Director, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue in Addis Ababa)
127 Interview: Amare Anslau (CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation)
128 The interviewees were not primed but responded to generic questions. For example, they were not 
asked how the Prime Minister was using the system, but they were asked only to provide examples of
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5.3.3 Refusal to engage
A final aspect of the discourse on communication is related to the relationship 
the TPLF/EPRDF has with its political opponents. As illustrated in section 4.2 the 
vision of society advanced as part of the EPRDF’s nation building project posits a 
population divided between a large constituency for which the state is responsible 
and a minority that opposes the endeavour. Since it came to power the EPRDF has 
chosen not to negotiate with adversarial voices, preferring to expand its influence and 
presence as exemplified by ambitious projects like Woredanet and Shoolnet. The 
party has sought to minimize and marginalize opposition, rather than enlarging its 
base by incorporating new forces and perspectives. This attitude is clearly evident in 
the words of two senior members of the EPRDF, Bereket Simon and Ahmed Hassen, 
Deputy Chairman of the Information & Culture Affairs Commission, as they 
describe the initial period of EPRDF government and how the policy towards 
opposition entailed ignoring competing ideas.
There were problems with the practical perception of what we were doing.
With the new constitution there were people who were not happy with the idea 
of ethnic federalism. They were thinking that ethnic federalism would have 
endangered the unity of this country. And we had to reply to them with the 
practice. [...] The elites in the urban areas did not like us for the handling of 
the national question. So we decided that we were going to deal with this with 
time. Not immediately. We wanted to address this issue by showing it. And we 
were also busy addressing all other issues: agriculture, education, everything 
that was needed to rule a country. And our being busy addressing all these 
issues also gave the opportunity to the opposition to hammer us constantly.
But we were ready to accept these hiccups. We did not have to explain. We 
were doing.129
how Woredanet was used. In some cases, such as those cited here, this question was not even asked, 
but the reference to the Prime Minister came spontaneously as part of the response to a different 
question.
129 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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Bereket’s statement summarizes a range of issues that have been analyzed so 
far: ethnic federalism as the core of a new discourse of the nation, the dismissal of 
urban elites as inimical forces, and the importance accorded to practice rather than 
rhetoric. But most importantly for the present argument is observing how little 
relevance he accorded to the engagement with other voices and the need to respond 
to criticism. As is typical of populist discourses, the culture of “doing” pursued by 
the EPRDF was opposed to a culture of just “talking”, which oppositional forces are 
accused of. This point was further substantiated during an interview with Ahmed 
Hassan, Member of Parliament and Deputy Chairman of the Information & Culture 
Affairs Commission:
We saw this initial phase as a transition period. We did not have very much 
hope. We hoped that a democratic process would have come through the civil 
society and we were hoping also through the media. But the media did not 
participate. They were just adversarial. And so our approach was to just ignore 
them. At the time of the transitional government they were attacking Meles 
personally but he decided just to ignore them. [...] Unfortunately there is no 
middle ground in Ethiopia. The culture of dialogue is not there.130
This confrontational environment and the lack of any desire for engagement, 
on both sides of the political spectrum, is one of the main factors which later led to 
the closure of many critical newspapers, and the censoring of blogs. The government 
contributed to the creation of this climate but it has also been a victim of it. Its 
refusal to engage has polarized political debate, further radicalizing adversarial 
components of society which, after having been framed as enemies, have become 
enemies in actuality.
130 Interview: Ahmed Hassen (MP, Deputy Chairman of the Information & Culture Affairs 
Commission)
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5.4 Conclusion
Chapters 4 and 5 contribute substantially to answering the first component of 
the question driving this thesis: why ICTs in Ethiopia have taken the shape they have. 
This chapter, in particular, identifies the nation and state building processes Ethiopia 
was engaged in at the time when a new wave of ICTs for development campaigns 
reached the country, as the most influential factors in shaping ICTs to manifest 
themselves in their present form. While connecting the Ethiopian case with wider 
scholarship on nations as imagined communities (Anderson, 1983), this chapter has 
investigated the specific discourses that were aimed at building Ethiopia as a 
federation of ethnicities, creating a popular base against political opponents and 
effectively communicating with it. The evolution of the discourses was also 
illustrated, focusing, in particular, on how they originated at the time the EPRDF was 
a guerrilla movement fighting the Derg regime and how they later came to influence 
the re-interpretation, re-definition and re-shaping of ICTs in the country.
The specificity of the discourses articulated in Ethiopia suggests that there 
should be greater reflection in the scholarship on the explanatory power held by 
theories addressing, for example, the democratizing potential of new technologies or 
their capacity to support good governance. If most of the research on ICTs and their 
appropriation in developing countries continues to focus on categories that are 
grounded in Western thought, it will continue to ignore the important processes that 
influence the shaping and use of new technologies. Transforming a country into an 
ethnic federation may or may not be positively associated with greater democratic 
processes and a more accountable state, but the realization of this project certainly 
has consequences for the lives of Ethiopian citizens, consequences that are worth 
studying per se. The findings illustrated in this chapter should also stand as an 
invitation for future research to move beyond questions asking, for example, whether 
ICTs have a democratizing effect or not, and instead focus on the more complex 
nexus of governance and politics and how ICTs emerge and operate in developing 
contexts. The next chapter further substantiates this argument, illustrating how the 
combination of global tools and local discourses generated technopolitical regimes 
that present challenging puzzles to mainstream ICTs for development theories.
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C h a p t e r  6  -  T h e  n a t io n a l  t e c h n o p o l it ic a l  r e g im e
Not long ago, many of us felt that we were too poor to afford to invest seriously 
in ICT. We assumed that ICT was a luxury that only the rich could afford. We 
were convinced, and rightly so, that we should invest every penny we have on 
securing the next meal for our people, on putting some sort of shelter over their 
heads, on reducing or, as the experts in the development business would have it, 
alleviating absolute poverty, absolute poverty which has aptly been defined as 
poverty that kills. We did not believe that serious investment in ICT had 
anything to do with facing the challenges of poverty that kills. Now I think we 
know better. Now we believe we are too poor not to save everything we can and 
invest as much of it as possible on ICT. We recognize that while ICT may be a 
luxury for the rich, for us - the poor countries - it is a vital and essential tool for 
fighting poverty, for beating poverty that kills and ensuring our survival. That is 
why we are fully committed to investing as much of our time, energy, and 
money as possible on ICT and to its effective use in our war on poverty. (Meles 
Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia)131
Meles Zenawi’s statement illustrates how dramatically the perception of ICTs 
has evolved over time in Ethiopia. ICTs were initially interpreted as instruments that 
could do little to help a country where food security was still one of the main 
concerns, only to later become, in the words of the Prime Minister, “a vital and 
essential tool”. This chapter analyzes the various steps which characterized this 
progress, but it also addresses some key aspects concealed by the Prime Minister’s 
words: how the investment of “time, energy, and money” in ICTs was not simply 
motivated by the “war on poverty”, but, more importantly, by the desire to use 
technology to enact the EPRDF’s political plans.
The previous two chapters analyzed the discourses at the core of this plan as 
well as those emerging around ICTs, starting with politics to get at technology. This
131 The quote is taken from the inaugural speech made the Minister of Capacity Building Tefera 
Walua (2006) at e-Leaming Africa, the international conference on ICT for development, education 
and training in Africa that took place in Addis Ababa on 25-27 May 2006.
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chapter and the following one will move in the opposite direction, looking closely at 
technological artefacts to reconstruct how they have embedded specific political 
plans. They will focus on the technopolitics that emerged at the intersection between 
hegemonic projects and technical possibilities and on the actual technopolitical 
regimes that were generated from this intersection.
After having dealt with the passages that led to a progressive engagement of 
the Ethiopian government with ICTs and finally to the development of a national 
technopolitical regime centred on Woredanet and Schoolnet, this chapter will 
illustrate how the discourses on the nation, society and communication were 
embodied in different components of these two systems. It will also be shown how 
the process of adaptation of tools designed outside Ethiopia to meet local needs did 
not result in a perfect “machine” which could lead to the most effective 
implementation of the plans defined at the centre, but instead in a less coherent 
assemblage which fell short of realizing all the aspirations expressed by the 
Ethiopian government.
The findings presented in this chapter are the result of the use of different 
sources and methods of data collection, as outlines in Chapter 3. During my 
fieldwork, I visited Woredanet and Schoolnet sites in Tigray, Oromya, and SNNP, 
where the systems were analyzed and interviews were held with technical personnel, 
local administrators, civil servants, teachers, and students. Reports were collected 
from a variety of national and international institutions, private consultancy firms 
and independent research centres. Numerous interviews were also carried out with 
politicians, civil servants, and engineers in Addis Ababa, as well as with international 
civil servants and international consultants. All these sources helped to reconstruct 
the complexities of the Woredanet and Schoolnet systems and the story of their 
evolution from their inception to their deployment and use.
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6.1 Fluctuations and turning points: moving towards a new 
technopoiiticai regime
The process leading to the creation of a national technopolitical regime, which 
had Woredanet and Schoolnet at its core, was not linear or smooth. On the contrary, 
it was characterized by a chaotic evolution, marked by an initial slow progression 
and a subsequent rapid acceleration. This phenomenon could be explained by one of 
the principles developed in IR constructivist theory: the necessity for new discourses 
to be effectively embraced to resonate with those already articulated in specific 
social and political environments. In many cases this fit is not initially apparent, but 
must be constructed by either local or international actors, or both (Checkel, 2001; 
Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Following this principle the movement towards the design of 
Woredanet and Schoolnet could be divided into three different phases. During a first 
phase, the discourse on ICT for development as articulated internationally emerged 
as mostly alien to state agents, the only ones with enough power and resources to 
open the path towards new applications of ICTs. In a second phase different actors 
progressively built the bases for a fit to be created between international and local 
discourses. Given the nature of the ICT agenda, this fit had to be found both at the 
discursive and at the material level, and required the Ethiopian government to 
develop an understanding of the means that could be mobilized to support its agenda. 
Finally, a path was opened for the creation of a new technopolitical regime, taking 
shape at the crossroad between the opportunities opened by the new tools and the 
political ambitions articulated at the local level.
The first phase can be dated between 1991, when the EPRDF seized power, 
and the early 2000s. In this period the government showed little inclination to 
embrace ICTs as advocated by international organizations and corporations. Its 
priority was guiding the country through a critical political transition after a long 
civil war and new technologies, as framed in international circles, did not appear 
instrumental in achieving this plan. The promotion of the private sector and of the 
free flow of information held very little appeal for the EPRDF. Economic growth and 
efficiency were certainly more interesting, but were not as crucial as political
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hegemony or the control of the state, which, quite predictably, did not feature in the 
international discourse. As a sign of this minimal interest, the centres in charge of 
ICTs instituted by the Derg regime were left almost untouched, in contrast to urgent 
efforts to re-orient other institutions, which lead for example to the dismissal of most 
officers in the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Education. As a former 
official of the National Computer Centre, recalled: “at the beginning they did not 
really care about us, we could continue to do what we were doing. Later they started 
asking us to do more bureaucratic work such as checking if efforts were duplicated, 
but we were not really affected by the change in power”.
During this period the new discourse on ICTs simply fluctuated throughout 
different sectors of the Ethiopian society, without finding a concrete application. In 
the absence of a clear understanding of how technology could be used to serve the 
state’s interests or, on the contrary, could be turned against them, the government 
simply acted to guarantee that no other actors would be able to seize the 
opportunities potentially opened by ICTs. Telecommunications continued to be a 
state monopoly, no private Internet Service Provider (ISP) was licensed and even the 
purchase of hardware and software was complicated by a limited offer and by high
133import taxes.
The beginning of the new millennium, however, witnessed the development of 
a different attitude towards ICTs, opening a second phase which would later lead to 
the massive investments undertaken to realize projects such as Schoolnet and 
Woredanet. It is difficult to assess exactly what event led to this turning point, and 
most probably it was not one, but a series of events which conspired to produce 
change, generating momentum for a new strategic approach to ICTs.
Between 1999 and 2001, the international community organized an 
unprecedented number of events on ICTs for development in Addis Ababa that
132 Interview: Anonymous (25)
133 Until 2008 all items such as personal computers, laptops, printers, etc. were subject to a 5% duty 
and 10% surtax on top of the 15% VAT. The lifting of the duty and surtax was welcomed by the 
business sector in the country, which, however, indicated that also the VAT should be lifted in order 
to promote the private sector and computer literacy (Mekuria, 2008).
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forced some key figures, including Meles Zenawi, to engage more seriously with the 
new tools and rhetoric.134 As previously argued, this did not mean that the discourses 
articulated on these occasions were unchallenged, in fact the opposite was the case, 
but they offered Ethiopia’s leaders the chance to reflect on which aspects of this 
discourse were more compatible with their plans and to appreciate that despite often 
being framed as a holistic package, ICTs were not a monolithic entity.
The “unpacking” of ICTs was further facilitated by international companies 
which, if generally interested in supporting a discourse centred around the reduction 
of the digital divide, also had strong commercial interests and were eager to to win 
large contracts with African governments, even if this meant serving agendas that 
differed from those advocated in international fora. The first person to work closely 
with the Ethiopian government and to illustrate how ICTs could be tailored to the 
country’s specific needs was Noah Samara, an Ethiopian national living in the US 
who founded the first satellite radio network, World Space Radio, as referred to in 
Chapter 5. The civil servants I interviewed at the Educational Media Agency and the 
Ministry of Education remembered Samara as the person who introduced ministers 
and technocrats to the uses of satellite communication to provide educational content 
and reach the peripheries of a large state like Ethiopia.135 After Samara, other 
international corporations such as Cisco, Hughes Network and Panasonic started 
proposing similar or complementary ideas to respond to the requests articulated by 
the Ethiopian government, opening the path to a more enthusiastic appropriation of 
ICTs.
The availability of the skills necessary to re-shape new technologies according 
to a local agenda could be found in the international market and made it possible for 
the Ethiopian government to envisage new ways to implement their plans on the 
ground, which ultimately led to the design of Woredanet and Schoolnet. Relying on
134 See section 4.1.1 for a list of events and training activities in which representatives of Ethiopian 
institutions were involved.
135 As Noah explained during a speech he delivered at the African Development Forum in 1999: “we 
have embarked on a study with the Ethiopian Media Agency to put receivers in every school and 
attach these receivers to computers and printers. In addition to delivering the curriculum for each 
school, the units would address the needs of the other constituencies attached to the schools: like 
women, health professionals, farmers” (Samara, 1999).
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foreign companies rather than on local ones also represented a greater guarantee that 
the expected result could be reached in a shorter period of time, without having to 
wait for the necessary local workforce to be adequately trained, and that local politics 
would not jeopardize the realization of the plans defined at the centre. In contrast to 
other governments in the developing world, which might have seen the realization of 
similar large projects as an opportunity to strengthen the local private sector and 
develop a skilled work-force, the Ethiopian government prioritized the 
implementation of a national agenda and the connection of the centre with the 
periphery over the possibility of making of ICTs a dynamic sector. Even Noah 
Samara, who could have claimed a better knowledge of the Ethiopian society and 
culture, eventually fell out of the picture and all contracts for the implementation of 
both Schoolnet and Woredanet were signed either with American or Japanese 
companies: Cisco Systems for the provision of the networking technologies, Hughes 
Networks for the satellite connection, VCON for most of the videoconferencing 
equipments and Panasonic for the Plasma TV screens.
Since the decision was taken, the implementation of Schoolnet and Woredanet 
proceeded with remarkable speed, especially in comparison with the long time often 
required for projects of such a magnitude to be implemented in Africa. In 2004, only 
a couple of years after a Request for Proposals was issued to put the systems in place, 
the first broadcast classes could be attended in many secondary schools and 
videoconferences took place between the central government and some woreda 
offices. In order to enable the operation of the systems in even the most remote areas 
of Ethiopia which were without electricity and not served by the main roads, petrol 
generators were installed and the military was employed to airlift some of the 
equipment.
The explanation for the faster pace that characterized this third phase can be 
found in the greater clarity about how ICTs could be bent to serve specific national 
needs. According to some commentators, their deployment was accelerated in time 
for the 2005 elections, which posed an important challenge for the EPRDF and one 
that had to be addressed in advance. Prior to 2000, elections in Ethiopia had been 
staged for the ruling party to reaffirm its control over the territory and for external
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consumption rather than to provide a real opportunity for political competition. 
Opposition parties historically had been harassed and, in most cases, boycotted 
elections in protest. However, in an effort to consolidate its domestic and 
international legitimacy, the EPRDF decided to make the parliamentary elections of 
2005 the first openly contested polls in the history of Ethiopia. As was later 
recognized by international observers, the EPRDF allowed the voting process to be 
free and fair (Carter Center, 2005). Opposition parties were given unprecedented 
access to the state media and numerous oppositional newspapers were able to 
circulate in Addis Ababa and other major cities. The comparative openness, 
however, required the government to develop new tools to make sure that it retained 
a competitive advantage and occupied the political spaces necessary to win the 
election through consensus and not coercion alone. Bobak Rezian, the ICT focal 
point for the World Bank, argued that the election strategy had a profound influence 
on how new technologies were to be interpreted:
Before the elections in 2005 it was key for them [the government of Ethiopia] to 
reach the population in the rural areas. To speak with the peripheries. And they 
saw technology as an opportunity to do that, a great opportunity. And this 
strategy was the driving force behind their plans, even if they did not realize 
how expansive the project was going to be.
But because of this the political dimension created problems. Technical 
decisions were made by political figures creating a convoluted combination.
And they rushed all their plans so much that they were not aware of all the 
problems that would have obviously arisen on the way. In fact at the end it did 
not really serve the purpose they had in mind. And the technology did not make 
such a big difference in the elections of 2005. But at the same time by investing 
and implementing so much they realized that this tool was powerful for politics 
and for other reasons too. This is the law of unintended consequences.136
As Bobak’s words suggest, the deeper knowledge of the potential of ICTs, if 
motivated by a greater enthusiasm among the political elite, did not necessarily lead 
to the creation of a perfect assemblage. The Ethiopian leaders still had to confront the
136 Interview: Bobak Rezian (ICT Focal Point for Ethiopia, World Bank)
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reality of adapting a technology that was designed to serve different purposes. In the 
minds of top level politicians, technology had to be a direct expression of their 
strategic thinking. But in the absence of a local capacity to reconfigure and re-shape 
technology, a variety of actors needed to be mobilized to establish Schoolnet and 
Woredanet. International corporations were responding to the requests expressed by 
the government, but always within the limits set by the contracts they had signed. 
Middle level bureaucrats were left to mediate between the two worlds but at the same 
time they often lacked enough power to take important decisions. As a long serving 
Ethiopian technocrat who worked on Woredanet since its initial conception 
explained: “The minister of capacity building was asking and demanding and we had 
to come up with solutions to what he was asking. There was frustration after
117frustration. All the decisions were political decisions”.
The need for a thorough coordination motivated the building of institutions 
where political will and technical expertise could be reconciled. A national ICT 
committee was created with input from all the main ministries to assess the needs of 
different sectors, from agriculture to federal affairs. But it was the foundation of the 
Ethiopian ICT Development Agency (EICTDA) in 2003 that provided the 
coordination and oversight necessary to develop and manage complex projects such 
as Woredanet and Schoolnet, as well as other ICT projects in the country. EICTDA 
became the transmission chain between the highest levels of the government and all 
other gears of the national technopolitical regime. It was a novel kind of institution in 
the Ethiopian landscape. Hosted in one of the newest buildings erected by the 
Ethiopian government, it was set to represent a new outpost of modernity. As 
compared to the traditional ministerial bureau, usually dated and reflecting the 
country’s communist past, the luminous EICTDA’s offices, separated by glass rather 
than walls, were set to incorporate the new principles of transparency and 
accountability. Most the staff were young graduates that were among the best in the 
country. At the same time, as most Ethiopian institutions, it still maintained the 
burden of the centralized administration of power, marginalizing creative but 
unaligned positions in favour of politically motivated ones. This was evident in the 
numerous interviews carried out with EICTDA’s officers and in the variety of
137 Interview: Anonymous (32)
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opinions collected among them, of which, however, very few found an application 
in official policies and state sponsored technologies.
6.2 Technopolitics in action: embedding the key discourses 
into artefacts
A growing understanding of how ICTs could be employed to serve its nation- 
building agenda and the international availability of the skills required to translate 
this vision into practice provided the Ethiopian government the opportunity to turn 
politics into technopolitics. This enhanced dimension of political power opened the 
opportunity to enact policies through the support of technological artefacts, but it 
also engaged politicians and engineers in complex negotiations to reconcile political 
aspirations and technical possibilities. This section analyzes the key aspects of these 
negotiations, focusing, in particular, on the influences exercised by the three 
discourses illustrated in Chapter 5 on the actual development of Woredanet and 
Schoolnet. Through a close look at the two systems it is shown on the one hand how 
they were designed to structure both objects and users in ways that were instrumental 
to the EPRDF’s national plan, and on the other hand how the material nature of ICTs 
often forced technocrats and politicians to revise parts of their strategies.
In order to equip the reader with all the necessary means to indentify the 
various steps of this process of mutual influence, before moving to the analysis of 
how discourses on the nation, society and communication were embedded into 
Woredanet and Schoolnet, some of the technical aspects of the two systems are 
briefly outlined.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the architecture that Woredanet and, in part, Schoolnet are 
based upon. The system is divided into three fundamental components: the satellite, 
represented at the top of the picture; the national data centre, on the left; and the 
remote sites, on the far right. Each component is described in detail below, also 
illustrating some key features of Schoolnet by comparing it to the very similar 
architecture of Woredanet.
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Fig. 6.1 The Woredanet Architecture (Source: EICTDA)
The satellite
For a country like Ethiopia, vast, landlocked and with very little infrastructure, 
the use of a satellite was the most practical option to implement Woredanet and 
Schoolnet within a short timeframe. The connectivity was provided by Hughes 
Network Systems, through a C-band transponder on the Intelsat Satellite 901 in 
service over the Atlantic Ocean. The transponder, with a capacity of approximately 
60 MBps, had to be shared between all the services offered by the two systems.
Schoolnet was allocated approximately 16 MBps which were used to broadcast pre-
1 ^8recorded classes on eight channels. The remaining bandwidth was used by
138 The number o f  classes was later increased to 12, but this did not require augmenting the bandwidth 
allocated to Schoolnet on the satellite. The channels were administered through a statistical
Woredanet to provide various services: videoconferencing, emailing, voice-over- IP 
(VoIP) and access to the Internet. The system offered Broadband on Demand (BoD): 
each service was allocated a certain amount of Mbps, but each channel could be 
switched off to free bandwidth for the others, as was often the case.
The national data centre
Woredanet’s main servers were installed in the national data centre, located in 
the office of the Prime Minister. This site hosted the equipment necessary to initiate 
and manage videoconferencing sessions as well as to remotely control the other 
services provided through the satellite. The selection of the site is indicative of the 
strategic relevance of the system and its importance in serving a centrally defined 
agenda. Two sets of servers, the Media Xchange Manager (MXM) and the 
Multipoint Control Unit (MCU), were configured to support different 
videoconferencing typologies, enabling centralized communication. The three most 
important are detailed below.
Broadcast is a type of transmission whereby messages are sent from one point 
to all other points. It requires a stream of information to be sent only once but it does 
not permit any other node to interact with the source or other nodes. While it is the 
most centralized, it does not allow the centre to see what happens in the remote sites.
Multipoint transmission allows simultaneous videoconferencing between three 
or more remote points. It is mediated through an MCU where each party must be 
authenticated. The MCU receives streams of information from each node and, 
similarly, sends individual streams to each of them. In a situation where bandwidth 
is scarce, as in the case of Woredanet, only a few nodes can simultaneously 
participate in the same session. It is a relatively centralized system. The centre has 
the power to connect or disconnect parties to a specific session. It also sees what is
multiplexing, a system which could optimally allocate bandwidth among channels. According to the 
system administrator in charge of the management of the bandwidth at Sululta Earth Station, “a 
statistical multiplex allocates bandwidth to each channel according to the needs in a particular 
moment. For example if one channel for some time has just a black screen and does not require a lot 
of bandwidth, extra bandwidth is freed for other channels that may have picturesor videos which 
require more”.
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happening in the remote sites and it is the only node that can decide whether or not to 
forward messages coming from one remote site to the others.
Multicast is a type of transmission where messages originating from each node 
are sent directly to all others, without the need for a central server. Multicast allows 
the remote sites to communicate with each other, bypassing the centre which is 
required as a bridge during a multipoint session. However, similar to multipoint, 
multicast presents some challenges when bandwidth is scarce and multiple nodes 
participate in the same session. It is the most decentralized and transparent system, in 
theory allowing each party to join a multicast session at any time and see all other 
streams.
Woredanet was configured to manage each type of transmission, while 
Schoolnet was capable only of broadcasting messages. Also, while Woredanet 
content was managed at the national data centre, the Schoolnet’s broadcasts regularly 
originated from the Educational Media Agency.139
The remote sites
In the Woredanet’s architecture the remote sites are composed of regional and 
woreda nodes. They function using similar equipment, with two exceptions. Regional 
nodes, in theory, are able to initiate a multicast session, while woreda nodes can only 
join an existing one. Most regional nodes are also equipped with a terrestrial 
connection that allows them to be connected to the Internet and use other 
applications on a regular basis, while woreda nodes only have access to the Internet 
through satellite which provides intermittent service.140 Apart from these differences, 
all remote sites are equipped with a Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), a 2.4 m 
satellite dish connected to a router and switch, which addresses traffic to three 
different types of equipment: a set of PCs, two VoIP phones and a videoconferencing 
system. As shown in Figure 6.2 the front end of the videoconferencing system is
139 Also the national data centre could reach Schoolnet remote sites when needed, as will be explained 
in section 6.2.2
140 At the time of my research the Regional Data Centres in Gambella and Benishangul did not have a 
terrestrial connection.
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constituted by a large Plasma TV screen, a video-camera, and other equipment 
managing video and audio streams. The videoconferencing system is usually 
installed in the Bureau of Capacity Building in the regional and woreda offices, so it 
is necessary for administrators and civil servants to gather there in order to attend the 
videoconferencing sessions.
Fig. 6.2 A room dedicated to Woredanet videoconferencing (©Author)
Schoolnefis remote sites are simpler than Woredanet’s. As schools only receive 
broadcasted lessons they do not need videoconferencing equipment. In addition, they 
do not have VoIP phones and only a few enjoy an Internet connection. However, 
similar to Woredanet, they receive streams through a VS AT and have a 42 inch 
plasma television screen as a delivery mode.
As described so far, the system may simply appear to be characterized by a 
eclectic and complicated architecture. On the contrary, as will be discussed in the 
next section by associating some of the components of Woredanet and Schoolnet
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with the specific discourses illustrated in Chapter 5, there were underlying 
motivations behind this convoluted patchwork of technology and politics.
6.2.1 An ethno-technical federation tied to the centre
The influence of the EPRDF’s ethnic federalist project on the development of 
both Woredanet and Schoolnet can be seen in the architecture of the two systems. As 
illustrated in Chapter 5, the promotion of a discourse reframing the domination of a 
single minority in the larger context of the right to self-determination of every 
minority, proved a challenging enterprise, often forcing politicians and bureaucrats 
to come up with original solutions to a variety of problems, from the everyday 
administration of the periphery to the consolidation of power at the centre. In the 
case of Schoolnet and Woredanet this aspect was expressed both in the scale of the 
two systems and in their convoluted design. Some services, such as 
videoconferencing from the centre to the periphery, were privileged over others, such 
as the access to the Internet or the capacity to communicate horizontally among 
different nodes of the state apparatus.
The scale of Woredanet and Schoolnet was one of the most contentious issues 
dividing the Ethiopian government and the international community. Donor agencies 
were concerned that there were no examples of systems of this kind in Africa or 
elsewhere in the world and were demanding to pilot them first, before full-scale 
implementation. It would have been more logical, for example, to start with the 
major towns that were easier to access and had a greater availability of skilled 
personnel. The government, however, was responding to a different rationale. As 
Zelalem Bekele, the Chief Technical Officer at ETC explained:
There is one principle here. When we started Woredanet and Schoolnet we went 
full scale and we knew it was going to be expensive but it was not unaffordable.
But we had to respond to one principle in the government that is the principle of 
equity. You cannot derogate to that. This is something you cannot compromise.
So we had to do it for the whole country. You cannot pick up one town here and
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otae village there and say this deserves connectivity and this not. It would be
, . 141against equity.
Enforcing the principles of ethnic federalism on the ground required the 
allocation of the same rights and resources to every ethnic group. The symbolic value 
of equally distributing resources among different regions was seen to be as important 
as their material value. It was essential that each node of the federal state had equal 
access to use the system, even if this might constrain its effective functioning.
Respecting this principle imposed serious technical hurdles, especially on 
Woredanet. One of the most serious was represented by the constraint imposed by 
the limited bandwidth available though the satellite managed by Hughes. Having 
every woreda connected at the outset meant catering for almost 600 nodes. With only 
45 Mbps allocated to Woredanet on the Intelsat transponder, for every node to be 
constantly connected, the bandwidth available for each would have to be reduced to 
an untenable speed.142 Another major problem was related to the lack of a skilled 
workforce in the remote sites. Even if most of the equipment was deployed on time, 
there were too few technicians who could install and maintain it.
Paradoxically, these two problems could have cancelled each other out, at least 
temporarily. For the first few years, the operational nodes were reduced to only 100 
of the 600 sites that were equipped or waiting to be equipped with the required 
technology. Consequently, the bandwidth available for each Woreda was increased 
to a speed close to that provided by a normal dial up connection.143 However, even at 
this point, the bandwidth continued to be insufficient to provide the service that was 
deemed the most important by the EPRDF leaders. 44 Kbps would have been enough 
to allow individuals in the remote sites to browse the Internet and use email but it 
was videoconferencing and not Internet access that was considered a priority by the 
central government. To allow videoconferencing sessions of a quality that was good
141 Interview: Zelalem Bekele (Chief Technical Officer, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation)
142 If each node had to be connected to the Internet, the speed of the connection would have be around 
7.5 Kbps, half the speed allowed by the first commercial dial-up modems sold on the market in the 
early 1990s, whose speed was 14.4 Kbps.
143 If one hour of navigation was allowed per region, the bandwidth available to each woreda could 
have been of a much higher speed, those usually available to commercial broadband used in Europe.
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enough for the large screens located in each remote site, the bandwidth allocated by 
Hughes was 1 Mbps for download and 512 Kbps for upload. This dramatically 
reduced the number of nodes that could participate in a videoconferencing session 
and led to a competition of resources between different services such Internet 
browsing, videoconferencing, VoIP and emailing. As individuals who managed and 
used Woredanet described during interviews, this problem was solved simply by 
switching off the channels allocated to all other services so as to free bandwidth for 
central and remote sites to be “on screen”.144
Additional evidence of the minimal interest in providing the periphery with a 
reliable Internet connection was also provided by the analysis of another aspect of 
the Woredanet architecture: the convoluted route that packages had to follow up and 
down the satellites in order to connect to a remote computer and a server hosting a 
website. The following explanation by an international consultant details the 
problem.
Content from the Internet would have to travel first over satellite/fiber optic 
gateway from Europe, America, Asia to the ETC gateway [the teleport at 
Sululta] and then travel back up to a satellite (perhaps different from the first) to 
then be retransmitted down to the destination at a distant woreda and the user 
would get their desired Internet content with an extreme amount of delay. 
Typical roundtrip times for a single satellite hop are over 550 ms with no traffic, 
so a double-hop path would make interactive applications very difficult to use 
and websites very hard to navigate. (Haque, 2004, p. 13)
If the Internet was a priority, this complex system could have been simplified 
with a few changes in the architecture to reduce the two-hops to one and make the
144 This aspect produced significant frustration among people using Woredanet in the remote sites. In 
feet, apart from when they were communicated to participate in a videoconferencing session, they did 
not know when they could have access to the Internet and when it would be unavailable. There was no 
service agreement of any kind. As an informant argued “no one in the remote sites knows when the 
system is going to work and for how long. From the centre, people can shut down the system without 
saying anything in advance, [even] just to test applications or for other reasons” (Interview: 
anonymous (59)
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transport of Internet data faster and cheaper.145 Videoconferencing packages, on the 
other hand, were not affected by this issue as they only had to travel “locally” with 
no need to access data coming from outside Ethiopia. Therefore, the alternative 
architecture that could have facilitated the browsing of websites without affecting the 
other services was never implemented.
The decisions to favour services such as videoconferencing over the Internet 
were rooted in the complex plan of controlled decentralization articulated by the 
Ethiopian government. As Yemane Kidane summarized in a quote cited in Chapter 5, 
“the people at the centre do not allow people at the woreda level to make their own 
mistakes. There is this obsession with control and command. So the people in the 
woredas, even if more trained and skilled [...] they are not allowed to learn from trial 
and error. They will always wait for instructions and will be afraid of taking 
responsibility”.146 Woredanet was installed in the remote areas not to empower 
individuals to find solutions to their problems independently, for example through 
accessing the Internet, but to offer to the central power the opportunity to impart 
clear directions when needed, even to the most remote nodes of the state apparatus.
Similarly, the strategies that had been employed in the bush to communicate 
internally played an important part in favouring a service such as videoconferencing 
over others. This influence was noted by Haddush Kassu, the former Manager of the 
Ethiopian News Agency:
Face to face communication is vital to reach consensus. This is part of our way 
of framing communication. Woredanet comes from this attitude. The leaders of 
our country are here in Addis and they cannot communicate with the people all 
the time or travel to have face to face meetings. So Woredanet came to allow
145 Rather than being channelled through the teleport at Sululta, the Internet data could have been 
provided directly from a teleport on the Hughes or another satellite. This would have entailed 
equipping the remote sites with receiving infrastructure and a routing system which could allow 
concurrent reception and forwarding of signals from both sources (one signal from the international 
teleport, and the other from the ‘local’ teleport at Sululta).
146 Interview: Yemane Kidane (Former Member of EPRDF and Officer in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Director, Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue in Addis Ababa)
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the Prime Minister and others to communicate as if they were in a face to face 
interaction, speaking to the people but also listening to what they have to say.147
The type of videoconferencing method that was chosen from those that were 
available represented a further illustration of how, in the minds of those who 
envisaged it, Woredanet had to serve the plan of progressive and controlled 
decentralization. Decentralization was a necessary step in the implementation of an 
ethnic federation, but the particular form envisaged by the EPRDF had to be 
controlled by the centre so as to prevent the nodes of the federal government from 
gaining too much independence.
According to this principle, multipoint communication was privileged over 
other videoconferencing formats that could be used through the Woredanet 
architecture. By using multi-point, all transmissions, whether between two woredas, 
between regions and woredas or between the centre and regions, had to be mediated 
by the centre. The other nodes were not given the freedom to choose when to use the 
system. To participate in a videoconference, remote sites were supposed to file a 
request at the national data centre, but more often the national data centre would 
notify the administrators in regions and woredas to convene in front of the plasma at
* * 1 iQa specific date and time to receive a transmission. As explained by a technocrat 
working on the PSCAP reform, “Woredanet is there to provide support for things to 
be done properly, and to supervise them. But still nothing can be implemented 
without approval from the centre. Federalism does not mean independence [...] 
Technology helps to keep the pieces together. Maybe in the future the regions will be
147 Interview: Haddush Kassu (Head of Research for the Ministry of Information and Former General 
Manager of the Ethiopian News Agency)
148 An assessment commissioned by the EICTDA to an independent consultancy firm clearly 
illustrates this point “BCX and VCON had designed and spec’ed the system on the basis that 
videoconferencing sessions would only be initiated and controlled by either the Prime Minister’s 
office (or the National Data Centre) or by the Federal and Regional sites -  remote WoredaNet sites 
(the vast majority) would not be able to initiate or control videoconferencing sessions, and (because of 
this limitation), it would thus not be possible for any remote WoredaNet sites to videoconference with 
each other directly” (Daedan, 2004, p. 54)
180
strong to decide for themselves. But not now. Now it is not possible”.149 The 
technical and the political were thus aligned to make sure that the progress towards a 
better functioning of the peripheries of the state was gradual. The remote nodes were 
offered new and unprecedented opportunities, but they could be easily retracted and 
the nodes were always controlled at the centre.
Choosing multicast instead of multipoint would have posed some technical 
hurdles, but it would have equipped the system with far greater transparency and 
flexibility.150 Regions would have been able to start their own sessions and 
communicate with each other without central mediation. Remote woredas still would 
not have been allowed to initiate a videoconferencing session, but they would have 
been able to join a session without requiring permission. At the same time, a 
multicast type of transmission would not have enabled the centre to authenticate and 
control the remote sites. The problem of bandwidth would have remained and the 
system would have been a little more chaotic. However, the limited resources could 
have been allocated optimally creating time-slots for different nodes to communicate 
with each other: region to region, a region with its woredas, a region mediating 
among different woredas, and so forth. However, this path was never tried. On the 
contrary, at the Woredanet sites I visited a service level agreement or document that 
could explain how, when and for how long they would have been allowed to use the 
system, was never provided. It was not only artefacts themselves but also the rules 
developed for their operation that made the remote nodes entirely dependent on the 
centre to perform any kind of action.
149 Interview: Anonymous (70)
150 It would have created saturation problems because the bandwidth available would have been 
managed by the systems through statistical multiplexing and not by individuals deciding who to 
connect and disconnect. However, this problem could have been bypassed by providing windows for 
different regions or areas to communicate which could be managed independently from the centre.
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6.2.2 Shaping society thorough the use of technology
Some aspects of the national technopolitical regime developed by the Ethiopian 
government, such as its penetration in the rural areas, might appear to be a 
consequence of successful advocacy by international organizations to use technology 
for the benefit of the poor. The AISI, along with authors such as Hudson (1984; 
1990) and Parker (1981), placed significant emphasis on the opportunities offered by 
the new technologies to connect remote villages to resources previously available 
only in urban centres. A photo such as the one in Fig 6.3, taken outside a secondary 
institute equipped with Schoolnet could have been taken from a report published by a 
UN agency or a NGO about success stories of ICT applications in remote 
communities. Similarly, Fig. 6.4, which reproduces a popular ETC advertisement, is 
an illustration of how catering for farmers was a central component of the discourse 
on ICTs advanced by the Ethiopian government. However, the fact that Woredanet 
and Schoolnet were planned to reach even the most remote areas was less dependent 
on voluntary alignment with a discourse articulated internationally than on the 
ideological background of the EPRDF. The kind of equipment brought into schools 
and government offices could, and did, offer students and local administrators greater 
access to new training opportunities. However, this bore little resemblance to the 
off-ramps from information highways connecting villages to a globalized world that 
was envisaged by the AISI framework.
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Fig. 6.3 - A teacher and students in front o f a VSAT terminal
Commitment to the peasantry played a central role in the EPRDF's discourse 
on society, but it was also a means of reaffirming its legitimacy and control over the 
territory. If Woredanet and Schoolnet were designed to improve the quality of life of 
rural communities, this simultaneously entailed increasing the presence of the state 
on the ground. The two systems sought to address this in complementary ways: by 
improving service delivery and by opening new communication channels directly 
with the grassroots. The strategy had both practical and symbolic components.
The principles inspiring Woredanet were succinctly summarized, and cited in 
Chapter 5, by Bereket Simon:
Woredanet is for different purposes. It is to strengthen the capacity of the public 
administration,
but it is also to reach rural Ethiopia, to make sure that the farmers get the right 
information. Woredanet is part of the wider communication strategy we have 
developed. Instead of communicating with everybody, we prefer to
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communicate with the most advanced part of the society and let it be our 
messenger.151
i n n e c t i n o
ETHIOPIA TO THE FUTURE
Fig. 6.4 ETC advertisement
At the practical level Woredanet had to build the capacity of the peripheral 
nodes of the state by training and instructing individuals, some of whom had little 
formal education, to enable them to provide better services. This had to benefit the 
whole community, but at the same time it also had to symbolize the commitment of
151 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister o f  Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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the government to the rural population. The most advanced part of the society was 
required to demonstrate the principles inspiring the Ethiopian state through their 
actions and become signifiers of a wider strategy. It was therefore extremely 
important that everybody knew what this strategy was. Analyzing the arguments 
used by two officials in charge of ICT in two local administrative nodes to describe 
the main functions of Woredanet in their localities suggests that the government was 
successful in this respect.
This time it is possible that even the people at the grassroots level can receive 
the same information, they can receive the very voice of the Prime Minister. We 
have been using the system mostly for videoconferencing. It helps a lot to 
understand what the line of the government is, but also to leam new practices.152
The government wants to provide us with information directly on our desk, the 
same information about the budget, politics, development to all desks in the 
country. In the remote areas people are not aware of what they should do. 
People do not know how to use new techniques for development. And this is a 
way to reach them.153
At the lower levels of the state apparatus there was awareness and acceptance 
that administrators and bureaucrats had to primarily serve as performers of policies 
that had been decided at the centre. The unity of the message was understood in its 
importance so as to coalesce the whole country around similar principles, despite its 
diversity. On the contrary, there was little perception that this strategy was openly 
contradicting the rationale of a federalist system, the delegation of key decisions to 
the officials who are elected locally and who can act according to a better knowledge 
of the situation on the ground (Kymlicka, 2006).
As compared to Woredanet, Schoolnet served the rural communities as well as 
the needs of the state in a different way. It enabled students living in the countryside 
to access the same kind of education as those in the major towns and cities. They no
152 Interview: Anonymous (64)
153 Interview: Anonymous (47)
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longer had to rely on the weakest teachers for their education, as it used to be the 
case.154 This was a powerful symbol of the EPRDF’s commitment to guarantee every 
citizen equal rights and opportunities. Probably nowhere else in Africa can children 
who are bom in remote areas attend classes of the same quality as those residing in 
the urban areas. However, abiding by this principle also meant that for some time 
Schoolnet was more effective at a symbolic level rather than at a practical level.
The fact that all the classes were taught in English caused serious 
comprehension problems for most students. In the schools I visited in 2005 and 2006, 
both in towns and in remote villages, I could barely have a basic conversation in 
English with students who were supposed to have been trained for at least one year 
with English as the medium of instruction. Also, when attending class during a 
broadcast, I noticed that most students were trying to sketch notes on their 
notebooks, but had to give up after a few seconds because the teachers on the screen 
were too fast to follow. As confirmed in an evaluation carried out in 2006 by UNDP 
among teachers and students, “the speed of plasma instructions and exercises 
coupled with the English language difficulty of learners have impacted negatively on 
students’ understanding of the lessons delivered” (Asefa, 2006, p. 59). A number of 
amendments were later introduced by EM A to respond to some of these problems, 
and the “real teachers”, those in the classroom, were allocated more time for 
explaining what had not been clear during the broadcast. As a result new evidence 
indicated that, especially in the higher grades, the level of understanding of what was 
said on TV had increased, also affecting the overall perception of the project.155 A
154 According to the Education statistics annual abstract for 2006-2007 (Ministry of Education, 
2008), during the school year covered by the study, there were extreme differences among regions in 
the number of qualified teachers, and thus the teachers possessing the necessary titles to be teaching at 
the secondary level. In the regions surrounding urban areas such as Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and 
Harar more than 80% of the teachers were qualified. In the peripheries the picture was dramatically 
different. In Gambella only 7.5% of the teachers had the right titles to be teaching at the secondary 
level, 32.3% in the Somali region and 39.7% in the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples 
(SNNP) region (Ministry of Education, 2008).
155 According to a presentation made by Demissew Bekele, EMA’s General Manager in Addis Ababa 
in May 2008, as of 2008 the ratio of students who could understand the broadcast classes had 
increased to 66.3%. And, according to EMA’s assessment, 70.8% of the students reported to have
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United Nations Volunteer, carrying out an assessment of Schoolnet in 2008 
recognized that “at the beginning the students did not like it. They wanted to break 
the plasma. Now they see it as their own property. So, things have changed over 
time”.156
Another advantage of having each student exposed to the same programming 
was that each of the students could be equally trained in the founding principles of 
the state. Civic education was among the first subjects to be included in the 
Schoolnet programming and, according to some of the individuals I interviewed, the
1 ^ 7way it was taught was highly problematic. Below are excerpts from the two 
manuals on which the lessons were based. Their purpose is not to judge the 
discourses articulated through the civic education programme, but simply to 
highlight how they were constructing subjects and objects in ways that could not be 
other than partial. While some of the modules for the higher grades were addressing 
ways to curb corruption, to respect human rights and participate in elections, other 
issues addressed by the civic education classes were more problematic. For example 
for some Western audiences the following reference to capitalism is likely to seem 
contentious:
In societies where we find categories of master and slave, landlord and serf, 
capitalist and proletariat, there shall be unequal distribution of rights and 
burdens among citizens. These inequalities lead to the existence of 
discrimination among citizens (Engida, 2007, p. 86).
Similarly, sympathizers of the former Derg regime as well as opponents of the 
idea of ethnic federalism would strongly challenge a statement like the one below:
been motivated to actively participate by Schoolnet. It must be noted, however, that these figures 
emerged from an internal and not an independent evaluation.
156 Interview: Anonymous (63)
157 In April 2005, during one of my first visits to attend a Schoolnet broadcast in a secondary school in 
Addis Ababa, the teacher of civic education followed me out after the lesson and vehemently argued 
how what we both saw on the screen was propaganda and not educational content.
1581 also personally attended some of the civic education classes and downloaded some of them from 
the servers at EMA.
187
The right to equality of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples includes the equal 
rights to full measure of self-governance [...] It guarantees the nationalities, 
nations and peoples’ equal right to administer their own region by themselves in 
a democratic manner. It also creates better conditions for national unity (Engida,
2007, p. 91).
Evaluating the efficacy of civic education taught through Schoolnet was 
outside the scope of my research. Nonetheless I could infer from interviews with 
local elites that many EPRDF cadres held a strong faith in the power of the new 
teaching to influence young Ethiopians. As Bereket Simon noted, in reference to 
Schoolnet:
In our education our cornerstones are math, science and civic and ethical 
education. So we can have a home-grown democracy. A country in order. Now 
we will have a new generation that has been trained in the principles of 
democracy in secondary education and they will know how to contribute to the 
development of the country.159
Similarly, Haddush Kassu argued:
We can use Woredanet and Schoolnet to educate people about civics, ethics, our 
national flag and hymn. All the information about the nation should be 
strengthened through the media and new technologies.160
Bereket and Haddush’s words acquire even more significance when located in 
the broader context of the role young educated Ethiopians played in the country’s 
political transformations. As illustrated by Young (1997), many of the TPLF’s early 
recruits during the struggle against the Derg were secondary schools students. This
159 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
160 Interview: Haddush Kassu (Head of Research in the Ministry of Information and Former General 
Manager o f  the Ethiopian News Agency)
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point was further, and dramatically, illustrated by Fetlework GebreEsgabier, the 
female fighter I interviewed in Tigray:
An important school was Queen of Sheba in Adwa. But there were important 
schools also in Mekelle. A lot of high school students joined the struggle. They 
were key especially at the beginning. And in Tigray the TPLF started having a 
lot of influence in the schools. Most of the people who joined the struggle at the 
time were students and many of them died as martyrs. I joined the struggle with 
my brothers and sisters and all of them died in it.161
The appreciation of the role youth can have in political mobilization persisted 
after the civil war, as did the strategies employed to reach out to young Ethiopians. 
Some of these strategies were implemented through newer means, such as the civic 
education programme offered by Schoolnet, while others represented a simpler 
extension of models that had proved successful in the past.
Schoolnet, however, was not meant only to educate the youth. From the 
analysis of the architecture that was employed to transmit messages from EMA’s 
headquarters in Addis Ababa towards secondary schools, it became apparent that the 
system was designed to enable other uses, beyond the transmission of pre-recorded 
classes.
161 Interview: Fetlework GebreEsgabier (Former Guerrilla Fighter and Officer in the Aksum province)
162 An illustration of this latter tendency was offered by Solomon Inquai, an important ideologist of 
the TPLF and a long serving director of the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the NGO created by the 
TPLF during the war to provide humanitarian assistance to the population in Tigray and that 
continued to play a pivotal role in the provision of basic services in the region after 1991. His 
response was to a question about how the ruling party lost some key constituencies in 2005 election. 
“In 2005 we lost Addis and many other towns. Since than we decided to organize youth leagues, and 
women leagues. Some of the members are university students, some are younger. We are also getting 
old and we need new members to replace us. Also during the struggle we had similar associations. But 
the reason of the election result is that we became too confident, we lost perspective. So we are trying 
to revive this tradition of associations, but on a wider scale. Not just for Tigray but for other regions as 
well”. Interview: Solomon Inquai (Former Director of the Relief Society of Tigray).
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In contrast to the videoconferencing used by Woredanet which was designed to 
be bidirectional, Schoolnet was based on static content and did not require 
interactivity between central and remote sites. If this had been the only use the 
system was designed for, employing a satellite to broadcast classes was not the most 
efficient mode of delivery. The provision of high quality education to both urban and 
rural areas, as well as the training in the principles of the state, could have been 
provided more easily and less expensively in different ways, for example, by saving 
all lessons on hard disks mounted on a local server.163 As a young foreign consultant 
who visited some Schoolnet sites noted,
The first time we saw Schoolnet we were shocked. They rented a satellite to 
broadcast pre-recorded content. Whoever designed it was crazy. The content is 
static. It would have been so much cheaper to buy hard drives and install the 
lessons oh them. A big video server would have been much cheaper.164
Even if Schoolnet, like Woredanet, had many weaknesses, the reason for its 
particular configuration was not the folly of its designers, but simply was attributable 
to the fact that it was designed not only to reproduce the same educational content, 
but also to broadcast new messages when this was needed. When the students were 
not in school, the system was used as a platform for other training, including what 
has been described by some informants as “political” training. In this sense 
Schoolnet complemented Woredanet. While the latter was used to reach officers in 
the state apparatus, the former was an instrument to communicate with larger 
audiences. Amare Anslau, the CEO of ETC, explained this synergy:
163 A basic Schoolnet outlet needed at least a VSAT, a decoder, a router and a switch. Using a video- 
server and hard disk would have required a capacity of around 150 GB, a reasonable capacity for a 
hard disk even in 2004. According to EMA there were 2978 classes when the system started, and once 
digitized in an Audio Video Interleave (AVI) format a single class occupyed around 50 MB. This 
system would also have allowed teachers and students to replay some lessons so as to revise key 
issues in the curriculum or to provide students who could not attend a class with the opportunity of 
catching up with the program.
164 Interview: Anonymous (41)
190
Before Woredanet if the Prime Minister wanted to speak to the officials he had 
to call them, but now in a moment he can communicate with every woreda.165 
So this is disclosing unprecedented opportunities. The Prime Minister can 
address people through Schoolnet too and reach the whole country. He can also 
do it through Woredanet to contact every official. Now we can make sure that 
different people in different areas can be reached by the same message, 
directly.166
Woredanet and Schoolnet thus need to be understood not as separate 
programmes, designed to respond to different needs, but as complementary 
expressions of a similar need to reach the periphery of the state. If they were the 
incarnation of a serious commitment towards development, providing greater 
education opportunities and better services, they were also aimed at translating this 
commitment into a greater political acceptance of those in power and a reduction of 
the political space available for critique and alternative.
6.2.3 Internet or intranet?
The previous two sections (6.2.1 and 6.2.2) have analyzed how the discourses 
about the nation-state and society, ethnicity and the peasantry appeared to have 
influenced the shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia and, in particular, of systems like 
Schoolnet and Woredanet. They have illustrated how the discourses at the core of the 
ethnic federation motivated the decision to install the new equipment simultaneously 
in the key nodes of the state apparatus and how the need for controlled 
decentralization structured communication between them. I have explained how the 
use of ICTs to respond to the needs of rural communities was accompanied with the 
reinforcement of the presence of the state on the ground. By illustrating these points 
the two sections have also demonstrated some aspects of what I referred to in 
Chapter 5 as the discourse on communication. First, the communication strategy of
165 Here Amare refers to the fact that even Woredanet could use a broadcast type of transmission when 
needed. However, as compared to multi-point this type of transmission was less common.
166 Interview: Amare Anslau (CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation)
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the EPRDF, based on showing empirical results, led the government to increase the 
capacity of the state to deliver basic services with the support of technology. Second, 
both systems, but especially Woredanet, were a response to the need to deliver the 
same messages from the highest to the lowest ranks of the government without 
intermediaries, and to have the recipients of these messages act as messengers 
themselves to their larger communities.
To conclude this analysis, I want to examine one final component of the 
government’s discourse on communication that has influenced the design of both 
Woredanet and Schoolnet: the refusal to engage in dialogue with oppositional forces. 
Although both Woredanet and Schoolnet were based on the IP and intended to 
deliver a variety of services, the very limited access granted to data from outside 
Ethiopia transformed the systems into a state intranet. In the case of Woredanet, as 
illustrated at length above, videoconferencing was the only system to be employed.
1 f \ 7Emailing was also occasionally used, but only within Woredanet sites. Similarly, 
although some Schoolnet sites were supposed to receive an Internet connection, most 
of them did not, or did so only for a short period of time. This meant that most, if not 
all, information being received through the systems emanated exclusively from the 
centre of the state.
Woredanet and Schoolnet were essentially functioning ,as communication 
channels which were partially invisible to a large component of the Ethiopian 
society. Woredanet allowed exclusive and routine communication between nodes of 
the state. Schoolnet ensured that the new generations were exposed to messages 
decided at the centre, without the mediation of possibly critical teachers, and it also
1A8allowed the EPRDF to reach wider constituencies discretely. Use of these new
167 A typical address of an officer in a woreda was “name@woreda.region.gov.et”.
1681 am not implying that marginalizing teachers was one of the main reasons the system was put in 
place, but it is important to be aware that in the history of Ethiopia teachers have played a key role as 
an oppositional force. As pointed out by Markakis, in the turmoil that led to the deposition of Haile 
Salassie, “The 17,500 teachers constituted more than half the country’s professional stratum. [...] 
Their association was the only effective professional organization in existence, and it was to play a 
leading role in the popular movement” (Markakis & Ayele, 1986, p. 55). Similarly, many former 
TPLF fighters recognized that it was mostly in secondary schools that new recruits were convinced to 
join the struggle. After Schoolnet was introduced many teachers reacted negatively to their
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channels provided the government with a strong competitive advantage over 
oppositional forces and prevented it from having to engage with them. As illustrated 
by Kumlachew Dagne, a member of the association InterAfrica, that mediated the 
televised debates between government and opposition leaders during the campaign 
for the 2005 election, “During the campaign the government was having a tough time 
in the debates. Many opposition candidates were having more success than the 
government leaders. As a result they cut the voices that could oppose them. And they 
had to rely on alternative ways to reach their goals”.169
In this context, Woredanet and Schoolnet assisted the government in expanding 
its sphere of influence through the use of technology. The EPRDF almost always 
refused to engage in dialogue with other groups in society. When it attempted to do 
so, as indicated by Kumlachew, its culture of communication that centred more on 
showing tangible results than on winning rhetorical battles disadvantaged it in 
relation to the opposition. This experience reinforced the idea that the alternative 
strategies pursued through systems like Woredanet and Schoolnet should be 
strengthened in order to support the government nation building project and to 
increase its legitimacy in the eyes of Ethiopia’s citizens.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has explored how a national technopolitical regime based on ICTs 
emerged in Ethiopia, incorporating salient discourses advanced by its ruling party 
and being designed to further enact them on the ground. The analysis responds to the 
second component of my main research question, i.e. how ICTs were re-interpreted,
marginalization, especially the most experienced and active among them. A UN volunteer who 
assessed the use of Schoolnet among teachers and students noted that “In grade 9 when they start 
attending the plasma lessons for the first time they do not understand but slowly they start liking it. 
But a lot of school deans complain that as a result of the plasma a lot o f teachers are becoming 
passive”. Interview: Anonymous (63)
169 Interview: Kumlachew Dagne (InterAfrica). Between September 2004 and April 2005 the main 
parties participated in nine televised debates each covering a different issue, with some key issues 
such as governance or federalism and decentralization being addressed in more than one debate.
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re-defined and re-shaped. It has shown that it was by relying on competencies and 
resources available on the international market that the Ethiopian government could 
develop and implement its technopolitics. It similarly illustrated that it was thorough 
a constant process of negotiation between the political and the technical, and among 
different actors, that assemblages like Woredanet and Schoolnet developed, though 
progressive adjustments and solving the problems that arose as part of their design 
and implementation.
The focus on the mutual influence between politics and technology, however, 
was not intended to rule out other factors influencing the shaping of ICTs in 
Ethiopia, but depended on the specific conceptual framework structuring my 
research. Not all aspects of Woredanet and Schoolnet were motivated by a political 
will. Ethiopia is a vast and landlocked country, with an irregular geography, and 
employing a satellite as the transmission channel emerged as the only available 
option to realize Woredanet and Schoolnet within the chosen timeframe. The 
hierarchical nature of the system was also influenced by the similarly hierarchical 
structure characterizing the Ethiopian society that has developed through the 
centuries as a defining trait of the Ethiopian polity, distinguishing it from other 
countries in Eastern Africa. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that while 
the development of Woredanet and Schoolnet, was influenced by factors at the 
technical and cultural level, the idea of the systems emerged first to perform specific 
political goals.
My argument is that politics is always likely to play an important role in the 
development of technological artefacts, especially of those of national relevance, but 
its primacy over other factors is not absolute and has to be assessed at the empirical 
level. This chapter has illustrated how politics prevailed in the case of Ethiopia. The 
next will continue to provide evidence reinforcing this claim, illustrating how 
alternative technopolitical regimes which could have challenged the EPRDF’s 
national plan, were actively resisted and marginalized.
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C h a p t e r  7 -  R e s is t in g  a lte r n a tiv e  t e c h n o p o l it ic a l  
REGIMES
One o f  the prim ary characteristics o f a system builder is the ability to construct 
or to force unity from diversity, centralization in the face o f  pluralism, and 
coherence from chaos. This construction often involves the destruction o f 
alternative systems (Hughes, 1987, p. 52)
Using ICTs to support nation building meant that the Ethiopian government not 
only had to assemble a technopolitical regime which amplified the discourses at the 
core of its political agenda, but also that it had to resist the emergence of alternative 
ones which could oppose it. Since the appearance of a new discourse on ICTs and 
development in the 1990s actors other than the government, both at the international 
and at the national levels, have favoured aspects of it which competed with the 
priorities articulated by the EPRDF and sustained different sets of interests. In some 
cases these alternative projects remained potentialities, elements of the discourse on 
ICTs and development included in official documents and advocated by important 
agents such as the UNECA, but with little or no application in the Ethiopian context. 
In other cases they were actualized in concrete artefacts and practices, leading to the 
emergence of technopolitical regimes that tried to oppose, complement or “patch” 
the technopolitical regime developed by the Ethiopian government.
This chapter considers these regimes, further illustrating how the struggle for 
the definition of ICTs in Ethiopia was fought both at the discursive and at the 
material level. It analyzes how the government’s active resistance to some of the uses 
of ICTs had to face attempts by international organizations, private companies and 
opponent political groups to enforce them in the pursuit of competing goals. Three 
technopolitical regimes are analyzed, representing more or less structured 
alternatives to the national regime developed by the Ethiopian government: an 
international, a privatised, and an oppositional technopolitical regime.
Similar to the previous chapters, the findings presented here are drawn from 
several sources and methods of data collection. In addition to interviews with
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Ethiopian politicians, civil servants, and technocrats as well as with international 
civil servants, the direct observation of technical artefacts was accompanied by 
reference to reports on those artefacts collected from national and international 
institutions. A screening of the most popular blogs and websites targeting Ethiopian 
readership was carried out to understand the nature of the oppositional 
technopolitical regime that was developed by members of the diaspora and of 
oppositional political groups. In particular, the three websites that were ranked as the 
most popular, Nazret, Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian Review, were monitored for 12
1 70months before they were blocked by the Ethiopian government in May 2006.
7.1 The international technopolitical regime: fighting
international politics through technology
The implementation of Schoolnet and Woredanet alarmed the members of the 
international community in Ethiopia. Both donor and UN agencies were critical of 
systems that had no precedents in the field of ICTs for development and whose scale 
was considered disproportionate for a poorly resourced country like Ethiopia. In 
addition, the unwillingness of the government to pilot the two projects first, and to 
provide information that could facilitate a better understanding of their scope and 
nature, further alienated international actors and triggered increasingly aggressive, 
but not necessarily effective, responses.
Starting from 2004, when both Schoolnet and Woredanet became operational, 
the majority of bilateral organizations started to become reluctant to operate in the 
field of ICTs and to engage in new initiatives promoted directly by the government. 
In contrast to what was happening on the rest of the continent, where the influence of 
events such as the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) was placing ICTs 
on the agenda, fewer meetings organized by donor agencies in Ethiopia on education 
or health proposed ICTs as a solution. This scepticism continued to influence the
,70The popularity of the blogs was assessed through Alexa.com that registers how frequently websites 
are visited. The results were crosschecked with some of the informants. For more information on the 
methods employed to select and analyze online data see section 3.2.3
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donor approach in the following years: it was evident, for example, in the refusal by 
most embassies to support Negroponte’s One Laptop per Child (OLPC) programme 
in Ethiopia and in similar rejections to fund ICT components in country 
programmes.171
Multilateral organizations reacted in a slightly different way, elaborating a 
more articulated and ambitious agenda. In the years following the implementation of 
Schoolnet and Woredanet, agencies such as the UNDP and The World Bank started 
planning ICT projects which incorporated some aspects of the ICTs for development 
discourse that were resisted or excluded by the Ethiopian government. They used 
their leverage to progressively build a parallel technopolitical regime which could 
reduce the eccentricity of the national one assembled by the Ethiopian government. 
By implementing more mainstream initiatives which had been applied in other 
developing countries, and enjoyed a greater degree of support from the international 
community, multilateral organizations were attempting to patch in practice what they 
had not been able to redress employing the usual means of diplomacy.
The UNDP’s project was the one where the “patching effort” was most 
evident. It consisted of the installation of computer laboratories connected to the 
Internet in every preparatory school (those catering for students in grades 11 and 12) 
already receiving broadcast content. Each lab was designed to be used by students to
171 OLPC is an initiative launched by Nicholas Negroponte, the founder of the Media Lab at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to equip children in developing countries with rugged, low- 
cost laptops, to facilitate their learning process. In Ethiopia, the only donor agencies that supported the 
initiative were the German and Italian embassies. This followed decisions taken by the Italian 
government after a high level meeting between former Prime Minister Romano Prodi and Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. While the Italian government provided the funds to purchase 5000 
laptops, the German Development Cooperation took care of their deployment and piloting in selected 
secondary schools. This intervention was supposed to represent the first phase of a larger scale 
intervention funded by other agencies, but no donors stepped up to continue this plan. More 
information can be found on the OLPC Ethiopia website http://wi ki. I aptop. org/go/O LPC Ethiop ia. 
Last accessed 19.04.2010. Similarly, in 2008, when all major donors embarked on the “General 
Education Quality Improvement Program Project” (GEQIP), a USD 400 million initiative aimed at 
improving the curriculum in schools, training teachers, improving coordination among education 
offices, they refused to include the investment in ICTs, as requested by the Ethiopian government.
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learn key computer skills (word processing, spreadsheets, etc.), but more 
importantly, to conduct independent research using the Internet to complement the 
school curriculum. A total of 2,700 PCs were donated to 161 schools and each school 
was provided with an Internet connection initially paid for by UNDP with the 
intention that it would subsequently be funded by ETC.172 In this case, the Internet 
connection was framed not as a marginal service, but as the system’s defining 
characteristic: all computers were networked in a Local Area Network (LAN) and set 
to be connected to the Internet either through VSAT, dial-up or ADSL. If the project 
managed by EMA in Addis Ababa was meant to reach the periphery with content 
defined at the centre, officially to improve the quality of education throughout the 
country, the one promoted by UNDP was opening each school-node to the world, 
letting students and teachers decide which content they wanted to access.
UNDP operated not only at the technical level, but also at the symbolic level, 
strategically positioning its own project in relation to the one promoted by the 
Ethiopian government. Similar to the Ethiopian government’s project the UN’s 
project also was called Schoolnet. This was not done to frame the laboratories as an 
integral part of the Schoolnet system managed by EMA but rather to present an 
alternative to it. By referring to other international experiences such as Schoolnet 
Canada and Schoolnet South Africa, which are also based on computer laboratories 
that are connected to the Internet, the UNDP was trying to flag the use of the term 
promoted by the Ethiopian government as inappropriate, and to reclaim the name
171Schoolnet for its own initiative. The excerpt below, taken from an assessment by 
an Ethiopian consultant, Gorfu Asefa, was commissioned by UNDP to analyze the 
effectiveness of both Schoolnet programmes. It clearly illustrates how this strategy 
worked in practice.
172 Twenty schools were later added to the plan.
173 The first Schoolnet project started in Canada in the early 1990s with the aim of wiring all 
secondary schools in the country to the Internet and linking students and teachers to high quality 
educational material tailored to the needs of students in different grades (Shade & Dechief, 2004). A 
similar model was later extended first to South Africa and later to other countries in the continent such 
as Namibia, Lesotho, Senegal, and Uganda. The Ottawa based International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) played a substantial role in encouraging and funding Schoolnet systems around the 
African continent (Cossa & Cronj£, 2004).
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The term SchoolNet has become part of the vocabulary of those technical 
personnel working in the education and telecommunications sectors two years 
now. The term is now extensively used by the MoE [Ministry of Education],
EMA, schools and ETC in relation to pre and post-implementation activities 
related to the inauguration of the satellite-based educational TV program. 
Nonetheless, the concept of SchoolNet is understood differently by the 
institutions. For instance, for ETC SchoolNet means the totality of the ICT 
infrastructure, the VS AT terminal network, communication devices being used 
for the transmission of plasma lessons. From what has been gathered from 
students, teachers and staff of MoE/EMA working on the project, the concept of 
SchoolNet is associated to plasma education. On the other hand, the concept 
and understanding prevalent among ICT practitioners in the ICT for 
development circle is a bit different from the above two groups in that 
SchoolNet is referred as a web interface used to link learners and educators each 
other over the Internet and provide a framework where educational contents and 
resources are collectively created and used towards improving the quality of 
education and making the teaching-learning process interesting and responsive 
to problems faced in real life situations. [...]
For the author of this report, the SchoolNet Ethiopia Initiative is a digital 
connectivity initiative whose aim is to establish local area networks in schools 
and use the Internet to facilitate communication and interaction among students, 
teachers and school administrators locally and abroad for collectively 
embarking on content creation and exchange of learning resources and 
experiences. Thus, this initiative should not be considered as a new initiative 
but as a call for using digital opportunities for interactive and active learning 
and for supplementing classroom learning resources with learning materials on 
the web (Asefa, 2006, pp. 27-28).
Similar language to that which was used by Asefa was used in press releases 
and official documents produced by UNDP and other UN agencies, referring only to 
the project based on computer laboratories as Schoolnet and to the one managed by 
the Ethiopian government simply as “plasma”, indicating its most visible and
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anomalous feature, the 42 inches plasma TV screen.174 This war of words is 
indicative of the larger political battle that was being fought over ICTs, including the 
efforts to distinguish appropriate uses from unorthodox ones, and of the ways in 
which both linguistic and technical aspects were mobilized to support competing 
hegemonic projects. The government of Ethiopia was trying to promote a use of 
ICTs which could mostly serve its nation building plan, enhancing the possibilities of 
the centre to reach the periphery without making peripheral nodes more capable of 
seeking and receiving information independently. On the contrary, the UNDP 
initiative was re-affirming the globalizing and individualistic nature of ICTs, 
enacting discourses articulated internationally. It was stressing the role the new tools 
should have in facilitating the free flow of information among nations and 
individuals.
At the end of the “Schoolnet conflict”, however, the strategy elaborated by the 
UNDP proved only partially successful. The UNDP’s patching effort was set to 
produce results in the short term and it assumed that the Ethiopian government 
eventually would have accepted the new project and developed ownership of it. Very 
little was planned to sustain this strategy for a more extended period of time and to 
respond to the eventuality of a protracted resistance of the government to the 
attempts to redress its course of action. As a result, after the UNDP ceased to provide 
Internet connectivity, ETC did not step in as initially planned. Most of the 
laboratories lost their role of Internet points and became little more than spaces 
occasionally visited by students to learn some basic skills in word processing. The 
Ethiopian government continued to provide resources for the maintenance of the 
“plasma” and to extend it to newly created secondary schools. However, it decided 
not to allocate any resources to increase or even to maintain the exposure of
17SEthiopian students to content produced outside Ethiopia.
174 I found this ambiguity puzzling in the early months of my experience working for UNESCO in 
Addis Ababa. Whether speaking with government officers or UN personnel, the same name was being 
used to refer to two different projects. When I visited Ethiopia again in 2008 for the field research 
many people working in international organizations in Addis Ababa continued confuse the two 
projects.
175 In some cases it was the local communities that tried to mobilize resources to guarantee that the 
school laboratories could continue to be used as Internet points. As reported by one of the UN
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An analogous destiny awaited the other large initiative supported by another 
international organization and aimed at reinforcing an international technopolitical 
regime. With a budget of more than USD 30 million, of which 25 million was 
granted by The World Bank, the ICT Assisted Development (ICTAD) Project was a 
multi-sector framework structured to enforce aspects of the discourse on ICTs that 
had been marginalized by the Ethiopian government. ICTAD advocated the increase 
of Internet connectivity, the support of the private sector and the provision of better 
access to market information. The projects developed to transform this vision into 
practice were part of a carnet of initiatives inspired by various international 
experiences: telecentres offering Internet access, business incubators, refurbishment 
centres, community radios and private Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Despite the substantial resources available, the competition between ICTAD 
and the government of Ethiopia’s priorities made the implementation of the strategy 
developed by The World Bank slower and more problematic than initially expected. 
In 2008, three years after ICTAD started, only a few of its objectives had been 
achieved. The licensing of ISPs, agreed in the first covenant between The World 
Bank and the government of Ethiopia, was achieved with great delay, and none of 
the licensed companies ever started operations.177 A similar tactic was employed for
volunteers overseeing Schoolnet in the regions “In Nekempt for example, one of the towns I visited, 
they wanted to know about connectivity. They asked me how they could have it and they said that if 
the government was not going to provide it they would have found the resources for paying a 
connection themselves”. Interview: Anonymous (63).
176 As stated in the project document, its key areas of assistance were:
- Creating an enabling policy and a legal and regulatory framework for the growth of the Ethiopian 
ICT sector;
- Increasing connectivity and providing access to communication services throughout the country;
- Strengthening the institutional capacity of regulatory, advocacy and key policy making institutions;
- Establishing locally adapted ICT industry standards and data security policies;
- Fostering opportunities for women and youth as well as small and medium enterprises in the ICT 
sector;
- Facilitating access to markets and market information for rural and urban communities. (World 
Bank, 2004a, p. 1)
177 According to the contract, the ISPs had to be licensed by September 2005, but the licences were 
issued only in March 2007. However, as of March 2008, the four companies that obtained a licence,
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the drafting of a comprehensive ICT policy. ICTAD invested considerable resources 
to make this process as participative and effective as possible. Numerous events were 
organized in Addis Ababa to include in the debate both the civil society and the 
private sector. Renowned international consultants were hired to assist in the 
preparation of the policy. As a result, the consultative process was well received even 
by the individuals who were usually critical of the operations of the Ethiopian 
government. This is illustrated, for example, in the words of Hamed Hassen, the 
founder of the most important private ICT college in the country and one of the most 
active civil society representatives during the drafting of the ICT policy.
Schoolnet and Woredanet were not debated. Someone decided it and imposed it.
There was no debate around what to do with that. My guess is that they may
have a hidden agenda for it. But look at the debate on ICT policy instead. That
was open. They were looking around for suggestions. We debated freely, there
178were no restrictions.
Unfortunately this participative experience ended in frustration. The Ethiopian 
government did not keep the promise of transforming the debated policy into law but 
maintained it as a draft with no binding power. In addition, as further argued in the 
following sections, if some of the principles incorporated in the draft policy were 
apparently consistent with international discourses, such as recognizing a leading 
role to the private sector, they were had little impact in informing concrete actions in 
the ICT sector.
Even the few successes that were achieved by ICTAD, such as the 
implementation of telecentres in the South-Western part of the country, the licensing 
of four community radios and the localization of software in local languages, never 
managed to seriously affect the development of ICTs in the country (EICTDA,
2008). ICTAD created new opportunities for individual communities and operated in
Millennium systems, All-In-One, Symbol Technology and Net Computer, had not started operations 
(EICTDA, 2008)
178 Interview: Ahmed Hussien (Professor of Computer Science. Founder of the private college Hilcoe, 
Higher Learning Center of Excellence, Addis Ababa)
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a variety of sectors, but did not succeed in challenging the centralized use of ICTs 
advanced by the Ethiopian government.
In comparison with the national technopolitical regime based on projects such 
as Schoolnet and Woredanet, and managed by EICTDA and ETC, the international 
technopolitical regime was less centralized and did not depend upon a unitary 
authority. The UNDP and The World Bank initiatives were initiated concurrently and 
were both aimed using technology to enact discourses that had been selectively 
refused by the EPRDF. They were not, however, implemented as part of a 
coordinated effort by the two institutions. This trait and the lack of substantial 
support from other actors in the international community prevented the emerging 
international regime to represent a serious threat to the ambitious plan articulated by 
the Ethiopian government. As further illustrated in the following section through the 
case of private companies trying to enter the ICT market, the Ethiopian government 
could act from a position of greater power than its adversaries and accept features 
that were not challenging its control over ICTs while restraining and delaying others.
7.2 The privatised technopolitical regime: marginal nodes 
in a state-dominated information economy
While the international technopolitical regime was centred on two 
uncoordinated but prominent institutions acting to support alternative discourses, the 
agents comprising the privatised regime were more passive and simply occupied a 
space that was carefully circumscribed by the state. Even if they had similar interests, 
and some of them did coalesce to form consultative bodies such as the Ethiopian IT 
Professional Association (EITPA), the government did not allow local private 
companies to grow strong enough to influence or shape an Ethiopian path towards 
ICT.
Despite the proclamations of the Ethiopian politicians that affirmed the 
relevance of the private sector in developing a modem information society, they did 
not generate real opportunities for engagement. As illustrated by historians of
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technology in similar cases, when technology emerges in critical moments in the 
history of a country, there is often a “disjuncture between declared policy (policy as 
rhetoric) and enacted policy (policy as practice)” (Allen & Hecht, 2001, p. 18). The 
complex strategies pursued by politicians can be understood only by concurrently 
analyzing what they said and how this was embodied in the technopolitical regimes 
they promoted. Meles Zenawi, for example, during the speech cited in Chapter 4 
where he criticized the globalization logic and reaffirmed the centrality of the state, 
used encouraging words towards the local private initiatives.
On the part o f  Africa there is little doubt that for it to be able to take whatever 
opportunities there are in the global economy, it has no option but to do 
w hatever it takes to ensure having a vibrant private sector. By this I mean, first 
o f  all, a vibrant dom estic private sector. The reason for em phasizing the role o f  
dom estic private sector is neither philosophical nor political. It is merely 
practical (Zenawi, 1999).
A similar rhetoric was employed in the draft ICT policy, which addressed the 
private sector as one of the driving forces in the creation of an Ethiopian information 
society. For example the section on Private Sector Development was opened 
affirming that “since the private sector plays a crucial role in accelerating the process 
of transforming Ethiopia into a knowledge - and information - economy and society 
the Government is committed to removing obstacles constraining its development” 
(EICTDA, 2006, p. 18). However, as previously mentioned, the policy was never 
enforced and the provisions about the private sector either did not find a concrete 
application or were interpreted in a very selective fashion. Powerful ideological 
forces were preventing the market from structuring the development of ICTs.
ICT businesses were only allowed to operate freely in areas that could produce 
an incremental and predictable increase in productivity and in sectors that were 
considered safe by the government. Continuing to follow an approach of the kind 
developed when the first computers appeared in Ethiopia, and with the 
modernization plans pursued by different political elites in the history of the country, 
newer ICTs were adopted and supported largely when they emerged as simple
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enhancers of tasks already defined at the centre. While the number of private 
companies operating in sectors such as sales and maintenance or in software 
development sharply increased over the years, no private firms were allowed to 
operate in the telecommunication sector. Between 2006 and 2008, for example, the 
sales and maintenance sector grew by 227%, and software development by 140%. 
Among the best selling applications were Word and Excel, which reached 48.34% of 
the overall sales in 2008, closely followed by accounting (27,1%) and engineering 
software (19,2%). The software developed in Ethiopia was for accounting and 
finance, human resource management, payroll and inventory control (EICTDA,
2009). As this list indicates, none of the industries that experienced considerable 
growth, or the products they sold or produced, appeared to represent a direct threat to 
the state apparatus.
On the contrary, the opportunities to communicate within and beyond the 
national borders were interpreted as a riskier component of ICTs which should be 
tightly controlled to prohibit oppositional forces from taking advantage of the new 
channels. Also, the commitment to rural areas, coupled with a greater suspicion 
towards urban elites, motivated the Ethiopian leadership to prioritize features of the 
telecommunication network that were in open contrast to successful models 
emerging in other developing countries. For example, in many English-speaking 
countries such as South Africa, Kenya, or Nigeria, ICTs have often been framed as a 
way for local firms to provide services on the global market at competitive prices, 
relying on increasingly fast and widespread connections, at least in the main urban 
centres (Esselaar, Gillwald, & Stork, 2007). In Ethiopia, on the contrary, while 
massive efforts were made to equip even the most remote schools and government 
offices with the appliances needed to run Schoolnet and Woredanet, the major towns, 
including the capital, were left with connections of very poor quality and, where 
broadband was available, its cost was exorbitant. As of 2008 the monthly fee for a 64 
kbps ADSL connection was USD 200, and for a 2 Mbps line, which is normally 
offered in Europe for around USD 20, reached almost USD 5,000 (EICTDA, 2009). 
The prices remained the same between 2006 and 2008, indicating no significant 
change in the policy, despite the fall in the prices for broadband connections 
worldwide. Similarly, in 2008 calling abroad was still beyond the reach of many
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Ethiopians: a one minute-call cost 10.72 Birr (around one USD in 2008), twice as
much as the average daily income.179 This obstacle could not be overcome by
resorting to cheaper Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications, which were
1 80blocked by the ETC for all domestic and business connections.
As these examples indicate, most of the applications that could increase the 
interlinking of Ethiopia with the rest of the world were either blocked or seriously 
constrained, reflecting resistance on the part of the government towards globalizing 
forces. The justifications offered by three influential individuals working on ICTs in 
Ethiopia further highlight the ideological nature of these decisions and how they 
were dependent on the discourses on the Ethiopian nation-state that were articulated 
by the EPRDF. They strongly supported this peculiar configuration of the sector 
including the retention of telecommunications as a state monopoly and the 
prioritization of development in rural areas. As Debretsion Gebre-Michael, the 
General Manager of EICTDA, argues:
Monopoly is a crucial factor in this. It is exactly because ICTs are so important 
and they have the capacity to penetrate every aspect of our lives that we have to 
make sure that it is the state that is in charge of using and implementing them.
In this phase we cannot leave it to the market. ICTs are too key for our 
development. They are a priority. Behind the decision of leaving the monopoly 
in the ICTs and telecommunication market there is big philosophical thinking. It 
is not just because we want to make money from the use of telecoms.181
179 According to the United Nations Statistics Division in 2007 the GDP per capita in Ethiopia was 
USD 201. See
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf7Countrv Snapshots Sep%202009/Ethiopia.pdf Last 
time accessed 12.01.2010
180 As illustrated in Chapter 6, this feature was, on the contrary, included in the Woredanet 
architecture to allow free communication among different nodes of the state. However, the 
prioritization of videoconferencing and the lack of bandwidth dramatically reduced the use of VoIP 
among Woredanet nodes.
181 Interview: Debretsion GebreMichael (Director General, EICTDA and former guerrilla fighter in 
charge of the radio equipment and propaganda)
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This approach was further illustrated by Bereket Simon, a former Minister of 
Information and one of the most influential politicians in the country.
The majority of Ethiopians still live in the rural areas. If you go there you do not 
make profit. So the private won’t cover the rural areas. But if Ethiopia has to 
develop first it has to have the rural on board. When we will be done with this 
and other projects the private sector will be accepted. Look at Schoolnet. Now 
all the students in Ethiopia can have access to the same education. No private 
sector company would have done anything like that.182
ETC’s chief executive officer, Amare Amslau, further explained how ICT 
policies must be understood in the context of a divide between the people/peasants 
and the individuals/elites as articulated by the populist discourse on society 
developed by the EPRDF and how this affected important decisions in the 
telecommunication sector.
Holding telecommunications is not just about security. We need this instrument 
for development, so we need it for the people. Ethiopia is not like any other 
African country. Those countries just think that they can become rich, the 
individual can become rich. But what we want is instead building in the mind of 
people the attachment for their land and for their country. Once you have 
technology you become addicted to it. So, if you allow the private they can 
certainly make money but what about the society? The society will not benefit 
from it. So the government is the one that has to make sure that things are done 
in the interest of the people.183
The hegemonic nature of this commitment, its ambition to structure the nation­
state according to a plan developed by the political elite, but not necessarily shared 
by all individuals in the state apparatus, emerged even more clearly in interviews 
with bureaucrats and technocrats in lower positions in the government. In contrast to 
their politically appointed superiors, most of them relied on a less ideologically
182 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
183 Interview: Amare Anslau (CEO, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation)
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charged discourse, grounded in evidence from other markets in Africa and elsewhere. 
They were critical of government policy and less convinced that monopoly was the 
way forward. They argued that competition in the telecommunication market had 
produced better results, even for rural populations. This divergence is also illustrative 
of the distribution of power in the Ethiopian state and of how those in the higher 
ranks of the power hierarchy had greater capacity to decide the outcome of discursive 
struggles. The opinions expressed by the mid-level bureaucrats and computer 
scientists cited below reflect frustration with policy emanating from above over 
which they have had little influence.
I am personally not very happy with the government policy because it won’t be 
able to provide quality service in the absence of competition. Even if you 
prioritize the rural, to reach 80 million people with all services in absence of 
competition is just impossible. The government people know it too but they are 
rigid. They have decided to stick to their plan.184
Technology is not used properly. The big problem is monopoly. There is a great 
potential for business but there is not a good environment for investment 
because of the government. [...] Many people have left. The CISCO people left.
Others left because of the Chinese. At a certain level I see a lot of commitment.
The government is installing fibre optic here and there. They are doing a good 
job. But the monopoly of the telecommunication is not the right decision.185
Here for example we have a monopoly of telecoms. For the Ethiopian 
government it is good, but even for me -  I am a government official -  they 
cannot last for long. They will have to change their policy. What they say is that 
Ethiopia is different from other countries like Kenya where the population is 
concentrated in urban areas. Ethiopia has never been colonized and so the 
villages are scattered. If a private company comes, it will cater only for the 
urban, leaving a lot of the population behind. And only a state monopoly can 
take care of the rural people. This may be true. But we have to find a solution. 
Maybe private companies will come, but it is the government that will continue
184 Interview: Anonymous (61)
185 Interview: Anonymous (25)
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to take care of rural connectivity or set rules for private companies to connect 
also the rural if they want to operate.186
The full development of a privatised technopolitical regime that could 
influence or at least complement the national strategy promoted by the Ethiopian 
government was constrained for a variety of reasons. The perspectives of the three 
bureaucrats, as well as the explanations offered by their superiors earlier in this 
section, point to two key features of the EPRDF’s discourse on the nation-state. They 
illustrate the need to equally distribute resources among different ethnically-based 
states to reinforce the ethnic federalist set-up, and the tendency to privilege the rural 
population, even when this constrained the empowerment of private entrepreneurs in 
ways that could eventually benefit the economy of the whole country.
Another key reason for the resistance to the emergence of a regime that would 
be more independent from the state and rely on other local actors was to prevent 
agents hostile to the EPRDF from taking advantage of the opportunities offered by 
new technologies to challenge the central power. This aspect is further analyzed in 
the following section that illustrates how some actors inside and outside Ethiopia, 
used ICTs to criticize the Ethiopian government. It is also shown that, given its 
monopoly of force as well as of communication channels, the government could 
easily silence these actors and their attempt to influence public opinion in Ethiopia.
7.3 The oppositional technopolitical regime: attacking the 
state from beyond its borders
Globalisation has generated new means for transnational populations to 
influence and for homeland governments, political parties, and social 
movements to seek to co-opt pressures from populations abroad. Political 
campaigns and strategies are in part the product of complex interactions 
between political and social leaders and organisations in multiple locations, 
with diaspora and other transnational networks serving key linking roles. These 
forms of cross border participation in the politics of countries of origin are
186 Interview: Anonymous (16)
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increasingly important as ‘political entrepreneurs’ create new networks and 
transnational practices that are distinct from inter-state political processes. 
(Lyons, 2007, p. 531)
The globalization Lyons describes, with its real and potential effects on internal 
politics, is what the Ethiopian government has sought most actively to resist. This 
opposition visibly materialized in May 2006, with the blanket censorship of most of 
the websites and blogs hosted outside Ethiopia that were critical of the operation of 
the government. As illustrated below through examining three of the most popular 
websites blocked in Ethiopia -  Nazret, Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian review -  the 
response of the government was motivated not only by its approach towards critical 
voices, preferring dismissal over engagement, but also by the kinds of attacks that 
were launched from those online spaces that targeted the heart of the EPRDF’s 
national discourse.
7.3.1 The free flow of contestation: connecting different media to 
disseminate oppositional voices
Despite the delay in establishing the first Internet connection, the tight control 
over telecommunication and the limited Internet penetration, the types of use of the 
medium developed by the diaspora as well as by the oppositional voices still residing 
in Ethiopia, made it an effective channel for disseminating alternative discourses. 
The websites targeting Ethiopian audiences that started appearing in the 1990s and 
dramatically increased in the early 2000s, demonstrated a significant capacity to
• 1 R7connect with other, older and newer, media. Opinion pieces and news published 
online were often picked up and translated by newspapers being printed and 
circulated in Addis Ababa and other major towns. In critical moments, such as the 
period surrounding the parliamentary elections in 2005, news, commentaries, and 
political manifestos published online were printed and turned into leaflets. Mobile
187 Nazret was the first Ethiopian website to go online, already in 1994. Ethiomedia was launched in 
2002. The Ethiopian review first started as a printed leaflet distributed to Ethiopians in the US in 
199land it developed an online edition in 2000.
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phones, especially the SMS, were used to mobilize people in real time and also 
responded to calls for action posted in web forums.
Eskinder Nega, Editor and columnist of the newspapers Menelik, Asqual, and 
Satenaw, among the most popular in Ethiopia before the government shut them down 
in November 2005, pointed out the ways in which his papers were promoting 
awareness within Ethiopia about debates generated by the Ethiopian diaspora: “We 
were publishing articles by prominent people in the diaspora. Fundamental debates 
were going on in websites such as Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian Review and we 
were translating them because we wanted to make sure they were known to the
1 SOpublic in Ethiopia”. As Eskinder continued to explain, this strategy responded to 
an idea of journalism as an oppositional force. Its role was raising key political issues 
rather than simply reporting news: “The unique situation of Ethiopia forced us to be 
not just journalists, but activists. We were not seeking this role, but the conditions in 
the country forced us to do so”.190
These interactions, between websites and newspapers, but also mobile 
communication and international broadcasters such as Voice of America (VOA), 
were making online spaces part of a wider system where oppositional voices were 
interconnected to each other, maximizing the capacity to reach different audiences 
using a variety of platforms and languages. Defining this network as an oppositional 
technopolitical regime may seem like an attempt to force the theory onto the
188 The use of SMS to disseminate slogans and organize political mobilization can appear to be a new 
phenomenon, but as reported for example in Markakis’ account of the revolution that lead to Haile 
Selassie’s demise, it connects with important referents in the history of Ethiopia (Markakis, 1987). 
Markakis stresses the importance of clandestine publications and leaflets in the main urban centres in 
promoting political mobilization, especially among students. Translations from two of these leaflets 
are also indicative of how the tension among different political forces in Ethiopia is not a new 
phenomenon, but is grounded in a more remote past.
“Ministers and generals enrich themselves at the expense of the soldier... Ethiopia rise. Crush the 
government that benefits only the few” Voice o f the oppressed to the armed forces 17 February 1974. 
“High officials and foreign capitalists are eating our flesh and sucking our blood. Next day will chew 
our bones. We must not keep silent. We must do something. We must rise up” Let us strengthen our 
unity 18 February 1974
189 Interview: Eskinder Nega (Former Editor of Menelik, Asqual, and Satenaw)
190 Interview: ibid.
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empirical data, but it was treated as a system by the Ethiopian government itself, that 
considered the oppositional voices articulated through different media as part of a 
somehow coordinated attempt to delegitimize it. Desta Tesfaw, the General Manager 
of the Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA), the institution in charge of licensing 
TV and radio stations as well monitoring their uses, explained this position:
That was a period that showed how technology can also affect society 
negatively. [...] Short messages were used to defamate people and you could 
not really know the source. If I send an SMS to you, then you can act as a 
multiplier. Also the websites were publishing a lot of factious articles. All this 
was making people confused. There was an uncontrolled circulation of 
unfiltered and unbalanced information. I think that it was a strategy of certain 
groups who know how to use the media. The strategy was to turn down this 
government and many different media were used to reach this single goal.191
As Desta continued to explain, it was mostly in the aftermath of the 2005 
elections that the threat of the oppositional technopolitical regime became fully 
apparent and motivated the government to take extreme measures. Following the 
voting on 15 May 2005, the lack of clarity in counting the ballots and the rumours 
that the opposition might have won the majority in parliament caused widespread 
protests, exploding in two different waves, in June and in November 2005. The 
Ethiopian government responded harshly, leading to numerous killings of protesters 
and to the arrest of thousands of individuals, captured in schools, universities, and in 
their own homes. Various communication channels were progressively closed so as 
to reduce their capacity to be employed, singularly or in combination, to serve the 
protest and disseminate alternative information and narratives. On 10 June the SMS, 
which had been used to mobilize people in real time in Addis Ababa and other major
109towns, was shut down. It would be restored only two years later, on the occasion
191 Interview: Desta Tesfaw (General Manager, Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority)
192 In June 2005 I was living in Addis Ababa and I remember friends and colleagues receiving 
messages on their phones calling them to participate to demonstrations, to strike if they were taxi 
drivers or shop owners, or to forward messages to their friends and acquaintances.
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1 O'lof the celebration of the Ethiopian millennium. In early November 2005, some of 
the most vocal Ethiopian journalists, including Eskinder quoted above, who 
challenged the results of the election and called for more democracy, were arrested 
and their papers closed down (Crawford, 2006).194 Even when released in 2007 most 
of them continued to be refused new licences to restart their publications. In May 
2006, one year after the contested election, the oppositional blogs were censored 
including the three most popular, Nazret, Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian Review 
(Opennet Initiative, 2007). As this thesis goes to press, the websites remain 
inaccessible from inside the country, as Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show.195 Finally, and 
in this case only intermittently, the radios broadcasting from outside Ethiopia using 
short waves, such as Voice of America and Deutsche Welle, were jammed.196
193 The first message the Ethiopian citizens received on their mobiles after a long silence was a 
greeting by ETC’s CEO Amare Anslau wishing them a an happy new Ethiopian millennium.
194 A full chronology of the crackdown on the media in the aftermath of the elections is offered by 
Ethio-Zagol, a famous Ethiopian blogger who used to post from within Ethiopia. His article can be 
found at http://seminawork.blogspot.com/2006 05 01 archive.html Last time accessed 14.04.2010.
195 The reason for the delay in the blocking of websites is attributable to the lack of a clear 
understanding of how this could be done rather than to a strategic sequencing. During interviews and 
informal conversations with oppositional figures, but also with a number of individuals connected to 
the government, it was pointed out that it was Chinese engineers who intervened to block websites, as 
requested by the Ethiopian government. However, if the blocking itself, always officially denied by 
ETC, could be easily proved, and was reported by organizations such as the Opennet Initiative and 
Reporters without Borders, I could not find any hard evidence that Chinese individuals or 
organizations were behind it.
196 The government actively targeted foreign-based media outlets. Beginning in January, the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) received reports that the broadcast signals of the U.S. 
government’s Voice of America (VOA) and the German Deutsche Welle were being jammed. 
Reacting to the reports, an Ethiopian Information Ministry spokesman, Zemedkun Tekle, told VOA 
that the allegations were “utterly baseless.” The report can be consulted here 
http://www.cpi.org/2009/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-20Q8-ethiopia.php Last time accessed 14.04.2010
213
*5
£ ite J E A J N w  Htfory fioofcmwta lo c h  * * *
(g) -  c / s> • htlp;//www.tttMO»mdi«.conv'
i h fc lo d E r r o r  x I 3  Stanhope Centre for CnmmMniobo... >
. Connection In te rrup ted
The document contains no data.
Tht network ink was interrupted while negotiating a  connection. Please try again. 
I TiyAgain |
httpaVwww.btocco.ufc/
Fig. 7.1
The Ethiomedia website blocked (The additional bar and the windows with the BBC heading 
are to illustrate that the internet connection was on while the timeout message was received
fo r  the blocked website)
-
f t*  id *  tfaw Hntory Bookmark* lo o k  tM >
■ l> Pane toad trror x  | Microsoft Outtook W *  Access x 1
N etw o rk  T im eout
The operation timed out when attempting to contact wwwJdnijitorg.
The requested site did not respond  to  a  connection request and  the browser has 
stopped  waiting for a  reply.
■ Could the server be  experiencing high dem and or a  tem porary failure? Try again 
later.
a Are you unable to  browse other sees? Check the com puters network connection. 
•  Is your computer or network protected by a firewall or proxy? Incorrect settings 
can interfere with Web browsing 
a still having trouble? Consult your network administrator or H e m e t provider for 
assistance.
% BSC . Homepage - Monlli Fjrefon
£Ue i *  tfe *  Htfoiy £ookmwk. lo o t .  Udp
• C  ff> ■  httpv/wwwalK.c 'C i - I [B -  =
■ 9B[ bJb| c | ^ ■ S B KmB
Fig. 7.2
The Kinjit website blocked -  The website o f  the main opposition group
214
p LoadEiro*
£drt tyew Higtory fiooknw ta loote b d p
^ Q |  ’  C  X  <S> ( A 1 http^/wwww^lhiopiinfwiwirxQm/
J . r < 9r b d i r »  X Q  London School of Economic! and P...
• ( G j -  ethicpun r
A Connection In te rru p te d
The document contains no data.
The network fink was interrupted while negotiating a  connection. Please try again.
1 I
i  B8C - Homepage - Mozilia firefox U d m d t
£.le tdrt *ew  rtgtwy fiookmwfcs lo o h  Jjelp
-  '  C  O  ■  http://www.bbc.co.uk/ A - j  f i \ I I
I I -  :  1
Fig. 7.3
The Ethiopian Review website blocked
The oppositional technopolitical regime was characterized by a marked 
heterogeneity. It was going from long-established radio stations such as VOA, whose 
adversarial role has been illustrated in Chapter 4, to blogs such as Urael, which 
started to be hosted on Nazret.com only in 2005 but quickly gained popularity in the 
Ethiopian blogosphere and beyond. It was not based on stable institutions, but 
represented the result of the efforts perpetrated by actors challenging the control of 
the EPRDF over the nation and taking advantage of the capacity of ICTs to coalesce 
around a common narrative people residing in different locations. The systemic 
nature of this technopolitical regime is also what turned the apparently insignificant 
number of Internet users, around twenty thousands in 2005, of mobile users, around 
four hundred thousands, and of newspapers readers into a powerful wave, 
challenging the control of the government over its citizens, and forcing it to take
more radical measures. 197
197 The data for Internet and mobile users are from EICTDA, which in 2005 reported the capacity o f  
the system in Ethiopia to cater for 21,914 Internet users and for 408,134 mobile users (EICTDA, 
2005)
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In general, similar to the international and the privatized technopolitical 
regimes, the oppositional regime was enhancing aspects of the discourse on ICTs 
which were opposed and resisted by the Ethiopian government. The actors at the core 
of the oppositional regime were challenging the use of new technologies as 
instruments to be used by the state to reinforce its control and legitimacy, and re­
framing them as channels to connect Ethiopians outside and inside the country in the 
effort to find political alternatives. As a popular blogger wrote, “The Diaspora is a 
political factor in the democratic struggle which is not to be underestimated. [...] In 
cyberspace Nazret.com and all the other publications make it impossible that we are
1 Q O
silenced”. The next section, however, shows that while some online spaces were 
characterized by a genuine desire for peace and democracy, others used the web for 
violently attacking the Ethiopian government, its representatives and the key aspects 
of its discourses on the nation-state.
7.3.2 Attacking and defending the national narrative
Blogs and websites opposing the government in Addis Ababa were not blocked 
all together, but were obscured progressively during the month of May 2006. The 
first to condemn the filtering were Ethiopian bloggers themselves. Those operating 
from inside the country were able to register the online spaces that had become 
inaccessible on a daily basis. For example Ethio-Zagol, a blogger posting from Addis 
Ababa, wrote on May 18:
Over the last two days, all blogspots blogs [...] have been blocked in Ethiopia.
Those who seek political quips from weichegud or intelligent analysis form other 
bloggers can't access the sites via the telecom servers. In addition, the government 
has blocked Ethiopian Review, cyber ethiopia, quatero and Free Our Leaders
198 Sickness and the nephew, Urael on Nazret, 13 April 2006,
http://nazret.comMog/index.php?blog:::::13&title=sickness_and the nephew&more^l&c^l&tb^&pb 
=1 Last time accessed 12.02.2010
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websites. My sources told me this is done by tel. [the Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Corporation] with the advise and help of the Chinese.199
This information was later confirmed by other sources inside and outside
Ethiopia.200 Defying the blocking, most bloggers residing in the country continued to
update their spaces through proxies and sent information to friends and colleagues
living abroad, while websites such as the Ethiopian review and Ethiomedia, managed
primarily by Ethiopians in the diaspora, continued to be adjourned as usual. Many
bloggers started providing advice to their readers on how to circumvent the
censorship, hoping this information could reach the intended targets through the
™ 1
websites that were still accessible or through emails or other means. Cyber­
199 Government blocks bloggers, Ethio-Zagol, 18 May 2006
http://seminawork.blogspot.com/2006/05/govemment-blocks-bloggers-over-last.html. Last time 
accessed 12.02.2010
200 From inside Ethiopia, see for example Addis Ferengi, a French woman managing a blog from 
Addis Ababa hosted on the online platform nazert.com. She wrote various articles on the issue, among 
which are Censorship Please forw ard , Addis Ferengi on Nazret.com, 22 May 2006 
(http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?blog=9&title=censorship please forward&more= 1 &c=l &tb=l &p 
b=l) and All "no-propaganda" websites are blocked now, Addis Ferengi on Nazret.com, 28 May 
2006
(http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?blog=9&title=all no propaganda w ebsitesareblockedn& m ore= 
1 &c= 1 &tb= 1 &pb= 1) Last time accessed 12.02.2010.
201 Addis Ferenji on nazret.com, for example, wrote: “The Ethiopian government is obviously decided 
to silence all independant Medias [sic]. Please note that the censorship may be circumvent by using 
http://securebar.secure-tunnel.com and forward the information to insiders” (Censorship Please 
forward , Addis Ferengi on Nazret.com, 22 May 2006
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?blog=9&title-censorship please forward&more=l&c=l&tb=l&pb 
=1 Last time accessed 12.02.2010). Ethio-Zagol offered a more detailed explanation on how to use 
these instruments: “This blog can't be accessed in Ethiopia so the following advise may not reach its 
intended readers. Other websites like Ethiomedia who hasn't yet been blocked should carry the 
message to Ethiopian readers. Readers can use an open proxy like this which allow to circumvent the 
blocks. Readers should click on http://securebar.secure-tunnel.eom/cgi-bin/nph-freebar.cgi/l 1011OA 
and enter the address that is blocked in the displayed box. Using the proxy we can access our beloved 
blogs and websites even though the government has censored them” (Government Blocks Bloggers, 
Ethio-Zagol, 18 May 2006, http://seminawork.blogspot.com/2006/Q5/goverament-blocks-bloggers- 
over-last.html Last time accessed 12.02.2010)
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activists operating at the international level, and advocacy organizations such as 
Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 
followed denouncing the new attempt of the Ethiopian government to further curtail 
an already narrow space for public debate.
As often happens when censorship measures are denounced by international 
actors and institutions, it was the simple act of blocking websites and blogs that was 
acknowledged while little or no mention was made of the discourses that were 
animating the targeted online spaces and of the underlying causes that led to the 
censorship. Knowledge of Ethiopia’s political history, and a closer examination of 
the articles and posts hosted on the most popular online spaces addressed to 
Ethiopian readers, would have shown that the filtering was just the latest incarnation 
of a long-term struggle between the EPRDF and other forces opposing its nation 
building plan. As the excerpts below from Ethiomedia and the Ethiopian review 
indicate, the attacks waged against the Ethiopian government were not simply critical 
of its governance, but were directed at some of the pillars on which the national 
agenda was founded, such as ethnic federalism which was presented as an attempt to 
divide rather than unite Ethiopian citizens, and revolutionary democracy, portrayed 
as just another form of authoritarianism.
The Meles propaganda machinery and his state apparatus are tirelessly 
promoting all sorts of machinations aimed at turning one Ethiopian ethnic group 
against another. In a police state where mismanagement, nepotism and 
corruption are rampant, and where the people are completely disenchanted and 
disgusted with the authoritarian rule of a tyrant, the illusion of stability and 
security would remain whimsical.203
202 See for example Ethan Zuckerman’s Ethiopia “pioneers ” cybercensorship in sub-Saharan Africa 
(http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2006/Q5/22/ethiopia-pioneers-cvbercensorship-in-sub- 
saharan-africa/). or RSF’s article: Three more sites unaccessible, government denies being involved 
(http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id article= 17783J and report Dictatorships get to grips with 
Web 2.0 (http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id article:=20844,). CPJ similarly denounced the 
censorship in a note: Critical Web sites inaccessible in Ethiopia (http://cpi.org/2006/05/critical-web- 
sites-inaccessible-in-ethiopia.php). Last time accessed 12.02.2010.
203 Deconstructing Meles Zenawi’s Response to US Congress, by Concerned Ethiopians in the United 
States, Ethiopian Review, 1 July 2005.
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Ethnic-based parcelling of the map of Ethiopia with evil design to make it 
convenient for cessation. This is a reckless and dangerous experiment, which 
should be utterly condemned not only by Ethiopians but also by all Africans 
suffering from tribal strife as a cancer to peace, stability and prosperity. 
Creation of a feudal land tenure system in which TPLF is the landlord and the 
peasants live in slavery in serfdom.204
The discourses articulated in these two posts, hosted on The Ethiopian Review 
and Ethiomedia, respectively, closely resemble those promoted in the 1990s by 
newspapers such as Tobiya. Ethnic federalism was not only attacked as a problematic 
strategy which could fail to hold the country together, but an “evil design” 
intentionally pursued by the Tigreyan minority to subjugate other ethnic groups. 
Similarly, in the second excerpt, the popular discourse of social integration was 
challenged. As previously argued, the TPLF/EPRDF had long addressed the peasants 
as the main beneficiaries of its policies. Reframing them as slaves serving a feudal 
lord, and employing imagery that was evocative of the times of imperial Ethiopia, 
meant accusing the government of having simply taken the throne from previous 
rulers, rather than being the revolutionary force it had tried to appear.
It must be noted, however, that the heated and polemical language employed in 
these and similar posts was not characteristic of oppositional voices alone, but was a 
trait common to most of the players participating in the polarized political debate in 
Ethiopia. A few days before the elections, for example, the Prime Minister himself 
declared in a televised interview:
I call on the people of Ethiopia to punish opposition parties who are promoting 
an ideology of hatred and divisiveness by denying them their votes at election 
on May 15. Their policies are geared toward creating hatred and rifts between 
ethnic groups similar to the policies of the Interahamwe when Hutu militia
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/2005/jul/0010pinionJulvl 2005_Re_Meles_Letter.html Last time 
accessed 14.02.2010
204 Two successive Ethiopian despots in comparison, by Robele Ababya, Ethiomedia, 16 August 2005 
http://www.ethiomedia.com/fastpress/two ethiopian despots.html Last time accessed 14.02.2010
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massacred Tutsis in Rwanda. It is a dangerous policy that leads the nation to 
violence and bloodshed.205
In the months following the elections and the unrest their uncertain result 
triggered, Meles’ argument was often turned on its head by bloggers who used 
similar or greater vehemence to accuse him, and not the oppositional forces, to be the 
main cause of ethnic divisions.
It is now clear that Meles’ campaign was centered on further deepening ethnic 
suspicion and mistrust in to the fiber of Ethiopian politics. Lacking results to 
show for the 14 years of his time at the helm, the PM chose to campaign on 
ethnic politics platform that shamelessly dared to bring the Rwandan experience 
in to the Ethiopian political discourse. Meles chose this platform, not only 
because he lacked a record to campaign on but he also believed that ethnic 
politics has taken root capable of delivering votes bounty. The lesson Meles will 
take from this election will be the need to accelerate his divisive ethnic project.
If allowed, he will come back with vengeance. Venomous ethnic division and 
instigation of tension among the people will be the trademark of his rule for 
years to come. Instability will ensue, providing Meles with the rational for his 
future extrajudicial measures. He will use this to impress and cajole the 
international community. Beware, given the chance, he will do it!206
These criminals [the EPRDF leaders] are more than capable of inflicting some 
atrocities, in the confusion of the time, on one or another group of Ethiopians 
and then blame other group(s) of Ethiopians so as to implement their 
‘Intrahamwe’ dream on Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Ethiopians have to be careful
205 Part of the speech is reported in the article A critical look into the Ethiopian elections, 3 June 2005, 
Sudan Tribune. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?paee=imprimable&id_article=9931 Last 
accessed 16.02.2010. It is also referred to in (EU-EOM, 2005; Teshome, 2009)
206 Why the result o f Election 2005 matters, by Ajibew A., Ethiopian Review, July 27 2005 
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/2005/iul/001QpinionJulv27_2005 Aiibew A.htm Last time 
accessed 16.02.2010
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not to be drawn into such traps of the criminal mafia and its head that would do 
anything to continue their open blunder.207
The mission of the militia is to go into the Oromo and Amhara regions of 
Ethiopia and eliminate anyone suspected of supporting the opposition against 
TPLF rule. Meles and his militia commanders are carrying out this mission of 
search and destroy in the name of protecting Tigreyans. The true intentions of 
Meles are to start ethnic warfare between Tigreyans and non-Tigreyans and use 
this as a pretext to divide the country and the people.208
These excerpts further exemplify how some of the most popular online spaces 
targeting Ethiopians in Ethiopia and abroad were challenging the very core of the 
national discourse advanced by the EPRDF. They also suggested, in potentially 
provocative and harmful language, ethnic federalism could turn into ethnic 
discrimination and ethnically motivated violence.209 These uses per se should not 
justify the censoring of blogs and websites, but, together with the responses they 
triggered in the Ethiopian government and with the condemnation this response 
received internationally from organizations such as RSF and CPJ, they illustrate how 
local and international discourses may coalesce as well as compete in complex and 
problematic ways. On the one hand, defending the discourse of ICTs as a globalizing 
force and of information as free to flow independent of frontiers sometimes required
207 Call For All Ethiopians, by Girum Getinet, Ethiomedia, November 3 2005 
http://www.ethiomedia.com/fastpress/call for all.html Last time accessed 16.02.2010
208 The violent birth and life o f Meles Zenawi may bring his downfall by Girma Bekele, Ethiomedia, 
September 28 2005 http://www.ethiomedia.com/fastpress/zenawi fuels violence.html Last time 
accessed 16.02.2010
209 Fortunately, the unfolding of the events in the aftermath of the elections proved that neither the 
warnings issued by the Prime Minister nor those of bloggers were justified. Violent confrontations 
between government opponents and police forces did erupt in Addis Ababa and other major towns, 
leading to killings and arbitrary imprisonments that were condemned by the international community, 
but they were largely motivated by politics rather than ethnicity (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009). The 
government reacted disproportionally to a scenario it had not foreseen and was moved by the fear of 
losing control over the urban areas, while the protests were directed mostly towards institutions 
accused to have stolen a vote, rather than towards specific groups such as the Tigreyans. For more 
information see (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009; Carter Center, 2005; EU-EOM, 2005)
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tolerating messages that appeared to lean towards hate speech and showed little 
sensitivity of the complexity of the political situation in Ethiopia. On the other hand, 
the Ethiopian government did not seek any form of consensus on the means that 
could be employed to bring the debate back to more constructive dialogue and 
prioritized its desire to hegemonize the political scene. As discussed in section 5.3.3, 
its tendency was to dismiss rather than reach out to critical voices, and also in this 
instance dissent was simply removed. Ethiopia’s sovereignty was affirmed at the 
technical, rather than at the discursive level, blocking the undesired spaces, while 
simultaneously denying it was actually occurring. This offered another example of 
how technology can expand the sphere of political decisions, without the necessity of 
a political debate to take place among relevant stakeholders.
The resistance to the oppositional technopolitical regime, however, did not 
simply result in a reduction of the freedom to receive and impart information in 
Ethiopia. As illustrated in the case of Woredanet and Schoolnet, the EPRDF’s 
priority was not narrowing down the space for political debate. Rather, it was 
occupying the political space to the greatest extent possible. The events of 2005 and 
2006 reminded its leaders that a significant portion of this space had grown outside 
of Ethiopia and, most importantly, that what was occurring in that space had 
important repercussions at home. As Bereket Simon explained:
We learned that we were taking many things for granted and this was a mistake.
We were thinking that for nation building you have to engage first with the 
people in the country. But later we changed our minds. And we decided that we 
had to engage with the diaspora as well. Now we have ETV [Ethiopian 
Television] on the satellite and the radio as well that can be reached by the 
diaspora everywhere.210
The blocking of online spaces was paired with a more aggressive strategy to 
engage Ethiopians abroad. It was structured along similar lines to that which was 
being employed in Ethiopia where the government refused to engage with elites
210 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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while trying to communicate more effectively with the grassroots, which in this case 
were not represented by the peasants but a “silent majority” of Ethiopians in the 
diaspora that were less politically engaged. As Bereket continued, “you have to take 
into account that in the diaspora you have 20% of vocal people and than you have 
80% of silent people. We are interested mostly in talking to this majority”. In order 
to reach this portion of Ethiopians abroad, the government tried to improve both the 
quantity and the quality of information, broadcasting the nation television and radio 
via satellites but also reaching out thorough the Internet. As Meles Gebre-Medhin, 
General Manager of the Ethiopian News Agency, one of the public institutions that 
had been selected as part of this new communication strategy, indicated:
We now have a new web-strategy whose aims are twofold. First, from a 
technical point of view we want to improve our skills to be on the Internet. By 
doing that we want to compete with other websites. We try to do that making 
our website more appealing. The second point is about reaching consensus on 
the idea of our country. It involves the national interest in particular. Most of 
our resources are channelled to this goal. Also as part of this is the building of a 
different image of Ethiopia, not anymore a country of famine and suffering but 
a country of opportunities.211
The Walta Information Centre, a formally independent news agency, which 
was strongly aligned to the EPRDF, was another pillar of this new strategy. As Haset 
Fishea, Head of ICT at Walta, explained:
The target of our website is the diaspora. And we are informing but also trying 
to counterbalance the extreme voices. And to tell people what is really going on. 
Usually the websites opened by the diaspora present biased information. As 
opposed to this our strategy is to show what is really happening here. We need 
our people to know that. But there are still gaps and there are capacity 
problems. In the elections of 2005 this gap became clear. But now media are 
trying to do a better job in that, to promote information inside and outside the
211 Interview: Meles Gebre-Medhin (General Manager, Ethiopian News Agency)
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country. To balance the extremist voices we just try to be responsible and to be 
balanced.212
As of 2008, however, this strategy had proved only partially successful. The 
websites remained basic and according to Alexa.com, they were ranked significantly
9 1 Tlower than the most popular Ethiopian websites.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter concludes the empirical section and has examined how ICTs 
evolved in Ethiopia from the 1990s, when a new political elite took control of the 
government as well as a new wave of ICTs for development campaigns reached the 
country, to the second half of the 2000s, when the same elite was capable of 
employing the new technologies to support its political agenda while marginalizing 
alternative uses of ICTs that would oppose it. This chapter focused, in particular, on 
those real or potential alternatives which emerged to patch, complement or oppose 
the national technopolitical regime developed by the Ethiopian government. Section 
7.1 illustrated how both the UNDP and the World Bank tried to redress in practice 
what could not be rectified through dialogue or diplomacy. These organizations 
implemented projects that incorporated discourses on ICTs for development that had 
been resisted by the Ethiopian government. In section 7.2 the initiatives of the 
Ethiopian private sector were taken into account, indicating how they failed to 
actively influence the development of ICTs in the country, but simply occupied the 
spaces left available by the government. Finally, section 7.3 addressed how, despite 
the limited penetration of ICTs in the country, the messages of oppositional forces 
travelled across different media, challenging the narrative advanced by the EPRDF 
and forcing the government to engage in subsequent acts of censorship, targeting
212 Interview: Haset Fishea (ICT Head, Walta Information Centre)
213 For a record of the rankings of websites addressed to the Ethiopian readership, see Ethiopia -  
Nazret is ranked #7Ethiopian website. 12 December 2008, Nazret.com
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?c= 1 &more= 1 &pb= 1 &tb= 1 &title=ethiopia_nazret com is ranked 1 
ethiopia Last accessed on 15.02.2010.
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various channels of information, from messages sent through a variety of 
communication outlets, from cell-phones to newspapers and from the Internet to 
radio stations that broadcasting from outside Ethiopia.
The next chapter will continue to explore these alternative technopolitical 
regimes by connecting their evolution with that of the national technopolitical regime 
developed by the EPRDF and by returning to analyze the arguments developed in the 
previous chapters. The conceptual framework illustrated in Chapter 2 will be 
employed to structure the analysis of the evidence presented and to further address 
the puzzle of why and how ICTs have been re-interpreted, re-defined and reshaped in 
Ethiopia.
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C h a p t e r  8 -  A n a l y s is : t h e  r e - in t e r p r e t a t io n , r e ­
d e f in it io n  AND RE-SHAPING OF ICTS IN ETHIOPIA
This chapter offers a structured analysis of why and how ICTs have been re­
interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia. The conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter 2 is employed to analyze the data that have been presented and 
to offer answers to the questions that have informed this research. The chapter is 
divided into four sections along the four core components of the conceptual 
framework. Each section contributes a unique piece of the puzzle of the adoption 
and adaptation of ICTs in Ethiopia. In addition, the chapter is structured to have 
sections 8.1 and 8.2 provide answers to the first sub-question addressing the reasons 
that have motivated the generation of particular technopolitical regimes and the 
resistance to the emergence of others. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 focus more on the second 
sub-question and on the means that have made the realization of a national 
technopolitical regime possible. It also considers the processes that various actors, 
discourses and artefacts were part of throughout its generation.
8.1 Conflict is the starting point
Chapters 1 and 2 examined the salient aspects of international policy discourse 
framing ICTs. ICTs were shown to have been presented by important international 
organizations as tools capable of supporting goals such as helping developing 
countries emerge from poverty, preventing natural and manmade disasters, and 
promoting economic growth. If that discourse was accepted by the Ethiopian 
government, as one of the poorest countries in Africa and one of the most affected by 
famine, ICTs would probably have been employed to: boost the productivity of the 
agricultural sector; set up early warning systems to respond quickly to drought and 
other natural disasters; support private initiatives; or offer the population new spaces 
for debating how to better solve the many problems affecting the country.
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As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, very little of this happened in Ethiopia. 
Projects intended to apply new technologies to agriculture remained on paper. IT 
companies were almost non-existent and in no position to seize the opportunities 
offered by a global market or even sufficiently to cater to the local demand. Access 
to the most popular online spaces was blocked in the country and Internet 
connections were either too slow or too expensive.
Instead, millions of dollars were invested to develop systems like Woredanet 
and Schoolnet that could reinforce the presence of the government in the periphery 
and improve its capacity of providing services, but also allow the EPRDF to occupy 
key political spaces. The two systems emerged as a unique patchwork of global tools 
and local needs.
The reasons why this patchwork emerged were found in the complex process 
of transformation the country was engaged in at the time the new wave of ICTs for 
development campaigns reached it. Various actors were battling to assert or resist 
particular ideas of the Ethiopian nation-state and ICTs became a component of this 
struggle. The government of Ethiopia, the only entity with enough power and 
resources to take control of the development of the new technologies nationally, 
appropriated them to support its ambitious nation-building project, while real or 
imagined enemies were prevented from developing uses that could challenge it.
The fact they were employed to support nation building does not mean that 
ICTs are always used as tools for nation building. But rather it highlights their 
potential to be used in this way. As argued throughout this thesis, ICTs had to be 
substantially re-adapted to serve that particular goal, a process that was achieved by 
incorporating specific discourses articulated by the EPRDF. At the same time a 
variety of measures had to be taken to prevent other applications, many which were 
presented at the international level as the most “natural” and appropriate, from 
diffusing and possibly challenging those controlled by the state.
Using ICTs to enact a national project does not mean that they can do it 
successfully. Assessing the effectiveness of Woredanet and Schoolnet was beyond 
the scope of my research. However, from the analysis of the systems, it has become 
evident that many of their features were problematically flawed. Responding to 
numerous, and not always compatible, politically motivated tasks in the absence of
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sufficient resources and expertise often meant developing convoluted architectures, 
overlooking technical details which would have later caused the malfunctioning of 
the systems, or prevented them from operating as expected. Similarly, blocking 
oppositional blogs did not stop the most skilled Internet users from relying on proxy 
servers to access them. And enlarging the offer of pro-government websites targeting 
Ethiopians in the country and abroad did not mean that they would become 
successful spaces for aggregation and debate.
What the analysis of the re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia strongly suggests is 
that politics is central to understanding technology and how it is deployed. 
Technologies, especially those that can come to constitute large technical systems, 
are subjected to intense conflicts and negotiations. They are likely to be captured in 
the networks of powers and discourses that characterize a country and are influenced 
accordingly. Nation building, and the specific discourses on the nation, society and 
communication articulated by the EPRDF have emerged as the most important 
factors in explaining why ICTs took the shape they did in Ethiopia. In another 
country different factors could have motivated the emergence of a different 
technopolitical regime. However, in all case studies, to understand why ICTs take the 
shape they do, it is important to “control” for politics first and then proceed to other 
explanations, rather than the other way around. Politics may or may not be the main 
force influencing the development of a particular technical system, but, as the case of 
Ethiopia demonstrates, along the lines of what was previously suggested in the works 
of Hughes (1983; 1986; 1987) and Hecht (1998; 2001), it is very probable that it can 
play a considerable role.
If politics matters, it does so in varying degrees and it is unlikely to be the only 
factor explaining why ICTs adopt a particular shape. Placing greater significance on 
this particular aspect does not negate other accounts. For example, some of the 
features adopted by Woredanet and Schoolnet could be justified by the functions 
they had to perform in relation to specific material and social conditions encountered 
in Ethiopia rather than by politics. Using a satellite to transmit data, for example, was 
probably the most logical decision for a country with a heterogeneous geography and 
little infrastructure like Ethiopia. Similarly, some of the key features of the two 
systems were adaptations to specific characteristics of the audiences they were
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designed to target. In reference to Schoolnet, Demissaw Bekele, EMA’s General 
Manager, explained this point:
We wanted to start with less complex technology. Teachers, especially in the 
rural areas, were not ICT literate. But to operate a plasma TV you just need to 
push a button. Our teachers are computer illiterate, meaning that they do not 
know how to use a computer and they are information illiterate, meaning that 
even if they know how to operate a computer they would not know what to do 
with it.
It is important to recall, however, that if these functions were developed to 
adapt technology to given geographical and educational circumstances, they emerged 
to increase the effectiveness of systems that were created to respond to specific 
political demands in the first place. A functional account alone is unable to explain 
the emergence and functioning of Woredanet and Schoolnet.
This example illustrates that to fully understand the process of adoption and 
adaptation of ICTs in developing countries, different approaches must be combined 
to explore various dimensions. However, for too long deterministic approaches have 
prevailed.
The Ethiopian case also suggests an important lesson for development 
practitioners and the individuals and institutions that advocate the use of technology 
for development. The fact that many international organizations in Ethiopia did not 
openly acknowledge that technology may be a site of conflict and negotiations, but 
only focused on its transformative potential, had significant consequences for a 
variety of actors who became involved, or tried to be involved, in the development of 
an Ethiopian path towards ICTs.
As illustrated in Chapter 4 many members of civil society and the private 
sector developed false expectations about how the new tools could change their 
country and open new opportunities. They subscribed to an agenda defined 
internationally only later to realize that there was little applicability in a country like 
Ethiopia where power was tightly controlled at the central level and where the 
priorities defined by the government were competing with those advocated by the 
international community.
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The AISI vision reported in Chapter 4 set “development imperatives” and 
“priority strategies” to build “information highways”, support “free markets”, and 
help “exerciz[ing] democratic and human rights”. Similar to other documents aimed 
at defining a common agenda, its assertiveness and the recurrence of a technocratic 
language were instrumental in convincing and rallying a variety of actors around 
supposedly common goals and shared principles. Most of the resources mobilized by 
the UNECA and by the donor community in general, were employed to market new 
discourses and artefacts rather than to understand how they could contextually apply 
to countries marred by conflict. Unfortunately, the expectations that were created 
among members of Ethiopia’s civil society and private sector later turned into 
disillusionments. After realizing that the Ethiopian government was taking the 
implementation of ICTs in directions that were conflicting with those advocated 
internationally, many donor agencies simply decided to disengage.
The lesson from this experience, however, is not that international 
organizations should adopt a conservative approach and be cautious in producing 
alterations within a given country. If new tools can help improving the living 
conditions in developing countries, they should be employed and diffused, even if 
this may entail a risk. The analysis of the Ethiopian case does suggest a more 
responsible approach and it reconfirms Melvin Kranzberg's argument that 
"technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral" (1986, p. 547). ICTs, as 
presented in the mainstream discourses, come with a bias. As was illustrated 
throughout this thesis and is further addressed in the next section, the modernizing, 
globalizing and democratizing potentials of the new technologies were not simple 
descriptions of reality. They were both prescriptions indicating how the new tools 
should be used and features embedded in the artefacts by actors belonging to specific 
socio-cultural contexts. As such, they could be resisted and the technology 
incorporating them redefined to integrate new discourses.
This experience should suggest to development practitioners that while 
describing new artefacts and discourses as neutral and universal may be necessary to 
define a global agenda, the incapacity to make this agenda flexible enough to match 
local conditions can hamper its success and produce avoidable side effects, such as 
wasted resources, unreasonable expectations and an increase in tensions among
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competing actors. If ICTs were perceived for what they are, as potential sites of 
conflict, greater attention could be paid to analyzing both the material and 
intellectual resources a country can mobilize to use technology in predefined ways, 
as well as how different priorities and political goals can lead to a redefinition of 
tools and their multiple uses.
8.2 Technology is both material and discursive
The concept of ICTs I adopted to understand why and how ICTs took the shape 
they did in Ethiopia, appreciated technology to be both material and discursive. The 
latter component, its discursive nature, was articulated along two interrelated and 
complementary dimensions. On the one hand, discourses were framed as the socio­
political components which are inserted into artefacts to perform specific functions, 
and thus also incorporate specific worldviews, along the lines illustrated by Hughes 
(1983), Hecht (1998), but also by Mansell and Silverstone (1996) and Winner 
(1980). On the other hand, they were conceived as texts describing the uses that 
should be made of a particular artefact, aimed at magnifying certain aspects while 
marginalizing others (Pinch et al., 1992). These should not be conceived as isolated 
dimensions but as continuations of each other. Descriptions may be inscribed into 
artefacts in an effort to lock particular functions into an object rather than simply 
indicating how a user should perform them. And descriptions, similarly to those 
appearing in technical manuals, can be employed to reinforce the effectiveness of a 
specific feature designed into an artefact.
Conceiving technology as both material and discursive was useful to 
reconstruct the process through which ICTs were interpreted and negotiated in 
Ethiopia and to explore how the same technology could be perceived by some actors 
as liberating and by others as a threat. It helped to understand why artefacts that were 
presented as modernizing, globalizing and democratizing, and could have been so, 
did not produce the outcomes indicated in their “descriptions” in Ethiopia.
The case of the globalizing potential of ICTs is one where the complex 
connections between the material and discursive aspects of technology emerged in all
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their clarity. The Internet is one example. Because of its capacity to deliver 
information fast and cheaply, it has been framed in the policy discourse as a 
globalizing force. This is an accurate characterization. Some of its main components, 
email and the World Wide Web, were designed precisely to perform the goals of 
transmitting and linking information almost independently of where it is stored and 
from where the senders and receivers are located. These components were also those 
that received the greatest attention and figured prominently in the documents 
indicating how ICTs could and should be used.
At the same time, the globalizing practices allowed by the technology at the 
core of the Internet were far from being the only possible ones. Woredanet and 
Schoolnet were employing the same transmission protocol the Internet is based upon 
(the Internet Protocol). Information packages were transported by a satellite, which is 
both a vehicle and a symbol of global communications. However, as illustrated in 
Chapter 6, these technologies were not applied to connect Ethiopian citizens to the 
rest of the world, but to create a kind of state intranet, maximizing the capacity of the 
central government to communicate with the periphery of the Ethiopian state, while 
minimizing the possibilities for the remote sites to access resources originating from 
abroad. This technical set-up was in line with other measures adopted in the country 
at large. As illustrated in Chapter 7, the quality of private and business Internet 
connections remained very poor, while their costs were exorbitant and did not adapt 
to the fall in prices experienced internationally. Political blogs opposing the 
government, in most cases edited by Ethiopians residing abroad, were blocked in the 
country. Even international calls were made difficult by their high costs and by the 
blocking of VoIP.
This picture illustrates how the globalizing traits of the new technologies, even 
if real and framed as advantageous, were actively resisted and contained ia  favour of 
others considered more instrumental to realize the projects defined by those in power 
in Ethiopia. A globalizing discourse, as incorporated into specific artefacts and 
further articulated in their descriptions, could be considered beneficial by actors 
operating from countries producing large amounts of digital content and embracing a 
vision of an open world. The same could be true for local agents, such as members 
of the civil society who could benefit, for example, from greater integration into
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activist networks and an enhanced capacity to reach and sensitize foreign audiences. 
On the contrary, the same discourse, and the same technologies, were perceived as 
threatening by a government struggling to control its country and to defend itself 
from attacks, both real and perceived, launched by its enemies at home and abroad.
If resistance to the forces of globalization has been documented in numerous 
studies on the relationship between the global and the local, the analysis of the 
Ethiopian case uniquely shows how it can be enacted not only through policies and 
behaviours, but also through technical artefacts. In addition, this study does not focus 
exclusively on reactive measures, such as the actions often registered by comparative 
research ranking countries according to number of censored websites or the measures 
taken against dissenting journalists or bloggers. In contrast, this research has focused 
substantially on the proactive actions, indicating how a conflict between competing 
discourses was resolved through a re-shaping of artefacts so as to have them 
incorporate new meanings and functions.
The negotiation that occurred around the democratizing potential of ICTs and 
the results that it produced can be explained by employing a similar analytic logic 
that has been applied to question the globalizing potential of new technologies. Had 
ICTs been democratizing tools, and had democratization of the kind described in 
documents such as the AISI framework been consensual, their application would be 
expected to have empowered individuals with greater rights and political freedoms. 
As argued throughout this thesis, however, some of the applications that could have 
helped to realize these goals were resisted, or at least they were not favoured, while 
those that were implemented responded to a concept of democracy that did not 
comply with the canon of Western, liberal democracy.
The case of the two Schoolnets, one implemented by the Ethiopian government 
and the other by the UNDP, is a clear illustration of this point. The system developed 
by the international organization was based on computer laboratories installed in 
preparatory schools and was aimed at using “the Internet to facilitate communication 
and interaction among students, teachers and school administrators locally and 
abroad for collectively embarking on content creation and exchange of learning 
resources and experiences” (Asefa, 2006, p. 28). It was inspired by the idea that
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individual interaction could lead to new and more effective learning experiences and 
that cooperation irrespective of physical or national boundaries was one of the key 
opportunities offered by the new medium. The kind of democratization it was meant 
to facilitate was based on the principle that individuals should be given the chance to 
access a wider variety of content and be left free to choose which ones suited them 
best. This system, however, emerged without the active support of the Ethiopian 
government, whose resistance became apparent when it refused to continue 
providing the internet connectivity the laboratories were depending on to fully 
perform their functions. The Schoolnet managed by EMA, on the contrary, took 
shape because of the support of the government and against the opposition of a 
variety of donor and multilateral agencies. The state-run Schoolnet gave little or no 
opportunity to choose content. It provided identical educational materials to every 
secondary school student in the country, by broadcasting pre-recorded classes on 
plasma TV screens installed in each classroom. The EPRDF leaders and the 
technocrats involved in Schoolnet’s design and management responded to a different 
ideal of democracy that was not based on individual choices. For them, the system 
had democratizing effects because it was offering equal opportunities to Ethiopian 
students, teaching them how to be better citizens and “how to contribute to the 
development of the country”.214
By comparing the two Schoolnets it is clear how different discourses on 
democratization led to the creation of different systems, often supporting rival goals. 
In addition, the fact that the two systems were developed in competition with each 
other, as explained in Chapter 7, further exemplifies the continuity between 
discursive and technical aspects of ICTs: a struggle over policies and ideologies was 
shifted to the technical level and fought in more subtle, less visible, ways. This 
phenomenon bears an interesting resemblance to the case of the French nuclear 
policy analyzed by Gabrielle Hecht. As she explained:
214 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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French military nuclear policy in the 1950s did not take the form of a 
ministerial decree; it took the shape of G2 (and other related technologies). This 
meant, for example, that in 1954 the assurances of the CEA's leaders that 
Marcoule reactors were both electricity-generating prototypes and plutonium 
producers enabled one prime minister to abstain from deciding about a bomb. 
Official French state policy declared a purely peaceful interest in atomic energy, 
while the CEA's actual technopolitics performed a military nuclear policy 
(Hecht, 2001, p. 270)
Similarly, the Ethiopian leaders could publicly assert their commitment to 
democracy, apparently aligning themselves to the requests of the international 
community, while in practice systems like Schoolnet and Woredanet performed 
policies that were not inspired by the principles of liberal democracy.
Finally, the analysis of how the modernizing potential of ICTs was translated 
into the Ethiopian context illustrates that even when there was a greater proximity to 
discourses articulated internationally, this did not lead to complete adherence. One 
reason is that discourses that can be separated analytically are highly intertwined in 
reality and influence each other in complex ways. For a long time and in many 
countries, modernization and globalization processes proceeded together and one 
was often considered the by-product of the other. They frequently inspired the 
production of a wide variety of technologies, including ICTs. Resisting globalization 
and globalizing features of specific artefacts could not leave the modernizing 
potential of those artefacts untouched. Or, conversely, the outcomes of one process 
could not be entirely achieved without concurrently triggering those linked to the 
other.
Another reason is the inevitable ambiguity that every discourse bears. What 
was illustrated earlier in the case of democracy, the possibility that substantially 
different meanings could be attached to the same term by different actors, still 
applied, even if to a lesser degree, to the case of the modernizing potential of new 
technologies. As described in Chapter 4 modernization was first introduced in 
Ethiopia as a means to defend its independence and was later embraced to extend the 
control of the state over its territory as well as to increase its capacity to function.
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However, this commitment towards modernization left ample room for differing 
interpretations of how modem and modernizing tools such as ICTs could better serve 
Ethiopia’s needs. It resulted in significant investments in the new technologies of a 
magnitude that surprised many international observers. It brought some of the latest 
symbols of progress, such as satellite dishes and flat screens, to some of the most 
remote areas in the world, as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. But it did not always follow the 
path prescribed by international actors. The Ethiopian authorities did not employ 
ICTs to support every sector that could have benefited from their application, but 
selected those that they perceived to be the most critical to improve the presence of 
the state on the ground. They similarly struggled to make sure that ICTs would not 
trigger an information revolution and produce transformations that could not be 
controlled. The government sought to use technology to produce incremental and 
predictable changes.
If modernization was accepted and favoured by the Ethiopian leaders, and ICTs 
were embraced as modernizing tools, their potential was attentively channelled to 
reach and empower only specific nodes of the Ethiopian society, while leaving others 
almost untouched. Any person travelling between a main Ethiopian town and a rural 
village would appreciate the results of this process. In the town, only a few offices, 
cybercafes, and a very limited number of private residences were likely to have 
access to the Internet, through slow and unreliable dial-up connections. In rural 
woredas, satellite dishes, power generators and plasma TV sets allowed students and 
administrators living in villages otherwise not reached by electricity to learn about 
mathematics and the founding principles of the state as well as to videoconference 
with their Prime Minister from his office in the capital.
215 As an assessment by Cisco Systems notes, “Possibly the most challenging aspect of the project was 
the creation of the Woredanet infrastructure. Given the nature of Ethiopia's terrain, a large percentage 
of the VS AT and videoconferencing equipment is deployed in extremely remote towns and villages, 
some of which are three days' walk from the nearest road or three days' drive from the nearest town”. 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/optical/ps5724/ps2006/prod case studv0900aecd8010d3 
26.html.
Last accessed 03.01.10
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8.3 Discourses do not spread by themselves and require 
agency to diffuse and be implemented
The re-interpretation, re-definition and re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia could 
not be fully understood by simply analyzing the characteristics of discourses and 
artefacts. To explain these processes it was essential to examine how specific 
international and local actors embraced and employed them. Along the journey that 
ICTs have undertaken in the country, from abstract ideas to concrete assemblages, 
different institutions, companies and individuals performed different functions and, 
over time, some prevailed over others. In Chapter 6 three phases were identified: the 
first was characterized by the intense activity of international organizations that were 
working to set a global, continental and national ICTs agenda and to convince a 
variety of local actors of the relevance of ICTs. In a second phase a variety of 
translational and mostly private agents competed to take advantage of the interest 
created in Ethiopia by earlier campaigns. The third phase started when a select 
number of actors, including Cisco Systems and Hughes Networks, were mandated by 
the Ethiopian government to implement a national regime, which could incorporate 
its political ambitions. The phenomena analyzed in Chapter 7 can be seen to belong 
to a fourth phase that is characterized by the attempts by actors other than the state to 
enact discourses opposed or marginalized by the state or to take advantage of the 
possibilities the state did not seize.
These phases have been described earlier in the thesis and it is not necessary to 
address them here at the same level of detail. However, returning to them briefly 
helps to illustrate some key aspects of how local regimes progressively take shape. In 
particular, the focus on the role played by different actors in different phases helps to 
understand the ways in which the interaction between international and local 
discourses was not a static interfacing of the elements comprising each of them, but 
was a dynamic process along which new possibilities were opened while other ones 
were ruled out by the active engagement of various agents embracing or resisting 
those elements.
For example, the resources mobilized by international, transnational and 
continental actors to set an ICT agenda are illustrative of the role “active teachers”
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play in promoting new discourses (Finnemore, 1993, 1996). In the 1990s the 
EPRDF, busy as it was in gaining legitimacy over the country after a long civil war, 
showed little interest in the transformations ICTs were triggering in the rest of the 
world. The EPRDF did not seek them out as tools that could support it in 
implementing its political plans. It was mostly through documents such as the AISI 
framework, ICT for development advocates and events such as the African 
Development Forum in 1999 that ICTs were “brought” to Ethiopia. However, they 
were initially presented mostly as an end in itself which could contribute “to realize a 
sustainable information society in Africa” (United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa, 1996, p. 6), or, conversely, whose absence would “leave African countries 
on the short end of an information and technology gap” (ibid, p. 1).
Analagous to the case of the diffusion of science bureaucracies investigated by 
Martha Finnemore “both the ‘problem’ and the solution were supplied to states by 
outside actors” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 11). But, in contrast to what happened with the 
science bureaucracies that were created to respond to UNESCO’s perceived 
necessity of coordinating scientists, in Ethiopia the relationship between problems 
and solutions progressively shifted. With time ICTs did start to be regarded as 
possible solutions, but not to the problems initially indicated by international 
organizations. As has been variously illustrated throughout this thesis, the EPRDF 
had little interest in facilitating the creation of an Ethiopian information society 
based on individual freedoms and the private initiative. However, the party was 
desperate to find new means to enforce its political agenda on the ground.
Despite being delayed, the EPRDF’s interest in ICTs was eventually decisive. 
It emerged as a precondition for a second phase characterized by a greater 
engagement of the Ethiopian government with new technologies, and it continued to 
be reinforced by some of the events that took place during this period. Among other 
factors, the greater involvement of international corporations and their role in 
explaining how ICTs could be adapted to serve a variety of goals was critical in 
allowing Ethiopian leaders to envisage new possibilities to employ them. In contrast 
to other areas where a compromise between international and local discourses is 
found mostly at the level of policies, the adoption of ICTs in the country required a 
fit to be created both at the discursive and at the material levels. Had ICTs only been
238
capable of producing the results illustrated in the mainstream discourse, they 
probably would have remained an issue of little interest in the minds of the EPRDF 
leaders. The government would have most likely continued to resist them to avoid 
importing new challenges, but might not have actively embraced them to serve its 
plans. Conversely, as illustrated in Chapter 6, the possibility of practically 
redesigning technological artefacts to make them incorporate new discourses and 
facilitate processes that did not figure in the mainstream documents convinced key 
EPRDF figures to embark on the ambitious project that eventually encouraged them 
to proceed with both Woredanet and Schoolnet.
The involvement of international corporations in this and in the next phase, 
when the projects envisaged by the Ethiopian leaders started taking the shape of a 
specific technopolitical regime, illustrates an aspect of the adoption of ICTs in 
developing countries that is often overlooked: the role played by international private 
companies, often the same ones that contributed to defining a mainstream ICTs 
agenda, in making other technopolitical regimes possible, even those contradicting 
the principles advocated in global fora. Without the possibility of relying on firms 
based in technologically advanced countries such as the United States and Japan the 
Ethiopian government probably would have never been able to implement 
Woredanet and Schoolnet. CISCO systems provided most of the equipment and 
tailored its networking solutions to meet the requirements defined by the Ethiopian 
government. Hughes Networks leased space on one of its satellites to allow data 
transmission across the vast Ethiopian territory. And Panasonic won the bid to supply 
the plasma TV screens.
The vital contribution of these corporations in developing a national 
technopolitical regime in Ethiopia also highlights the often-paradoxical nature of the 
campaigns to diffuse ICTs in the developing world. On the one hand, ICTs were 
presented as tools that could favour democratization, globalization and 
modernization. And, as illustrated in Chapter 1, many corporations contributed to 
promoting these discourses and to positioning them on the global agenda. On the 
other hand, when the opportunity to win large projects arose, private companies were 
ready to compromise on some of the principles they otherwise publicly supported. 
The Ethiopian case is not unique, but it represents an example of a trend that has
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been seen in a number of other countries where governments with the assistance of 
corporations used applications developed in the West to filter unwanted content 
(Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008).
This reliance on the skills made internationally available by private companies 
also generated another interesting paradox. It was because of the possibilities offered 
by the global market of competencies that the Ethiopian government could 
effectively resist the globalizing forces ICTs were bringing with them. This point can 
be made clearer by returning to an argument made by the former Minister of 
Information Bereket Simon:
Globalization is a double edge sword. It creates opportunities and it also creates 
challenges. [...]If you have money you can buy the latest technology. And you 
can implement it here. On the other hand when you implement you also import 
the challenges and you have to avoid them. If you are not ready you will lose.
One thing is sure. You cannot stand still.216
Berekef s words introduce a final aspect that has been shown to characterize 
the struggle among different actors for the implementation of ICTs in Ethiopia: 
despite the massive investments for the implementation of a national regime and the 
resistance to some of the challenges that ICTs could have “imported”, the battle for 
their appropriation did not have a clear end. The EPRDF leaders “could not stand 
still”. As argued in Chapter 7, some of the agents that were marginalized by the 
Ethiopian government persisted in seeking alternative ways to make use of ICTs and 
the discourses that were resisted continued to inspire their actions. Similar to what 
was indicated earlier about the necessity for a fit to be found both on a discursive and 
a material plane, the struggle was fought not simply at the level of politics: criticizing 
the uses of ICTs made by the government, withdrawing funds, proposing alternative 
ways to employ technology; but also practically, through the implementation of 
alternative technopolitical regimes.
216 Interview: Bereket Simon (Former Minister of Information and Political Advisor to the Prime 
Minister)
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8.4 Technopolitical regimes are where the negotiations 
occur
This thesis has comprehensively covered many aspects of ICTs including their 
conflictual nature and their material and discursive dimensions. The influence 
exercised by different actors in asserting or resisting particular discourses has been 
shown to have concrete expressions in the development of specific technopolitical 
regimes. The national regime assembled by the Ethiopian government, as well as the 
alternative regimes that emerged to complement, patch or oppose it, took shape as a 
result of progressive negotiations, both within and among different regimes. 
Throughout the design and implementation phases, heterogeneous entities came into 
contact with each other, initiating processes of transformation that were influenced 
by given networks of power, technologies and discourses, but were also influential in 
the redesign of those very networks. The realization of a regime was not simply the 
enactment of a given plan, but the progressive elaboration of responses to new 
opportunities and challenges, many of which were not even visible at the time the 
regime was imagined but became apparent only when it started taking shape. The 
next paragraphs offer some examples of how this happened in practice.
As illustrated in Chapter 6, the development of Schoolnet and Woredanet was 
neither linear nor smooth. Throughout the process that led to their design and 
implementation, multiple negotiations concurrently took place at different levels. 
Policy makers required their visions to be turned into technical features, but their 
aspirations were often frustrated by the inability of technocrats to fully understand 
whether and how this could be achieved. As the EICTDA officer recalled “the 
Minister of Capacity Building was asking and demanding and we had to come up
9 1 7with solutions to what he was asking. There was frustration after frustration”. The 
contractors that won the bid to implement the two systems worked to fulfil the 
requirements published by the government in its Request For Proposal (RFP), but in 
ways that often took advantage of the ambiguities left unresolved by the lack of 
expertise within the state apparatus. This was illustrated in a report commissioned by
217 Interview: Anonymous (32)
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the government to an independent evaluator in 2004 to assess how CISCO and 
Hughes were complying with their obligations and how some of the problems that 
had begun to arise could be solved:
In spite of the technology focus of the RFP, there were a number of material 
omissions and unclear definitions and expectations. These undoubtedly gave 
vendors significant leeway when interpreting the intention and meaning of the 
RFP, and it is thus likely that vendor submissions (although compliant to the 
occasionally unclear technology requirements) would not have been regarded as 
suitable if the technology specifications and requirements were much more 
clearly stated. (Daedan, 2004, p. 15)
These conflicts did not emerge exclusively as part of negotiations within and 
between organizations, but were affecting the interactions among technical artefacts. 
In order to incorporate the specific discourses on the nation, society and 
communication discussed in Chapter 5, and which uniquely characterized the nation- 
building project pursued by the EPRDF, important technical features had to be 
modified, often radically. Artefacts designed to perform given sets of tasks, in 
specific environments, had to be combined and compliment new ones in ways that 
had never been tried before. As the evaluation cited above continued, these 
adaptations could be highly problematic:
There is not only a real risk of the Woredanet service network becoming 
operationally unsustainable, but also that the project may become financially 
and economically unsustainable. Some of the issues that have contributed to this 
reality are: [...] The complexity of the HNS [Hughes Network Systems] 
DirecWay VSAT solution [the specific technology used to transmit data 
through the satellite], both in terms of the BoD [Broadband on Demand] 
requirement, as well as in terms of the complexity of the network design and the 
number of devices in the field. All this is necessitated by a requirement for a 
videoconferencing service which cannot ordinarily be accommodated by the 
HNS DirecWay VSAT platform. (Daedan, 2004, pp. 10-11)
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The scenario presented in this assessment, and illustrated at length in Chapter 
6, only emerged once the system started taking shape, when different actors and 
different artefacts started interacting among each other. Woredanet, as well as 
Schoolnet, did not evolve as the product of a well thought out plan, but acted as a 
tool “forcing” those who had imagined it to progressively understand which features 
and functions they really needed. The Ethiopian leaders had to make difficult 
decisions, ruling some possibilities out while accepting others, and thus gradually 
demonstrating what mattered most to them.
In this sense the evolution of a technopolitical regime can be considered the 
core site to study and understand how heterogeneous entities interact, the discourses 
that emerge as the most influential, the constraints that are the most difficult to 
overcome, and how power is distributed. On the one hand, the results of combining 
the discourses, artefacts, and actors could not have been imagined by analyzing each 
element in isolation or before they came into contact with each other. On the other 
hand, the nature of the single elements themselves became clearer as they started 
interacting.
The trajectory of the Internet as a service offered by Woredanet exemplifies 
these phenomena. Despite the resistance towards the globalizing forces exhibited by 
the EPRDF, access to the Internet was initially requested as one of Woredanet’s 
features. By the time a RFP was formulated by the Ethiopian government in 2002, 
browsing the web and sending emails had become standard features to be expected in 
any project employing ICTs to improve the efficiency of a state apparatus and its 
capacity to communicate with its nodes. When Woredanet started taking shape, 
however, the centrality of videoconferencing over other services drove the policy to 
limit the bandwidth available for accessing the Internet. In addition, the architecture 
that was implemented made data communication within Ethiopia easier, while it
91 Rstrongly limited the possibilities of visiting websites hosted outside the country. At 
a later stage, when the negative repercussions of the lack of bandwidth on the use 
videoconferencing emerged, even the thin share allocated for the Internet started to 
be employed for videoconferencing sessions, effectively switching off the possibility 
of browsing the web. As a result, the application that, probably more than any other,
2,8 For more detail see section 6.2.1
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contributed to triggering a new wave of ICTs for development campaigns was 
progressively marginalized in order to respond to other, local, discourses. There were 
no explicit requests to make browsing a webpage through Woredanet difficult. It was 
only when the Internet started interacting with other services that its relative 
importance for Ethiopian leaders became apparent. The redundancy embedded in the 
system as a result of conflicting global and local influences started decreasing, letting 
some features prevail over others. Against the assumptions of those who celebrated 
the transformative power of the new technology, the Internet showed little capacity 
of holding the ground against local demands. Only some of its features survived, 
such as the transmission protocol it was based upon, generating new assemblages 
that hardly could have been predicted by analyzing their constitutive discourses and 
artefacts in isolation.
However, when the national technopolitical regime was stabilized it did not 
represent the end of the negotiations that led to its realization. The balance between 
different discourses, artefacts and actors was only temporary. Benefiting from the 
eventual implementation of the systems on the ground, the government of Ethiopia 
initiated new negotiations with some of the key players from a position of greater 
power. For example, it agreed to allow international organizations, such as The
9 1 0World Bank, use Woredanet to implement some of their projects. It incorporated 
some of the critiques of Schoolnet in projects aimed at patching some of its 
problematic features. In 2008 two secondary schools in the towns of Awassa and 
Bahir Dar were connected to the ETC network through fibre optic cables, and
219 As reported in a World Bank project document, Woredanet was perceived as an opportunity to 
extend the reach of The World Bank’s Global Development Learning Network (GDLN), a system 
connecting institutions working on development issues all around the world. “The Bank and 
Government teams took advantage of the Government’s creation of a government network 
(WoredaNet) as a great opportunity to establish an interface between the Ethiopian Civil Service 
College’ GDLN center and the Government's WoredaNet (a network of more than 600 local 
government sites, each equipped with video-conference equipment and local area networks). This 
would allow the College to reach out to about 600 local government facilities through video­
conference programs, making it possible for ECSC to move toward reaching the development 
objectives related to the testing of electronic distance education approaches in the near future” (World 
Bank, 2007, p. 5)
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equipped with video servers, which allowed teachers and students to engage 
interactively with the educational content. They were able to replay classes and 
interrupt the viewing in order to provide more time for the teacher to integrate the 
recorded material. This project was framed as a pilot that could later be scaled up to 
other towns, when the fibre optic infrastructure would be completed to make it 
possible. Similarly, in 2008 the government lifted the taxes on hardware imports,
O ')  Clallowing a greater amount of PCs and laptops to be sold in Ethiopia. Finally, in 
cooperation with the Chinese company ZTE, the ETC embarked on an ambitious 
programme to overhaul the Ethiopian telecommunication infrastructure. This project 
increased the capacity of the mobile network, it reached many remote villages for the 
first time with fixed telephone lines, and, on paper, was also meant to make faster 
Internet connections more easily available, it
This further illustrates how the complexity of the interactions among 
competing hegemonic discourses, artefacts and actors needs to be addressed in 
context. A discourse that is refused at an early stage can be accepted, at least 
partially, in a subsequent one after a reconfiguration of the balance with other 
discourses, artefacts and actors. From a more practical point of view, it raises the 
important issue of timing and sequencing, and of the necessity for international 
actors not to push a given agenda on local stakeholders, but rather to understand 
which part of this agenda are the most compatible with local contexts at any given 
time. Accepting the evolutionary nature of technopolitical regimes can make a 
significant difference in planning effective interventions that are aimed at 
introducing new discourses and artefacts in scenarios that are different from those 
where they originated.
8.5 Conclusion
After having addressed the multiple transformations ICTs underwent in 
Ethiopia in the previous empirical chapters, this chapter has provided a synthesis of 
the most relevant findings and integrated them to answer the questions that inspired
220 See section 6.1 for the details on the taxation regimes for the hardware.
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the research. Sections 8.1 and 8.2, in particular, examined how, by framing conflict 
as the starting point in the analysis of the application of ICTs and by appreciating 
technology both in its material and discursive components, it was possible to 
understand why the same artefacts produced very different interpretations among 
various segments of the Ethiopian society and what consequences this had for the 
concrete development of ICTs in the country. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 focused more 
specifically on the actors that intervened in the re-definition, re-interpretation and re­
shaping of ICTs, and on the processes they activated and became part of throughout 
the development of specific technopolitical regimes. These sections stressed the 
dynamic nature of the application of ICTs in Ethiopia, illustrating the constant 
negotiation that allowed new possibilities to be revealed, while others were ruled out. 
The next chapter extends this analysis to consider the broader relevancy of what the 
Ethiopian experience means for other contexts and how the tools employed in this 
thesis could be applied to other cases.
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C h a p t e r  9 -  C o n c l u s io n
Since the international community placed ‘bridging the digital divide’ on the 
global agenda, numerous attempts and strategies have been made to support the 
diffusion of ICTs in the developing world. International organizations and donor 
governments have been motivated by the conviction that new technologies can drive 
economic growth and support democratization processes. Most of the studies that 
have emerged in the ICT for development field have been focused on identifying 
how these goals could be reached, detecting both the successes and failures, as well 
as understanding how the new tools could operate in different social, economic and 
cultural contexts.
My research has also been driven by a desire to understand how ICTs can 
benefit developing countries. However, I have chosen to take a step back and 
question the assumed consensus between international and local players about what 
ICTs are and how they should be used. Woredanet and Schoolnet provided a 
challenging test to the prevalent belief that developing countries are willing to pursue 
the path indicated by international organizations, but simply lack the resources and 
the capacity to do it properly. Rather, they suggested that profound discrepancies 
exist between interpretations of the same artefacts emerging internationally and 
locally, and that these differences can lead to processes of substantial re-shaping, 
even in a developing country such as Ethiopia that heavily relies on international
* 991assistance, primarily from donor countries in the West.
This thesis has examined the reasons and the consequences of these 
discrepancies. It has employed a conceptual framework combining insights from 
different forms of constructivism, especially from the international relations and the 
history of technology traditions, to analyze what led to magnifying certain aspects of 
ICTs, while marginalizing others (see Chapters 2 and 8). It has developed methods 
that facilitate the integration of discourses emerging from interviews with individuals
221 According to the OECD, in 2008 Ethiopia was the first recipient of donor assistance in Africa. The 
amount of aid has almost doubled in recent years, shifting from USD 1,809 million in 2004 to USD 
3,327 million in 2008 (OECD, 2009).
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who defined the path of ICTs in Ethiopia with observations of how the technical 
artefacts were actually implemented (see Chapter 3). These conceptual and 
methodological tools have helped reconstruct how the centralization of power in the 
hand of the state and the determination of the ruling party to enforce an ambitious 
national plan on the ground motivated the re-interpretation, re-definition and re­
shaping of the new technologies (see Chapters 4 and 5). Other agents, such as the 
private sector and the civil society, that were identified both in the policy and in 
academic discourses as potentially instrumental in the promotion of the use of ICTs 
for development, were actively constrained in their faculty of defining an Ethiopian 
way of applying ICTs (see Chapter 4).
This evidence suggests that governments in developing countries may have a 
greater motivation and capacity to adapt technology to their own needs and political 
projects than usually assumed by international actors defining a global ICT agenda 
(see Chapter 1 and 2). This was exemplified by the national technopolitical regime 
incorporating the discourses on the nation, society and communication articulated by 
the Ethiopian government (see Chapter 6). At the same time, the research also 
indicated how, despite the government efforts to monopolize both uses and meanings 
of the new artefacts, other applications continued to be implemented and advocated, 
crystallizing in more or less coherent alternative technopolitical regimes (see Chapter 
7). The analysis of how this competition evolved further substantiated the claim that 
new technologies are implemented as a result of complex negotiations occurring both 
at the discursive and at the material level, within and among technopolitical regimes, 
rather than as a simple transfer, making new tools available to perform functions that 
are defined internationally as the most appropriate (see Chapter 8).
The emphasis on the political aspects of the design and application of ICTs can 
arguably be considered one of this thesis’ major contributions. It helped to 
understand how power, at the local and at the international levels, as embedded in 
artefacts and exercised in social relations, influences the adoption and adaptation of 
new technologies and how ICTs are integrated in locations that are different from 
those of their invention, beyond particular normative perspectives. At the same time, 
and for the same reasons, this “political reading” could be criticized for downplaying
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other factors that are usually taken into greater account in explaining how new 
technologies are and should be used to support development.
Some critics might question the concept of selective adoption, suggesting 
instead a greater alignment between international and local readings of new 
technologies. They might argue, for example, that projects like Schoolnet and 
Woredanet represent just a variant of more traditional e-leaming and e-govemment 
projects which took the shape they did to adapt to a complex geography, to the lack 
of terrestrial infrastructure and to the low literacy rate outside of the capital. After all, 
as advocated by policy documents such as the AISI framework or the WSIS Geneva 
Declaration of Principles, these projects were designed to target mostly the rural 
population. Other critics might point out, for example, that the lack of affordable and 
reliable Internet access was not motivated by an active resistance to uses advocated 
internationally, but could be simply explained by incompetence and lack of 
resources.
While some of these explanations have not been completely ruled out and have 
been discussed, for example, in sections 6.3 and 8.1, it must be acknowledged that 
the political significance of these systems and of the resistance to alternative ones 
emerged from the interpretations advanced both by their advocates and designers and 
by their critics. Similar to what Hecht illustrated in her study of nuclear technology 
in France, many technocrats participating in the development and implementation of 
a technical system, referred to politics as a mayor variable in its shaping, without 
being primed by asking if “technology had politics”, but simply responding to 
questions investigating why and how a particular technology took the shape it did 
(Hecht, 1998). As was the case in other studies in history of technology (Allen & 
Hecht, 2001; Hughes, 1983; Weinberger, 2001), searching for insider perspectives, 
for the voices and witnesses of those who designed policies and technologies of 
national significance, led to the discovery of explanations that are usually 
downplayed by research focusing on the effects of the application of technology or 
on users’ behaviour.
The scope of this research was not ruling explanations other than politics out, 
and systems like Woredanet and Schoolnet can be described as unusual e- 
govemment and e-leaning projects without undermining the core argument emerging
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from the analysis of the data. This research sought to accord adequate attention to a 
dimension that is usually overlooked and which, if incorporated in wider frameworks 
used to study ICT for development, can greatly enrich the understanding of how new 
technologies concretely operate in different developing contexts. Some of the tools 
that can be adopted to incorporate this perspective are discussed in the next sections 
of this concluding chapter. Their illustration is complemented by an overview of 
other contributions that the study of the adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia offer to larger 
international debates in the areas that have been explored by my research. More 
specifically, I address why this research has deeper resonance beyond the single case 
study and offer insight into some of the complex changes that ICTs are facilitating in 
the developing world, but often remain overlooked. Section 9.1 stresses the 
importance of bringing the analysis of unique systems such as Woredanet and 
Schoolnet to the attention of the academic community and highlights potential new 
paths for research. Section 9.2 focuses on the theoretical and methodological 
contributions of this research. It illustrates how it fits into the scholarship on the 
politics of modem Ethiopia. It also suggests how international relations and the 
history of technology traditions can benefit from some of the tools developed to 
study the selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia. Section 9.3 discusses the ways in 
which the concepts and tools developed to study the evolution of ICTs in Ethiopia 
can be extended and applied beyond the single case study.
9.1 Broader implications
Despite the uniqueness of Woredanet and Schoolnet and the productive 
challenges they offer to understanding ICT applications in developing countries, at 
the time of writing no major studies have addressed these cases, exploring their
999causes and implications. This thesis represents the first attempt to analyze the two
222 There have been MA theses on Schoolnet (Takeuchi, 2008) and on e-govemment in Africa making 
references to Woredanet (Kitaw, 2006). There have also been reports commissioned from consultancy 
firms by the Ethiopian government (Daedan, 2004) or by other players involved in the implementation 
of Woredanet and Schoolnet (Asefa, 2006). The two systems have been mentioned in conference
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systems comprehensively, together with the alternatives that emerged in relation to 
them. In addition, the detailed descriptions offered in the previous chapters can 
provide scholars from different disciplines the opportunity to approach the data from 
complementary viewpoints and to identify phenomena that have the potential to 
inspire new research projects. Political scientists, for example, could further explore 
the political repercussions of Woredanet and Schoolnet, focusing on the influence the 
two systems have exercised on the local and national elections in 2008 and 2010 
when the ruling party obtained two landslide victories. This could be contrasted with 
the contested election in 2005 that took place less than a year after the two systems 
started operating. Education researchers could assess the consequences Schoolnet 
has had for the learning process as well as the evolution of the responses students 
developed towards the system which, as briefly reported in section 6.2.2, shifted 
from an initial resistance to a subsequent appreciation.
Researching Woredanet and Schoolnet, and the technopolitical regimes that 
tried to patch, complement and oppose them, responded to the need to engage more 
deeply with emerging assemblages of ICTs and local politics and cultures, even 
when they contradict widespread assumptions of what technology could and should 
do. This research has resisted the prevalent tendency to label uses of the kind 
promoted by the Ethiopian government simply as problematic or as the ordinary 
expression of an authoritarian regime, ignoring deeper meanings and implications.
Understanding the complexities of the selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia is 
rather urgent. With almost 80 million citizens, Ethiopia is the second most populous 
country in Africa after Nigeria and its population is growing rapidly. The Ethiopian 
government argues that Woredanet and Schoolnet are central to improving
papers, policy documents and reports, but without addressing the specificity of their set-up and of the 
functions they were set to perform (Asefa, 2006; Haque, 2004). However, at the time of writing, there 
are no major published works on Woredanet and Schoolnet.
223 This is a potentially exciting comparative study. Some of the data collected during my field 
research suggest that these systems have complemented the governments party mobilization of 
advanced elements as well as the encouragement for teachers and students to join party groups similar 
to the Soviet Unions’ “Young Pioneers”. Clearly identifying the role of Woredanet and Schoolnet in 
this mass mobilization campaign and the elections would be a dramatic study in technology for 
political capture.
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development and stability. This argument must not be taken lightly. In addition to 
being ill-equipped to handle the current massive population growth, the Ethiopian 
government continues to face several armed insurgencies threatening the central 
state. The Ogaden Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front, both of which 
were active during the civil war, continue to this day. And there have been 
additional insurgencies even in Tigray, the EPRDF’s stronghold. In addition, 
Ethiopia is conspicuously bordered by fragile states and states that are heavily 
engaged in armed conflict, including Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea. Disregarding the 
uses of ICTs promoted and restrained by the Ethiopian government and their possible 
implications for development, service provision, or political stability because they 
are too eccentric to be captured by the frameworks commonly employed to measure 
the diffusion of the new technologies would be a mistake.
As argued throughout this thesis, in order to address this challenge and to 
understand why and how ICTs took the shape they did -  the central research question 
in this study -  I relied on an open framework that did not start from assumptions 
about how ICTs should be used and which effects they should produce. This 
approach allowed local discourses to emerge and become guides for analysis. It also 
entailed some costs and trade offs.
On some occasions, the discussion of the analysis of the data risked appearing 
to defend a political elite that has been governing for almost twenty years and has 
offered little opportunity for a fair political competition while simultaneously 
constraining civic and political rights. Rather than justifying their rule, the analysis 
of the data was contextually dependent on the fact that some of the transformations 
brought by the enforcement of discourses such as ethnic federalism and revolutionary 
democracy could not be assessed outside the framework created by those very 
discourses. As a consequence, the focus was often on the services Ethiopians in rural 
areas were provided with or the attempts by the government to promote a greater 
sense of communal belonging among different ethnic groups. Similarly, the need to 
understand rather than to normatively assess or compare the uses of ICTs that 
emerged in Ethiopia highlighted the importance of analyzing political ideology. In 
the case of Ethiopia, the investigation of what informed the design of a national 
technopolitical regime, and the resistance to alternative ones, led to the recognition
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of discourses on the nation, society and communication. These are significant in 
Ethiopia but the same discourses might not be as useful for understanding the 
appropriation of ICTs in other countries. However, while applying discourses such as 
ethnic federalism or empiricism may not be a relevant strategy for researchers 
investigating the adoption of ICTs in other countries, the research design and 
analytical process this thesis employed offer an example of how complex patchworks 
of technology and politics can be addressed and analyzed “in their own terms”. The 
research design that led to the identification of more specific factors, including the 
focus on political ideology, could be productively employed beyond the Ethiopian 
case, to detect emerging processes of resistance and appropriation.
9.2 Theoretical and methodological contributions
Among the different academic traditions the study of systems such as 
Woredanet and Schoolnet, as well as of the alternatives that emerged in relation to 
them, could be approached, could draw from, the particular standpoint I adopted 
allowed me to contribute to the debate among ICT for development scholars and 
practitioners. The pillars of this contribution were discussed throughout the thesis, 
and most systematically, in Chapter 8. The conflictual nature of ICTs, as both 
material and discursive, as well as concepts such as technopolitics and 
technopolitical regimes represented important complements to the study of ICTs for 
development, by allowing researchers to critically address the negotiations that 
surround the implementation of ICTs in developing countries.
At the same time, the academic literature I referred to and the conceptual 
framework I developed that combined scholarship from international relations and 
the history of technology, enabled me to produce new insights and to propose new 
research tools for other disciplines. These empirical and theoretical contributions 
have been illustrated in different parts of this thesis and are addressed systematically 
in this section by focusing on how this research fits into the scholarship on the 
politics of modem Ethiopia. I then turn to some of the most significant contributions 
to the international relations and history of technology traditions.
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In Chapter 5 I referred to various studies addressing the transition of Ethiopia 
from the military rule of the Derg to a new political phase dominated by the EPRDF, 
(Aalen, 2002; Assefa & Tegegne, 2007; Gudina, 2003; Ottaway, 2003; Pausewang et 
al., 2002; Stremlau, 2008; Tegegne, 1998; Turton, 2006; Young, 1997). This body of 
literature shed light on how discourses such as ethnic federalism or revolutionary 
democracy informed the policies and practices of the new rulers, on the 
contradictions they created and on the strategies that were elaborated to face 
emerging challenges. These complex phenomena have been concisely captured by 
Bahru Zewde, the Ethiopian historian, when he noted:
This is the paradox the current government created: it is a m inority government 
and it needs to justify  with an ideology like ethnic federalism its staying in 
power. They need to decentralize to support their ideology but also to exert a 
central control to make sure they can stay in power.224
Re-framing Ethiopia as a federation of ethnicities rather than as a unitary and 
homogeneous state required the government to embark on a complex process of 
decentralization and the building of new institutions. Greater power and 
responsibilities had to be devolved to the local level, guaranteeing, or at least 
offering the impression of guaranteeing, the major ethnic groups representation and 
self-rule. At the same time, the government had to make sure that the greater rights 
the local institutions were entitled to would be exercised without challenging the 
authority and primacy of the centre over the periphery. Over the years, different 
strategies were adopted to address this challenge. Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 
(2002) explored how the EPRDF created a de facto single party system by founding 
dependent ethnically based parties and ensuring that these would be able to win 
majorities in both local and parliamentary elections. Assefa and Tegegne (2007) 
showed how the close control exercised by central government over financial 
resources in practice denied local administrations the capacity to define their own 
priority spending. Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003) identified additional measures such 
as the use of the federal security forces to control unstable peripheral zones and the
224 Interview: Bahru Zewde (Historian)
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provision of a wide range of training and courses to universalize the philosophy of 
the EPRDF.
My study has extended some of these arguments, unveiling aspects of the 
EPRDF’s political strategy as concretely embedded in technical artefacts. For 
example, the analysis of the videoconferencing typology that was privileged over 
others for Woredanet demonstrated how the peripherical nodes, despite being 
provided better resources, were kept dependent on the central authority to make use 
of the new system. Similarly, the marginalization of the Internet exemplified the 
resistance towards a genuine empowerment of peripherical institutions which 
practically were denied the possibility of autonomously seeking resources to respond 
to demands emerging locally. Through Schoolnet, and in particular through 
broadcasting lessons in civic and ethical education, a sense of common belonging 
was promoted among students, while simultaneously affirming the principles of 
ethnic federalism. By analyzing these and similar features as embedded in the 
national technopolitical regime promoted by the Ethiopian government, the paradox 
illustrated above by Bahru can be appreciated even more clearly. Regions and 
woredas were provided with better resources and new possibilities to access training 
and to learn about best practices. However, this always occurred within a framework 
that allowed the centre to assert its presence and primacy.
The characteristics of the national technopolitical regime mentioned above, 
together with others that have been elaborated in the previous chapters, such as the 
emphasis placed on implementing Woredanet and Schoolnet simultaneously in all 
regions and woredas, are illustrative of another important, and related, aspect of the 
selective adoption of ICTs in Ethiopia: how new technologies have been, and can be, 
embraced as tools for nation building. The research design I adopted was not 
intended to study the interactions between technology and nation building per se, but, 
as was explained throughout the thesis, and more specifically in Chapters 5, 6 and 8, 
these interactions emerged as significant from the engagement with the data collected 
in the field. Their analysis helped to answer the main research question of why and 
how ICTs were re-interpreted, re-defined and re-shaped in Ethiopia. It also offered
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original insights to scholarship investigating processes of nation and state building 
per se, in different respects.
It indicated how the national technopolitical regime implemented by the 
Ethiopian government was meant not simply to be a vehicle for messages about the 
new form of the nation, but also to serve as a symbol of some of the core aspects of 
the new national discourse. Schoolnet was to be used to teach the principles of ethnic 
federalism to secondary students, and Woredanet to make sure that local politicians 
and administrators could hear how the national project should be implemented from 
the very mouth of the Prime Minister. At the same time, the systems themselves, 
their presence among local communities in Ethiopia, were serving as signifiers of the 
discourses they were mediating. As explained in Chapter 5 and 6, the equal provision 
of resources along ethnic lines was also aimed at reinforcing, among Ethiopians, the 
perception that it was in their interest to articulate their demands as part of distinctive 
ethnic groups. It was through ICTs, as communication channels, that the government 
made sure its messages could reach different typologies of citizens. And it was with 
ICTs, as symbols of the presence of a modem state in the peripheries, that it signalled 
a particular vision of society, based on ethnic diversity and rooted in rural 
communities.
The negotiation of a new national identity did not happen through ICTs 
exclusively. It was part of a wider strategy, as explained in section 5.1. Local 
languages were accorded greater visibility and importance (see section 5.1.1). New 
institutions were created to facilitate local representation, and to signal the new role 
ethnicity had to play in Ethiopian politics (see section 5.1.2). The issue of nations 
and nationalities was placed at the core of the discourses promoted by state owned 
media (see section 5.1.1). The use of ICTs, however, was particularly indicative of 
the selective nature of the EPRDF’s national project, of the ambition its leadership 
had to reach national hegemony without seeking the consensus of important 
components of the Ethiopian society, such as the urban elites, the supporters of the 
previous regime and other political organizations that refused ethnic politics as the 
organizing principle of the state (see sections 5.3 and 5.4). Woredanet and Schoolnet 
could reach wide audiences and be used by government figures in a more secretive 
way than other media, such as television or radio. Because Woredanet allowed
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routine communication only between nodes of the state, it was primarily used by 
public figures at the centre to reach peripheral nodes, while minimizing the capacity 
of the latter to access information independently. Schoolnet ensured that the new 
generations were exposed to messages defined at the centre and it allowed EPRDF 
cadres to reach wider constituencies when needed. In a context where the boundaries 
between party and state had almost disappeared, the use of these new channels 
provided the central power with a strong competitive advantage over oppositional 
forces and prevented it from engaging with them.
As the government was enlarging its political control, reinforcing its apparatus 
on the ground as well as multiplying its communication channels through Woredanet 
and Schoolnet, the restrictions imposed on other media, as illustrated in section 7.3, 
were meant to prevent alternative discourses on the nation and on society to reach 
Ethiopian citizens. Therefore, ICTs, rather than opening new spaces for debate and 
confrontation, as had been the case for many developing countries, were largely 
applied to boost the capacity of a central authority to reach the most remote comers 
of the state. While critical information coming from outside Ethiopia had to fight 
hard to reach its intended destination, through Internet filters and slow and expensive 
connections, the Prime Minister had the chance to address his citizens and 
subordinates using a fast and private lane, wherever and whenever he wanted.
In essence, to enforce and defend a specific national project, the Ethiopian 
government had created two systems operating at different speeds: the first was a 
unique type of fast, state-owned, Intranet diffused throughout the whole territory; the 
second was a slow and partially censored network, that could allow users to access 
the Internet and other services almost exclusively in the urban centres and for a cost 
that could not be afforded by the large majority of the population.
In turning now to the contribution of this thesis to international relations 
scholarship, I suggest that the value of this research lies in investigating how 
discourses and norms articulated at the international level propagate and influence 
domestic practices. As illustrated in section 2.4, different scholars have focused on 
various actors intervening in this process including international organizations 
(Finnemore, 1996), NGOs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), epistemic communities (Haas,
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1992), and local institutions (Checkel, 1997; Sikkink, 1991). There has also been a 
focus on different phases in the life of discourses, from their origin (Adler, 1992), to 
the mechanisms that preside over their dissemination (Finnemore, 1996; Strang & 
Meyer, 1993), to how they fit into specific cultural and political environments 
(Checkel, 1997; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 2006; Magnusson, 2002; Risse- 
Kappen, 1995b; Sikkink, 1991).
Within this range, the analysis of how ICTs have been selectively adopted in 
Ethiopia offers new insights into processes of local appropriation, and the resistance 
and recombination of discourses articulated internationally. To date most of the 
research in the international relations field addressing this final moment has 
theorized the mechanisms leading to constructing a match between international 
norms and local contexts as significant (Checkel, 1999; Finnemore, 1996), but it has 
provided few concrete examples. Those scholars who have engaged with case studies 
have largely focused on the reasons that motivated a successful or unsuccessful 
socialization of local actors to new discourses, asking fewer questions about how 
these discourses could be reworked in practice, rather than being either accepted or 
rejected (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995b).
In contrast, by focusing on how technologies with an international relevance 
such as ICTs were appropriated in Ethiopia, the research presented in this thesis has 
addressed some of the complexities that characterize the concrete interactions 
between international and local discourses and the processes that can lead to their 
possible hybridization. It showed, in general, that analyzing discourses as embedded 
in technical artefacts may allow the researcher to better understand which aspects of 
those discourses are magnified, which ones are marginalized, and how they integrate 
in more or less coherent ways.
An artefact may enable users to perform specific actions, but it may also 
preclude other types of actions at the same time. When the analysis of both the 
material and discursive aspects of that artefact highlights assocations between some 
of its functions, as well as their descriptions, and specific discourses, it becomes 
possible to “read” the complex patchwork of discourses, as locally and 
internationally grounded, it refers to. This analysis arguably becomes even more 
meaningful when it is applied not at the level of single artefacts, but of large
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technical systems, linking technical objects to other social, economical and political 
factors, analyzing them as part of the seamless web described by Hughes and 
connecting the technical and the social (see section 2.3).
Various examples of how this analytical process can work in practice have 
been provided throughout this thesis. Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated the particular ways 
in which the capacity of accessing the Internet was constrained, as well as 
highlighted the costs, both at the technical and at the financial level, incurred to 
enable the central government to communicate with the nodes of the ethnic 
federation was enhanced.
More generally, and beyond ICTs, this research further confirmed how the 
study of technical artefacts as part of large technical systems can be appreciated as a 
way to understand the politics of a nation, or a group within a nation, as suggested 
Allen and Hecht (Allen & Hecht, 2001). In some cases analysing the features of a 
large technical system offers a picture that is more accurate than the one emerging 
from the examination of laws and policies. This can be especially true in developing 
countries, when it is often the case that laws and policies are created for donors’ 
consumption and are seldom enforced. In research investigating how supposedly 
global discourses are received and implemented locally, large technical systems 
analysis represents one of the entry points to appreciate some important features 
characterizing a specific location. These systems can be interpreted as texts which 
are representative of the discourses embraced by the individuals and groups who 
assembled them and can return valuable insights on the politics and culture of the 
society they are a part of.
In turning to the history of technology tradition, the contribution offered to this 
area of study mirrors the contribution to the international relations field. Above I 
illustrated how the investigation of the interactions between international and local 
was enriched by grounding it in the study of large technical systems. I now discuss 
how the understanding of the ways in which some of these systems originated and 
evolved was enhanced by locating them in an international context. I also 
demonstrate how this might be extended to other cases.
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There is a large body of literature in history of technology tradition that has 
adopted an international and comparative perspective. Some of this work has 
investigated how large technical systems centred on the “same” technology have 
evolved differently in distinct national contexts. For example, Hughes’ research on 
electrification spanned cases from the United States to England and Germany 
(Hughes, 1983), while Hecht’s reconstruction of the French nuclear program drew 
comparisons with the American and the British programs. These works, however, 
mostly located the drive for the appropriation and shaping of a particular technology 
in local governments and companies. They would, for example, indicate how a 
technology was demanded in a particular state and how it could then be adapted to 
take on specific traits of the political, social and economic environment that 
characterized it.
On the contrary, as the case of the re-shaping of ICTs in Ethiopia illustrated, 
together with other research, such as Finnemore’s study of UNESCO’s promotion of 
science bureaucracies (Finnemore, 1993) or Keck and Sikkink’s analysis of activists 
networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), in some cases innovations may be supplied to 
states rather then being sought out by them. In these cases technologies are likely to 
come as part of a package, together with prescriptions about how they should be used 
and what political or development goals they should help to achieve. As the analysis 
of the Ethiopian national technopolitical regime and of the resistance to its 
alternatives indicate, this does not necessarily mean that the package is accepted. 
However, it does suggest that to understand the evolution of a specific technical 
system it may be important to take into account how it emerged as part of a 
negotiation with relevant international players, and how a state resisted certain 
influences while adapting, and possibly adopting, some prescriptions.
Finally, the methodology that has been developed and employed in this thesis 
(as outlined in Chapter 3) employs a set of tools that can be applied to detect and 
understand the conflict that may emerge around ICTs in developing countries. It can 
also help to examine the implications this may have for the appropriation and use of 
the new technologies. These tools converge around two core practices. First, the 
identification of technopolitical regimes as privileged units of analysis. Second, the
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engagement in a process of iterative comparison between conceptualizations held by 
individuals who shaped the path of ICTs in the country, and observations of how the 
technical artefacts actually took shape.
When investigating how ICTs are employed in a specific context, the concept 
of technopolitical regimes, as well as the closely related concept of large technical 
systems, encourage the researcher to move beyond the isolated artefacts or 
assemblages and explore them in connection with non-technical elements, such as 
institutions, ideologies, and cultural habits. They help to counter the determinism that 
characterizes a large share of the ICT for development discourse, while promoting 
the investigation of processes of mutual influence among the technical, the social and 
the political.
Grounded in the history of technology tradition, the notion of technopolitical 
regimes encourages researchers to locate new technologies in the longer-term path of 
adoption and adaptations that has been traced by older technologies. It also stresses 
the importance of being attentive to how the discourses identified as significant have 
emerged and evolved in the history of the country. As the analysis of various ICT- 
based technopolitical regimes in Ethiopia made clear, some of the puzzles these 
systems presented could be solved by referring to discourses that emerged at the time 
of the civil war in the 1970s and 1980s or to competing hegemonic projects that had 
been battling for decades, as indicated in Chapter 5 and 7. These examples suggest 
that the ICT for development literature discussed in Chapter 2 could benefit from 
integrating some of the tools used by historians. This would help to overcome the 
prejudice and assumptions that the ‘newness’ of new technologies somehow excuse 
researchers from investigating how these technologies can be captured in the 
networks of discourses and power characterizing specific national contexts.
The toolkit available for ICT for development scholars could also be enriched 
by another method that was used in this thesis and has resonance beyond the 
Ethiopian case. Combining insights from grounded theory and from the history of 
technology tradition encouraged novel ways of engaging with discursive and 
material aspects of ICTs. This approach adopts a cyclical process that progressively 
reconstructs both the motifs and the resources that have led to the emergence of 
specific technopolitical regimes, and to the marginalization of other ones, as it was
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discussed most extensively in Chapters 6 and 7. It is based on understanding, through 
the collection of interviews, oral histories, and other textual material, how ICTs were 
conceived by stakeholders who became involved, at various stages, in the shaping of 
different technopolitical regimes. It also focuses on how these conceptions found 
concrete applications in technical artefacts. This moving “back and forth” between 
the technical and the discursive is essential if the conflictual nature of technological 
appropriation as well as the specific distribution of power characterizing the context 
under scrutiny are to be captured and explained.
9.3 Beyond Ethiopia
One of the most important lessons that can be drawn from the analysis of the 
Ethiopian case suggests that if researchers are overly concerned with detecting and 
evaluating normative processes of technological diffusion and appropriation, the 
reality of the complex role ICTs are playing in developing countries may be 
obscured. The research presented in this thesis has stressed the need for new lenses 
and new frameworks to understand the transformations that are taking place in an 
increasingly complex and multi-polar world. These changes are not limited to ICTs, 
nor to Ethiopia alone. Wang Shaoguang, for example, a Chinese scholar who has 
been working both in American and in Chinese universities, advanced a similar 
argument when reflecting on how the scholarship in the West characterizes Chinese 
politics. He argues that,
The analytical fram ework o f  authoritarianism from the W est is completely 
unable to capture these deep changes in Chinese politics. In the past several 
decades, this label has been casually put on China from the late Qing era to the 
early years o f  the Republic, the era o f warlords, Jiang Jieshi, M ao Zedong,
D eng X iaoping and Jiang Zemin. Chinese politics has made world-shaking 
changes during this period, but the label put on it m ade no change at all. (W ang 
Shaoguang in (Leonard, 2008, p. 76)
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Such categories can easily obscure more complex and nuanced processes. The 
risk is that, if efforts are not made to explore and understand emerging phenomena in 
their particular contexts, misunderstandings may turn into greater divides. 
Alternative models will continue to emerge and thrive without researchers or policy 
makers giving them their deserved attention. The national technopolitical regime 
developed by the Ethiopian government cannot be simply considered a temporary 
outcome of a transition that will eventually lead to more “appropriate” uses of ICTs, 
or to variations that the current democracy or freedom indexes will be able to 
measure. Systems like Woredanet and Schoolnet are enormous investments on the 
part of a poor country with significant implications for the lives of their citizens.
This evidence provided in this research may help international development 
practitioners and scholars to re-evaluate the capacity for developing countries to 
adapt technology to their own needs and political projects. This research has also 
proposed a set of tools that can be employed to study and understand the alternative 
models that are emerging in developing countries, with the ambition that they will be 
integrated in wider frameworks to capture new aspects of the contribution of ICTs to 
development.
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Appendix: Example of topic guide
This represents only an example of some of themes that were covered in a “typical” 
interview. Because of the variety of interviewees and the particular interview 
techniques used (see section 3.2.1), apart from some common threads, each interview 
was different and focused on particular events each informant participated or 
witnessed to.
Woredanet
- When did you first hear about Woredanet?
- What was your first reaction?
- Which purpose do you think Woredanet 
serves the most?
ICTs in Ethiopia
- What have been the most important driving 
forces in making ICTs what they are in 
Ethiopia?
- Has the situation changed over time?
Background
- Place of birth
- Education
- Profession (How what you do now relates 
to what you did before?)
Most significant uses and projects
- What do you think are the most significant 
uses of ICTs in the country?
- Is there a particular Ethiopian way to ICTs?
ICTs for development discourse
- When did you first associate ICTs and 
development?
- Who/what was the most influential in 
shaping your vision of ICTs?
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The civil war / transition
- Did you participate to the struggle against 
the Derg regime?
- Has what you learned then influenced your 
ideas and actions today?
Schoolnet
- Why do you think ICT for education in 
Ethiopia took this particular shape?
- Do you think it has been influenced by 
earlier uses of technologies for education?
Resistance to ICTs
- Do you think there are uses of ICTs that 
have been resisted in the country? Why?
- What do you think Ethiopian citizens think 
about this?
Summary
How would you define the road taken by 
Ethiopia in relation to ICTs? Which factors 
do you think played the most important role 
in making ICTs what they are today?
The larger context
- How do you think ICTs fits in the larger 
context of Ethiopian politics?
- Is there any relationship with ideas 
emerged at the time of the civil war?
Other projects
- Are there other significant uses of ICTs in 
Ethiopia?
- Do they have any relationship with projects 
such as Schoolnet and Woredanet?
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